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Part I: Introduction
1. Introduction
Empirical work is an important pillar of academic research in finance. On the one hand, it
provides a way to verify and test the validity of theoretical models while, on the other hand,
it informs theory of novel developments and changes observed in the markets. As such, the
empirical work is in constant exchange with the theoretical progress.
The work of the empirical guild is to a large part driven by the availability of data, as
many theoretical predictions are only testable if the appropriate data are being collected and
made available. The technological progress in recent decades alleviated the collection of data
and, equally important, provided empirical researchers with tools to work with ever growing
datasets. This mounting availability of more and new data is therefore also a chance for
empirical researchers to reconsider earlier, well-appreciated theoretical work. At the same
time, empiricists have put considerable effort into advancing the applied methodology to
thoroughly verify causalities predicted by the theoretical models. The increasing method-
ological rigor as well as the growing universe of data have allowed the empirical research to
steadily progress and provide valuable insights to policy makers as well as practitioners.
This thesis presents three empirical research papers that have a firm’s shareholders as a
common denominator. Shareholders play an important role in the economy. They provide
funds for firms and take a share of the business risk upon them. By the second quarter of
2012, the value of all equities traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) amounted
to USD 13.3 trillion.1 This compares to a total of debt outstanding by firms in the US of
USD 8.47 trillion in the same period.2 The important position of the shareholder within
the firm confronts him with various conflicts of interest that involve other stakeholders. The
most important frictions concerning shareholders have been outlined in the seminal work of
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
1Reported by the World Federation of Exchanges.
2Reported by the Securities Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA).
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The most widely discussed conflict in this context is certainly the agency problem between
shareholders and managers. In general, shareholders of firms that become big enough to be
listed on a stock market delegate the operative management to hired managers and set up
a board of directors as a supervisory authority. In this setting, shareholders will commonly
limit the exertion of their power to the votes at the annual meeting of the firm. While
this structure has generally worked well in the past, there have always been cases where
the system of checks and balances between shareholder, management and the board has
broken down, or at least been impaired (e.g. Enron, Lehman Brothers, etc.). The catalyst
was, more often than not, related to compensation packages (and thus incentives) granted
to management and endorsed by the board. The public discontent over some of these pay
practices has become large enough to attract the attention of policy makers eventually. As
a result, they have started to design laws that shift more power towards shareholders. The
analysis and development of such regulation is a very topical and ongoing endeavor.
Shareholders are the ultimate owner of the firm and as such generally coin the firm
according to their visions and believes. While they usually delegate the operative control,
they retain the power to decide over the most influential resolutions for the firm going forward
(for example, the approval of large mergers and acquisitions). At the same time, they have
the control to assign board seats and thus broadly influence the future of the firm in terms
of corporate culture and risk taking. Hence, the impact that shareholders have on the risk of
a firm relative to the market, as measured for example by the equity beta, is a controversial
one in the literature. While theoretical work, mostly in the field of asset pricing, is critical
of such an impact, the empirical analysis has come up with some evidence in favor of this
idea.
However, shareholders not only determine their own risk, but are also responsible for
how other important stakeholders in the firm, for example bondholders, fare. Contrary to
shareholders, bondholders provide capital to the firm without having any direct say, but
with a risk that is markedly lower than that of shareholders. The different liabilities of
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the investor attached to these two kind of financing give rise to the debt agency problem.
Because shareholders have a limited downside potential in their investment (i.e. the share
price can only drop to zero), but an unlimited upside potential, they generally are in favor
of increasing the risk of a firm (risk shifting). Bondholders, on the other hand, commit their
money to the firm over the medium to long term and, in the simplest case, set a bond’s future
payoff profile at issuance. Any increase in risk thereafter, which is generally supported by
shareholders, does impair the value of the bondholder’s investment. While the theoretical
framework for this agency has been established, the empirical evidence considering debt is
still limited.
The goal of the academic research on the firm, on its owners and on other stakeholders is
to understand where problems that distort an efficient functioning of this structure may occur
and how they can be solved or at least be moderated. Findings of this research inform policy
makers as well as investors. This thesis takes a closer look at the three above mentioned
domains of shareholders and intends to contribute to the current level of empirical research
by providing a rigorous methodological and data-specific analysis. I am very grateful to Per
O¨stberg and Alexander Wagner for their great guidance and support as well as their critical
and helpful comments which were of great value to advance my own thinking as well as
all three research papers. During the process of developing ideas and writing, I have also
profited, and am very thankful, from valuable discussions and remarks by, among others,
Kjell Nyborg and Ru¨diger Fahlenbrach.
2. Summary of Research Results
This thesis consists of three separate research papers. In this section, I briefly summarize
the projects and provide a short summary of the findings.
The first research paper, titled Agency versus Hold-up: On the Impact of Binding Say-
on-Pay on Shareholder Value, is joint work with Alexander Wagner. We consider the relation
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between shareholder power and shareholder value by analyzing a particular event in the Swiss
legislative process, namely the successful completion of a public referendum known as “Anti-
Rip-Off-Initiative” (“Initiative gegen die Abzockerei”). This particular initiative concerns
all listed companies domiciled in Switzerland and contains different provision that would
considerably strengthen the power of shareholders, especially on the issue of management
compensation. Specifically, the key demand of the initiative is a compulsory annual binding
vote on total compensation (sum of fixed and variable pay). The board of directors proposes
a compensation package for each body, which then needs to be approved by the general
assembly for the year to come. Anything that the board wishes to pay on top of that,
during or after the year, for example as a result of an extraordinary change in the business
environment during the year, has to be endorsed by the general assembly ex post.
Overall, for the 100 largest firms listed in Switzerland, the event led to a negative and
significant abnormal announcement return of 1.88% over a three day window. This compares
to an insignificant reaction of -0.03% for an industry and size matched sample of German
firms which were unaffected by the initiative. Further analysis was conducted by considering
the cross-sectional variation in reaction to this event. The particular design of the initative,
together with the fact that it is one of the rare binding say-on-pay provisions, leads to two
hypotheses.
First, the distinctive way in which shareholders gain additional power could hold up firm
specific investments by other stakeholders, in this case management, because they expect to
not receive the full return on any extra effort provided. Consistent with this hold-up hypoth-
esis, we find that firms where specific investments by the CEO are particularly important,
for example firms with younger CEOs, with CEO’s of a shorter tenure or in industries where
contracting is more difficult because of higher cash flow uncertainty, reacted more negatively
to the event. This finding is consistent with predictions from earlier theoretical literature
by Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997). To our best knowledge, this is the first paper to
provide empirical evidence that increased shareholder power can lead to a hold-up problem
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and thus be costly for shareholders. This cost is an important issue, especially in the process
of crafting regulatory rules on shareholder power.
Second, the increase in shareholder power is widely conceived as improving the alignment
between shareholders and management. This is for example shown in work by Becker,
Bergstresser, and Subramanian (2012) and Cohn, Gillan, and Hartzell (2011), who find that
developments towards increased proxy access for shareholders resulted in positive stock price
reactions for firms where shareholders are more likely to take advantage of that access. The
reduction in agency costs through better alignment should especially add value to firms
that are currently poorly aligned. This conjecture also finds support in our data as, for
example, firms that have underperformed size- and risk-adjusted benchmarks in the past,
fare relatively better in terms of abnormal returns than outperforming companies. A closely
related research paper by Cai and Walkling (2011) assesses the reaction to a law provision
in the US, requiring advisory say-on-pay. They find neutral to slightly positive reactions for
firms that currently have a poor alignment of shareholder and management interests.
This research extends the current literature by highlighting an important trade-off be-
tween hold-up costs and alignment benefits when shareholder power is increased. The find-
ings inform the current policy discussion on how to design shareholder rights laws.
Evidence of Excess Comovement in US Mergers is the second research paper which is
joint work with Per O¨stberg. In this paper, we provide evidence of stock market segmentation
by studying US mergers. According to the classical asset pricing theory, the return required
by investors in a frictionless market depends on the comovement of a firm’s assets with the
market only. However, Froot and Dabora (1999) and Chan, Hameed, and Ting Lau (2003)
provide empirical evidence that in an international context, frictions exist and lead to market
segmentation. They show that the comovement with the market changes significantly if firms
change their listing location.
A significant change in comovement as a result of cross-boarder mergers is found by
Brealey, Cooper, and Kaplanis (2010). They show that the comovement with the exchange
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of the acquiring firm increases in cross-border mergers. Our paper adds to this literature
by documenting the existence of within-border segmentation. Moreover, Pirinsky and Wang
(2006) document that when firms move their headquarters, they increase their comovement
with an index of local firms. In contrast, we use mergers to document the existence of within
index segmentation as opposed to across index segmentation.
To test for market segmentation, we use mergers as a means of identification. Target
shareholders who tender their stake in the merger will no longer be part of the merged
firm’s shareholder base and hence not contribute to the merged firm’s comovement anymore.
If comovement is determined not only by a firm’s assets, but also by its shareholders, we
should observe a shift in the comovement of the merged towards the acquiring firm. The
segmentation hypothesis predicts that the shift towards the acquirer’s comovement is greater
when more target shareholders exit. Therefore, cash mergers, where shareholder exit is
particularly pronounced, should result in especially large shifts in comovement.
We measure this shift towards the acquirer, the excess comovement, by comparing the
equity beta of an expected ex ante market-value weighted merged firm with the observed
equity beta of the merged firm ex post.
In the overall sample, we find that, when the ex-ante acquirer beta is higher than the
target beta, the comovement of the post-merger firm is 8.26 percent higher than the ex-ante
expected comovement. For deals that are paid in cash only, and hence lead to the largest
exit of target shareholders, the ex-post comovement is 20.65 percent higher than the ex-
ante expectation. In contrast, stock mergers, which will not lead to a direct exit of target
shareholders, show no effect at all. We find similar results for sample splits along other
characteristics that are likely to reveal a variation in the change of the shareholder base. For
example, if the merger leads to the inclusion of the target in the S&P 500, and hence part
of a new investor’s habitat, we find a greater shift towards the acquirer’s comovement.
The evidence provided in this paper is aimed to inform researchers and practitioners
alike of an important market friction that has so far not been documented on the essential
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national, within-index level. The evidence that segmentation is to a certain extent a result
of a firm’s investor base has important implications for the assessment of risk in terms of
beta. Particular consideration has to be given to the analysis of situations in which a large
share of the investor base changes.
The third project, Default Risk and Bondholder Wealth in US Mergers takes yet an-
other look at how shareholders influence other stakeholders within a firm. In particular, it
documents the effect of a merger announcement, which ultimately has to be approved by
shareholders, on the default risk of debt. The latter is measured by credit default swap
(CDS) spreads. The close link between CDS spreads and bond value allows, furthermore, to
not only consider abnormal changes in default risk to the announcement, but also to put a
price tag, in terms of value created or destroyed, on the deals.
Previous literature in this field has provided ambiguous results on how merger announce-
ments effect debtholders. The most comprehensive study on this topic is by Billett, King, and
Mauer (2004). They find that bond prices of target firms react positively and significantly
to merger announcements. This suggests a reduction in risk. Acquiring bonds, on the other
hand, show a negative price reaction which implies an increase in risk that is, however, very
small. The issue with this strand of literature is the comparably low trading frequency and
the relatively low degree of standardization of bonds. This impairs the power of the usual
test statistics considerably, as it is shown, for example, by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell,
and Xu (2009). The use of CDS spreads increases the power of the statistical analysis, as
trading is more frequent in this instrument. Moreover, the close link between CDS spreads
and debt value further allows to measure the economic effect of the merger announcement.
This is in contrast to related work by Furfine and Rosen (2011) who document an increase
in the probability to default within the next year by, on average, 93.6 percent as a result of a
merger. They measure changes in default with the KMV default score and thereby overcome
the standardization issue of the previous literature, yet cannot comment on the economic
impact of their findings.
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In my sample of merger announcements by US acquirer’s, I find that the acquirer’s debt
default risk increases in two thirds of the considered deals. The average cumulated abnormal
spread change in the three day window around the announcement is +4.95 percent for acquir-
ing firms. This is significantly different from the model prediction of a non-positive effect. I
therefore analyze the cross-sectional variation in abnormal reactions to the announcement.
Building upon a widely used asset pricing framework by Merton (1974) and linking it to a
CDS pricing model, I derive predictions on the changes in default risk.
In the data I find evidence that the abnormal increase in CDS spreads is particularly
large and significant for mergers that are done within the same industry, where cash flow
diversification possibilities are comparably small. In contrast, transactions across industries,
which can profit from this cash flow co-insurance effect, only show an insignificant change in
abnormal CDS spreads.
The size of the insurance provided by CDS in single firms also helps to explain the
abnormal change in default risk. Mergers in which the outstanding CDS cover an above
median share of the acquirer’s debt outstanding increase default risk significantly more on
average. These results suggest that ‘empty creditors’, i.e. bondholders that are insured
against default, seem to also matter in the context of mergers.
Moreover, the risk does not seem to be driven by the ex-ante differences between target
and acquirer characteristics, but rather by how a deal is structured, i.e. by how acquirer
characteristics change as a result of the merger. For example, it is not the fact that the target
has a higher leverage ratio than the acquirer that drives the increase in CDS spreads, but
rather the circumstance that the deal leads to an increase in the acquirer’s level of leverage.
Interestingly, the impact of mergers on bondholder wealth is rather moderate, with an
average loss of USD 17.3 million. What is striking, however, is the comparable change in
wealth of current CDS investors. On average, outstanding CDS contracts gain USD 656
million in gross value as a result of the merger announcement.
This paper provides novel evidence on how the default risk of debt changes as a result of
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a merger announcement and what this means in terms of wealth for debt and CDS investors.
It extends the relatively scarce and ambiguous academic knowledge in this particular field
and informs practitioners, especially bond investors, on a potentially conflicting issue.
Summing up, I hope that the results presented in this thesis help to extend the current
research frontier and foster our understanding in the three domains of shareholders I pointed
out. Equally important, in my opinion, is the ambition to contribute not only to research
per se, but also inform and be of added value to practitioners and regulators.
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Part II: Research Papers
Agency versus Hold-up:
On the Impact of Binding Say-on-Pay on Shareholder Value∗
Alexander F. Wagner† Christoph Wenk‡
January 13, 2013
Abstract
A policy experiment in Switzerland sheds light on the hitherto theoretical concept that
shareholders may prefer to have limits on their own power. The empirical evidence
suggests a trade-off: On the one hand, binding say-on-pay provides shareholders with
an enhanced ability to ensure alignment. On the other hand, the prospective law
under consideration would give shareholders an ability to partially set pay ex post
which may distort ex ante managerial incentives for extra-contractual, firm-specific
investments. Thus, shareholder power reduces agency costs, but accentuates hold-up
problems. These findings inform the design of policy.
∗This research was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, the NCCR FINRISK, the Swiss
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of Zurich. We thank PricewaterhouseCoopers (especially Robert Kuipers and Remo Schmid) for providing
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Uncertain Times in Lugano, the Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research in Zurich, the
Campus for Finance Conference, the SFI Annual Conference, and to Mike Burkart, Jay Cai, Denis Gromb,
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of the implications of the say-on-pay initiative, and to Thomas Minder for a conversation about the demands
of his say-on-pay initiative.
†Swiss Finance Institute - University of Zurich and CEPR. Mailing address: Department of Banking and
Finance, University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland, Phone: +41-44-634-3963,
Email: alexander.wagner@bf.uzh.ch.
‡Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, Email: christoph.wenk@bf.uzh.ch.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we assess the stock market reaction to the unexpected announcement of a
prospective change in Swiss law that would considerably increase the power of shareholders
by subjecting executive and board compensation to a binding shareholder vote. 70% of
Swiss public corporations responded with negative abnormal stock returns to this natural
experiment, an at first surprising result: Many shareholders seem to dislike the additional
power they would obtain. Closer inspection reveals that the cross-sectional variation of
shareholders reactions reflects the benefits and costs of binding say-on-pay in their respective
companies. While the widely discussed alignment benefits can explain part of the stock
price reactions, we provide novel evidence that shareholders also worry significantly about
the distortion of executives’ extra-contractual incentives that comes, as we show, with the
design features of the initiative. Our central finding is, therefore, that shareholders tend to
face a trade-off between agency and hold-up when it comes to the role of shareholder power
in shareholder value creation. Regulation needs to take this trade-off into account.
Understanding the advantages and disadvantages of shareholder power is not only a long-
standing academic question, but also an issue of significant policy relevance. Several recent
proposals in the U.S. and elsewhere consider enhancing the power of shareholders. Among
these, the question of how (and if at all) to design say-on-pay regulation is particularly
topical. In the U.S., a first proposal by Representative Barney Frank to provide shareholders
with an advisory vote on executive compensation passed the House in 2007. While it was
never picked up by the Senate, a similar proposal later became part of the “Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” of 2010. As a result thereof, the SEC adopted
a rule in January 2011 that requires an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation
at least once every three years. However, proposals for binding say-on-pay rules have also
been brought forward, and proposals to further strengthen shareholder power are likely to
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keep appearing.1 In Europe, the European Commission has been issuing recommendations
in connection with directors’ remuneration ever since 2004 (see European Commission (2010)
for a review). In December 2012, the European Commission (2012) announced that it will
propose a guideline for say-on-pay in member countries in 2013.2 A large number of countries
is considering or has implemented a (partially) binding say-on-pay rule.3
A recent natural experiment in Switzerland provides an opportunity to investigate how
shareholders perceive the benefits and costs of a particular law, designed to provide them with
a binding say-on-pay. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, it became public that more than
100’000 Swiss voters had signed the“Anti-Rip-Off-Initiative”(“Fat-Cat-Initiative,”“Initiative
gegen die Abzockerei”), a law proposal whose central element is the introduction of binding
say-on-pay for shareholders of all publicly traded firms. This meant that the proposed bill
was set for a popular vote with obligatory adjustments to the Swiss constitution in case of
a positive outcome.
To obtain insights into the channels through which an increase in shareholder power
may transmit to shareholder value, we investigate cross-sectional differences in the reactions
of firms, linking them to the extent to which firms benefit from (or are hurt by) binding
say-on-pay. We test two main hypotheses in this respect.
First, our primary focus is on a channel that has, for lack of appropriate data and settings,
received little empirical attention so far, but that has long been proposed in the theoretical
literature on optimal shareholder rights and managerial discretion (see in particular Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi (1997); Blair and Stout (1999), and Stout (2003)): When shareholders
have more power, other stakeholders who make specific investments in the firm are more likely
1For example, the Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval Act (May 2009) would have required a 60%
shareholder approval if an executive received more than 100 times the average salary within a firm.
2The report of the European Commission (2011) also specifically raises the question if the remuneration
policy and report should be subject to a mandatory shareholders’ vote, whether advisory or binding.
3For example, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Latvia, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden have introduced laws on say-on-pay with partially binding elements.
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to fear that shareholders “hold them up.” Shareholders recognize that ultimately their own
“piece of the pie” will be smaller when such specific investments are not made. In the present
case, as we will make clear, the new regulation leads to situations in which shareholders
vote on bonuses for management effort and performance in the elapsed year. More generally,
contracting becomes more complicated and uncertain. If CEOs expect that they will not
receive the full returns on their firm-specific investments, their ex-ante incentives to engage
in such efforts are diminished.4 This issue is not only of theoretical relevance, but also of
a high significance to practitioners. In a recent interview, Dennis Nally, head of the global
consulting firm PwC, warns that many firms in Switzerland are very concerned about the
initiative, exactly because the previously described hold-up problem will make it hard to find
skilled managers.5 Hypothesis 1 , therefore, states that the value impact of binding say-on-
pay is more negative in firms where specific investments by CEOs are more difficult or more
important to secure.
Second, say-on-pay may better align shareholder and manager interests and improve
governance and performance. Allowing shareholders to have a say in executive pay may help
to reduce the agency costs between executives, directors and shareholders, resulting in more
efficient compensation contracts and thus add value to the firm. To avoid the embarrassment
of a low approval vote on executive compensation, management may be more willing to start
dialogues with shareholders and listen to their concerns. Hypothesis 2, therefore, states that
the value impact of binding say-on-pay is more positive in firms where alignment is currently
poor. This channel partially features in existing work on advisory say-on-pay; we extend the
existing literature by conducting the first study of implications of binding say-on-pay and by
4This is true even if ex-post renegotiation is costless and efficient; see Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990) for seminal work on the hold-up problem. If renegotiation leads to disappointment
and psychological costs ex post, this has additional distortionary implications (Hart and Moore, 2008).
5NZZ am Sonntag, November 11, 2012. This concern is shared by the trade association SwissHoldings,
who warn in a recent newspaper article that the initiative’s demands considerably harm the competitiveness
of the Swiss economy as new talent will be hard to recruit (Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, November 13, 2012).
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considering a broad range of proxies for alignment benefits.
We study the announcement effects of the Anti-Rip-Off-Initiative.6 Importantly, the
announcement that enough public support in favor of the initiative was gathered to enforce
a national vote came suddenly and was hardly predictable. This setting is exceptional,
especially compared to the standard parliamentary vote situation where the date of the vote
as well as the distribution of power in favor or against the issue is usually known in advance.
Moreover, the Swiss stock market is highly liquid, allowing information to be reflected in
market prices efficiently. Despite some caveats, which we discuss in the text, we believe
that the announcement of the initiative overall provides a particularly clean experiment to
identify the causal impact of binding say-on-pay and to test the two hypotheses.
Evaluating the stock market reactions to this event, we find that 70% of firms reacted
abnormally negatively. In the three days around the event, the average cumulative abnormal
return among the largest 100 firms is a highly statistically significantly negative 1.88%. For a
sample of matched firms from the German market, which was unaffected by the initiative, we
find an abnormal return of -0.10% (-0.03%) for a sample of CDAX firms matched according
to stock return correlation (industry-size match). In both cases, the reaction of the German
firms was statistically indistinguishable from zero.
While it is easy to think of factors that affect all firms and that therefore play a role for
the general level of the reaction,7 our primary interest is with the cross-sectional variation
in reactions of Swiss corporations. As a novelty in the empirical literature on shareholder
rights legislation, we consider various tests of the idea that enhancing shareholder power may
6 The analysis of the value effects of regulatory changes confronts the researcher with difficult issues.
It may take a long time for the costs and benefits of a regulatory change to materialize, and the actual
changes in firm policies may be difficult to observe for the researcher. However, given rationality in the
marketplace, the effect of an event will be immediately reflected in asset prices, an insight that has been
used in many studies of the effects of regulation since Schwert (1981). With proxies capturing the variation in
potential benefits and costs of the new regulation for companies, one can then also test hypotheses regarding
differential effects of the regulation on firms even without observing actually changing firm policies.
7For example, shareholders may have a general aversion against changing rules of the game.
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worsen hold-up problems and distort firm-specific investment incentives of CEOs (Hypothesis
1 ). These problems are likely to be particularly accentuated in firms where CEOs have
opportunities and incentives to invest in general human capital and thus improve their outside
options or where a high volatility in the line of business makes contracting difficult in general.
While there is no obvious direct measure of the intensity of the hold-up problem, we propose
three (largely uncorrelated) groups of proxies: First, shareholders of firms that use only cash
bonuses – which would be subject to an ex-post shareholder vote8, – may especially worry
about a distortion of the ex ante incentives for executives. Second, shareholders of firms with
younger CEOs and those with CEOs of a shorter tenure at the respective firm are likely to
worry more that CEOs will have diminished incentives to make firm-specific investments;
these CEOs would be more inclined to improve or exercise their outside options. Third,
shareholders of firms with higher uncertainty concerning their annual sales or costs will find
it more difficult to contract with management efficiently as more contingencies would have
to be planned for, which is difficult under the new regime. Supporting the prediction of
Hypothesis 1, we find that stock price declines were more pronounced in these three groups
of firms.9
Hypothesis 2, regarding the alignment benefits of binding say-on-pay, also receives sup-
port. Firms which outperformed size- or risk-based benchmarks in the past experienced
particularly substantial abnormal stock price drops, while poor performers reacted relatively
more positively. Also, the stock prices of firms that paid their CEOs amounts close to the
estimated normal salary tended to drop the most during the event, whereas firms where
abnormal executive pay was either highly positive or negative only moved slightly.
Importantly, we also find that the portfolios which we compare (for example, firms with
young CEOs vs. those with older CEOs, or those high performance vs. those with low
8For example, when the board wishes to reward extraordinary performance in the previous year.
9Other theoretical models predicting limits on optimal shareholder control include Allen, Carletti, and
Marquez (2009) and Cohn and Rajan (2012). We discuss later the extent to which the evidence can be
partially explained by these models.
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performance) exhibited parallel trends in abnormal returns before the event, emphasizing its
causal impact.
Moreover, while the initiative also contains some other provisions related to corporate
governance, we document that none of them offers significant explanatory power for the
cross-section of firm reactions. This is consistent with the fact that the public discussion and
media coverage of the initiative almost exclusively concerned its say-on-pay content.
1.1. Contribution to the literature
This paper contributes to the literature on the empirical effects of shareholder power on
shareholder value. In the context of say-on-pay, Cai and Walkling (2011) first recognized
the potential of evaluating shareholder reactions to say-on-pay using an event study. They
find neutral to slightly positive stock market effects of advisory say-on-pay, with positive
outcomes in firms that paid their CEOs large excess compensation.10 In the more general
literature on shareholder power, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) document negative
market reactions to legal developments that suggest higher probabilities of governance and
executive pay regulation. By contrast, Becker, Bergstresser, and Subramanian (2012) and
Cohn, Gillan, and Hartzell (2011) find that developments suggesting a possible increased
proxy access for shareholders in the future resulted in positive stock price reactions for firms
where shareholders were more likely to take advantage of that access. Cun˜at, Gine, and
Guadalupe (2012) establish that when shareholders choose to adopt a provision that shifts
power to them, this causes a positive shareholder value effect; this effect is stronger, for
example, in firms with more antitakeover provisions. While these contributions are the most
closely related to out work, we are well aware of the much broader focus of the literature on
10In a laboratory experiment, Go¨x, Imhof, and Kunz (2010) show that while advisory say-on-pay votes do
not distort investment decisions, binding rules do so and may thus impair shareholder value.
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shareholder power.11
Our analysis adds to this existing work by offering a combination of several features:
First, we consider jointly a broad range of factors that explain stock price reactions. The
main innovation is that we document that shareholders appear to consider a trade-off: They
welcome binding say-on-pay because it helps them reign in agency costs, but they also
anticipate hold-up problems when they have too much power. This confirms a prediction
that so far has only been documented theoretically. Second, this paper focuses on the so
far only qualitatively assessed binding say-on-pay, as a policy alternative to advisory say-
on-pay. This offers us an opportunity to consider Hypothesis 1, and provides a sharper
test of Hypothesis 2 as alignment benefits are likely to appear more distinctly in this more
stringent regime. Third, the analysis uses a particularly clean event. The announcement
of the initiative’s success is surprising, and the evidence on parallel trends in subsamples
of interest before the event provides additional support for a causal interpretation of our
findings.
2. Legislative setting and the binding say-on-pay initiative
To provide a better understanding of the setting in which the event study is conducted, we
first describe the political environment that surrounds it. Second, we describe the major
demands of the binding say-on-pay initiative.
11For work covering various aspects of say-on-pay see, e.g., Bainbridge (2008); Bebchuk and Fried (2004);
Davis (2007); Deane (2007); Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011); Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2012); Ertimur,
Ferri, and Stubben (2010); Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006); Grundfest (1993); Lo (2003);
Thomas and Cotter (2007), and Thomas, Palmiter, and Cotter (2012). Conyon and Sadler (2009) and Ferri
and Maber (2012) look at the impact of legislation on executive pay and shareholder activism outside the
U.S. On shareholder activism more generally see Gillan and Starks (2000) and Gillan and Starks (2007).
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2.1. The Swiss legislation process
The Swiss political system knows two common ways of enacting new laws (see Klo¨ti, Knoepfel,
Kriesi, Linder, Papadopoulos, and Sciarini (2007) for a more detailed summary of the Swiss
system). One way is through a consensus decision between parliament and senate. The
second way is through the public itself, by means of an initiative which can be started by
every Swiss citizen. Switzerland has a lively tradition of direct democracy (see, for example,
Frey (1994)). If an initiative receives the backing of at least 100’000 Swiss citizens (about 2%
of the electorate of around 5’000’000) within 18 months, it must be put on the agenda for a
national vote. In case the public vote supports the initiative, it will turn into an amendment
to the Swiss constitution. The fraction of public initiatives that eventually pass the popular
vote has been increasing in recent years.
2.2. Content and design features of the initiative
We consider the so-called “Initiative gegen die Abzockerei” (“Anti-Rip-Off-Initiative,”“Fat-
Cat-Initiative”). This initiative was launched by entrepreneur Mr. Thomas Minder. Accord-
ing to the initiative’s text, it is proposed “to protect the economy, private property and the
shareholders,” making it a reasonably well suited event to study shareholder reactions to it.
On February 26, 2008, the announcement was made that the threshold of 100’000 signatures
in favor of the initiative had been collected. (We discuss the media coverage below.) Unlike
many initiatives that are rather a general call for action to parliament and senate than orig-
inal proposals to turn into law, the present initiative had a clear program that it aimed at
turning into legislation. It offered a specific text to be adopted as law, discussed below. The
fact that the initiative only represents a step toward a possible law implies that by studying
stock market reactions to the initiative we likely underestimate the true economic impact it
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would have upon enactment.12
The initiative affects all public Swiss limited liability companies. It requires a binding
annual vote on total compensation (the sum of all pay components, such as fixed and variable
pay) for each of three groups: the board of directors (BOD), the executive board (EB) as
well as the advisory council. It is important to understand the particular design of the
planned total compensation vote. The shareholders vote ex ante on the total amount of the
different compensation packages of each body, as proposed by the firm’s BOD. Furthermore,
and critically, they have the right to vote ex post on all compensation that is supposed to be
paid in excess of what has been approved at the previous general assembly. This latter point
creates a link to the structure of compensation. For example, in a typical case shareholders
may approve an equity plan as a part of base pay (where the amount approved is determined
according to some valuation model) and a cash bonus pool for management for the coming
year that covers the payout at target performance. For the equity plan, no extra vote will be
necessary in the following year; the value of equity may simply go up or down. To the extent
that the BOD wishes to hand out bonuses covered by this bonus pool, no additional vote is
necessary ex post either. However, at the end of the year, if the BOD wishes to grant higher
bonuses for the elapsed year – for example, because it perceives that senior management has
made particularly successful efforts during the year – the difference needs to be approved by
shareholders ex post. The initiative, therefore, is as much about pay levels as it is about the
pay structure.13
Moreover, contracts with new management would be conditional on their pay packages be-
ing approved at the next general assembly, with obviously high uncertainty for management
12On February 26, 2008, the probability of the initiative passing into law quickly was seen as substantial
and serious enough to catch the attention of the stock market participants. Subsequent political discussions
have delayed a vote on the initiative (much like it took more than three years for the 2007 U.S. House Say-
on-Pay Bill to find its way into law in the form of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010). The vote on the initiative
is scheduled to take place in March 2013.
13This design distinguishes the initiative from other proposals that call for a one-size fits all cap on
compensation or a restriction on the ratio senior management compensation to salaries of average employees.
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and the board. (One interpretation of the initiative is that if the incoming management’s
compensation package is similar to the leaving manager’s package, the previously approved
package may be used for the incoming management as well.)
In case shareholders do not accept any compensation proposal at the annual meeting,
management has to schedule a new assembly to vote on a revised proposal; this is an arguably
very expensive outcome that hurts the company’s reputation. To avoid the latter, a firm’s
board has to ensure ex ante that its proposals will be supported by a majority of shareholders.
This tight interaction with shareholders is a resource-consuming, ongoing process.
Moreover, the initiative closes all known loopholes to keep remuneration proposals from
annual votes. For example, it prohibits companies to delegate a firm’s management to a
foreign company.
While the public discussion and media coverage of the initiative almost exclusively con-
cerned its say-on-pay content, we note that the initiative also contains some other provisions.
Our setting provides an opportunity to test whether the market reacted to these provisions.
Specifically, performance-related pay to the BOD and the EB as well as other benefits (loans,
pension benefits, etc.) need to be set in the firm’s articles of association and can only be
altered through a vote of the general assembly. The initiative also prohibits any kind of
termination pay or advance payments to the BOD or EB. Other requirements pertain to
the election modes of the BOD and the compensation committee. As we will see, the cross-
sectional variation in market reactions is not explained by these elements.
The full text of the initiative can be found in Supplementary Appendix A.
3. Empirical strategy and data
3.1. Event study
We follow standard practices (Kolari and Pynno¨nen, 2010; Kothari and Warner, 2007; MacKin-
lay, 1997). Based on the event described in the Section 3.2, we define an event window that
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spans ±1 day around the event-day. For the length of the estimation-window, we choose the
well-established duration of 250 trading days ending two days before the event.
To calculate abnormal returns (AR), we apply the commonly used market model:14
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + i,t. (1)
The difference between the effectively observed return (Ri,t) and the predicted normal return
(R̂i,t), estimated by using Equation (1) is the abnormal return, and cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) are the sum of the abnormal returns in the event window. In Equation (1),
Ri,t is the risk-free rate adjusted return of company i on day t (ri,t− rf,t), i,t is a zero-mean
disturbance term and αi a stock specific constant. We also need to choose Rm,t, the daily
risk-free adjusted return of the market at date t. For the main analysis, we follow the most
widely used approach in event studies, using a national market index, the Swiss Performance
Index (SPI). Thus, βi is the sensitivity measure of stock i to movements of the SPI.
15 We
alternatively take the view of a globally integrated market and conduct our analysis using
the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market Index as the market return. All our results hold
(both qualitatively and quantitatively) when assessed with a global benchmark.
When comparing mean CARs of portfolios formed according to relevant characteristics of
interest, for the main presentation, we use the resulting CAR-variance to draw interference.16
We also employ an adjustment to the Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) test statistic,
14In short-run event studies, the gains from employing multifactor models for event studies are limited.
See, for example, the discussion in MacKinlay (1997), p. 18.
15The analysis for the sample of comparable German firms was conducted likewise. Normal returns were
calculated based on the CDAX index.
16When testing the impact of legislative events on a cross-section of companies, event-time clustering (a
common event window for companies) can potentially complicate inference because it implies a violation of
the assumption of independence of abnormal returns in the cross-section of analyzed firms (Bernard, 1987).
However, even for our basic testing procedure, this problem is typically much attenuated in studies like
ours that use very short event windows in connection with daily return data (see, for example, Kothari and
Warner (2007)).
28
proposed by Kolari and Pynno¨nen (2010).17 By taking into account the average sample cross-
correlation of abnormal returns in the test-specific variance, they show that their adjusted
test statistic not only stays robust in case of an event-induced variance increase, but also to
event-time clustering.18 (For details, see Supplementary Appendix B.)
Finally, we further follow proposals by Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari
and Pynno¨nen (2010) and complement the parametric tests mentioned above with a non-
parametric test, in our case the generalized sign test (Corrado and Zivney, 1992). The
generalized version of the sign test was calibrated according to the binomial distribution
of positive and negative abnormal returns, during the estimation window, of the portfolio
of stocks under consideration. Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) show that this test
generally performs better compared to parametric tests as it does not rely on assumptions
regarding correlations (and is, as such, free from the clustering issue), yet has a drawback in
case the event induced variance change is large. Since the variance increase in our sample
is only 30% instead of the doubling assumed in their test environment, we believe that the
generalized sign test is a reliable complement to the parametric tests.
3.2. The event and its coverage in the media
In every event study, it is important to carefully examine and define the date at which the
event to be analyzed took place. We conducted a national keyword-search in the news-
database of LexisNexis for the time period of July 2006 to March 2010, the timeline during
17Both test statistics account for event-time clustering by using scaled cumulative abnormal returns
(SCARs), as suggested by Patell (1976). Scaled abnormal returns reduce noise by weighting abnormal
returns by the inverse of their standard deviation and hence make it more likely to detect the true statistical
significance of the data. The test proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) not only takes into
account event induced variance changes, but also has better properties vis-a-vis the standard test to deal
with event time clustering.
18As with all test-statistics based on SCARs, the authors point out that it is important to only consider
SCARs to detect statistical significance of abnormal returns, but to rely on standard CARs for the interpre-
tation of economic effects. Hence, when comparing the difference in reaction between various portfolios, we
rely on the measures of basic CARs.
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which the initiative has been developing.
The main results of this search are collected in Table 1, and we discuss them briefly here.
The initiative was initially mentioned in the first week of August 2006, officially verified in
mid-October 2006, and the collection of signatures started on the last day of October 2006.
As these first three steps all carried a lot of uncertainty about the outcome and implication of
the initiative, it seems very unlikely that they had a significant impact on the stock market.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The event we focus on in this paper, on February 26, 2008, was the announcement that the
threshold of 100’000 signatures in favor of the initiative had been collected. This event was
hardly predictable for market participants since there was no publicly available signatures
count.
The news were released shortly before mid-day and communicated widely through various
channels, i.e., radio, television, news networks, etc. The coverage was further extended on
the following day by the print media.
According to Swiss press sources, the announcement was chosen to be released right before
the reporting season of the largest Swiss corporations started. By doing so, the promoter
of the initiative, Mr. Minder, aimed at increasing the pressure on companies to voluntarily
introduce advisory votes. This is another indication that the news release was new to the
market, as this strategy could not have had the hoped-for impact otherwise.19
The news were to some extent also picked up internationally; for example, after having
posted the announcement by the Swiss News Agency (SDA) in German in the early afternoon,
Bloomberg further reported on the initiative’s success in the late afternoon in English under
the heading “Swiss May Vote to Expand Shareholder Rights Over Executive Pay.”
19In a newspaper article seven months prior to the submission of the signatures, Mr. Minder told the press
that he had not anticipated that collecting 100’000 signatures would be so difficult. Moreover, he stated that
the following months of the collection period will be very difficult (newspaper Blick, June 23, 2007).
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In sum, these facts make the present event an attractive one from a methodological point
of view. Nonetheless, we emphasize two factors that are important for the interpretation of
the analysis. First, although Bloomberg’s coverage suggests that international investors are
likely to have been informed about the event, media coverage in Switzerland was much more
pronounced than internationally. For example, we note that the Factiva database (which
does not cover Bloomberg) does not show additional news coverage in U.S. media on the
event date. We address this factor in Section 4.1 and argue that if anything this introduces
a bias against finding a significant market reaction.
Second, while we are primarily interested in the cross-sectional variation in abnormal
returns on the event day, it is still of interest to know whether other events may have
influenced the general mood in the markets around the announcement. One related event
concerns the bank UBS. On February 26, 2008 a Swiss government official told the press that
he believes UBS would not need government support to overcome the crisis. A day later, UBS
held a special shareholder meeting at which a raise in equity capital was agreed. Another
possibly relevant event took place on February 24, 2008, when a corporate tax reform (the
“Unternehmenssteuerreform II ”) was accepted in a referendum by the Swiss electorate. We
address these two events in Section 5.4.
Particular events that potentially impact single firms specifically (e.g., earnings announce-
ments), were controlled for separately.20
Overall, we expect that any statistically significant abnormal return in the event window
can be attributed to the initiative.
20For the estimation-window, we also searched for news in connection to the initiative that may potentially
lead to a biased event window return estimator. For our event, we could not identify significant news content
that was directly connected to the legislation. We comment on one possible confounding event in the
robustness section.
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3.3. Data
Our initial sample covers all the companies listed in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI),
the index of the overall Swiss market, during the event window. For the main analysis, we
focus on the one hundred largest companies. Information is more quickly reflected in stock
prices for large firms (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Hou and Moskowitz, 2005; Peng, 2005)
and data more widely available. However, our results largely also hold in the full sample
of 225 stocks. Some additional results we find in the expanded sample are reported in the
robustness section.
To calculate firm-level stock returns, we use daily closing prices of the SPI constituent
companies from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database.21 We screen the data following
the recommendations of Ince and Porter (2006).
The free-float adjusted market value (Market Capitalization in what follows), the total
market value of the SPI companies,22 other price data for the Swiss Performance Index (which
we used to calculate the market return), trading volume, sales volume, cost of goods sold
(COGS), the SPI size-segment indices (each SPI stock is assigned to either the small-size,
medium-size, or large-size stock index), and the long-term Swiss government bond rate (a
proxy for the risk-free interest rate) are also collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
Abnormal Trading Volume is the difference between trading volume in the event window and
the median trading volume of the respective firm in the previous year, taken as a percentage
of the the median trading volume of the respective firm in the previous year. Sales Volatility
(COGS Volatility) measures the standard deviation of a firm’s sales (COGS) during the
window of 2002 - 2007 and scales it by the average annual sales (for both variables) of
the company during the same period. The scaling is necessary to account for the overall
21For the abnormal return calculation of the matched sample of German firms, we also use firm-level
stock returns for the CDAX constituents as well as the CDAX index from the Thomson Reuters Datastream
database. From the same source we obtain industry classification used for matching.
22In four cases where free-float adjusted market value was not available, we used total market value instead.
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size of the firm. Return data for the SPI size-segment subindices are used to obtain each
stock’s size-index adjusted one-year performance (Relative Performance). Furthermore, we
use weekly stock returns to calculate a risk adjusted performance measure, CAPM Alpha.
CAPM Alpha is the residual from a one-year predicted return, based on a two year, quarterly
rolling CAPM model return estimate, and the observed annual stock return.
Data on the firm’s Leverage, measured as total debt to total assets, a CEO’s Tenure at
the current firm, and the CEO Age are obtained from Bloomberg.
Compensation data for 2007 is from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) for the largest 48
companies and expanded to the full sample by hand-collection.23 Companies also document
the Cash Incentives, which is the portion of variable compensation conveyed in cash (and
not in equity). The data also cover Other Payments, the largest component of which are
payments towards pension plans.
In the spirit of Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), we calculate abnormal compensation
as difference between total compensation paid and remuneration granted by the average
comparable firm (Abnormal CEO Compensation and Abnormal Board Compensation). The
parameters for the prediction of normal compensation are estimated separately for CEOs
and board members to account for their different status inside the firm with respect to
remuneration. For CEOs, the prediction of the normal wage is based on the log of market
capitalization, ln(MCap), and on the one year, size-index adjusted firm performance, with a
further control for executive turnover, Months, the number of months an executive worked
in the firm during 2007, as well as Dual, a binary indicator stating whether the CEO holds
23Most companies provide company reports in the period January - March of the following year. As such,
at the end of February 2008, strictly speaking, information on compensation in all companies in 2007 may
not yet have been publicly available. Reliable compensation data for 2006 is not available for Switzerland,
however. The Transparency Act requiring firms to disclose compensation data came into force only in 2007.
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the position as chairman of the board at the same time:24
ln(Comp)i = β0 + β1ln(MCap)i + β2Relative Performancei + β3Monthsi + β4Duali + i. (2)
Based on the coefficient estimate from Equation (2), we predict total normal compensa-
tion for each executive. Abnormal compensation is then defined as the gap between predicted
normal and effectively paid compensation. To construct the portfolios used in Table 4, indi-
vidual abnormal compensation is aggregated by firm.
We also hand-collect, from firms’ annual reports, the fraction of Management Sharehold-
ings in the firm, whether a firm has a Staggered Board, which election procedure of board
members a company employs (Single Election vs. in-corpore vote), whether a CEO has a
severance agreement (CEO Severance Agreement), an agreement regarding termination ben-
efits in case of a change of control (CEO Change-of-Control Clause) or a notice period that
exceeds 12 months (CEO Long Notice Period). The variable Largest Shareholder captures
the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder. The binary indicator variable
Company Event is equal to one if a firm communicated its 2007 figures to the media within
five days around the event window.
The summary statistics for all variables of interest are collected in Table 2. Due to the
sometimes limited availability of certain data, the working sample is smaller for some parts
of the analysis. Correlations for the most important variables are in Table 3. We note that
the correlations of the variables of interest in the sample are overall very low.
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
24The analysis was also conducted with further controls, such as industry fixed effects or leverage of the
firm. Including these and other further variables did not improve the precision of the estimates which is
why we include only the variables with the most explanatory power. For board members, we use the same
approach but control for the number of members on the board, Board Size, instead of Dual.
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4. Results
4.1. Reactions in Switzerland
An overview of the distribution of the individual three-day cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) for the full sample is provided in Figure 1. 70% of CARs were negative. As shown
at the top of Table 4, the equal-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the Swiss Performance Index
(SPI) showed an average abnormal return of -1.49%. The average CAR of the largest 100
stocks, on which our cross-sectional analysis focuses, was -1.88%. These average abnormal
returns are highly statistically significant. The same pattern, both in terms of the cross-
sectional variation and the overall average, also holds when using the Dow Jones Global
Total Stock Market Index as the market portfolio. Here, the equal-weighted average CAR
for the largest 100 stocks was -1.49%.25 The effects are large, especially taking into account
that the successful initiative alone does not guarantee that the proposal will ultimately pass
the referendum and become law.26
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
We noted earlier that the news on the initiative were predominantly spread in Switzerland.
As previous literature has shown, the smaller a company, the more likely it is to have its
investors in close proximity.27 Thus, we expect investors of the relatively smaller firms to have
been more exposed to the news regarding the initiative and hence to be the most responsive.
If anything, therefore, including the largest companies in the sample is likely to bias the
results against finding an effect of the initiative. The robustness analysis confirms that our
25It is a pure coincidence that this average is similar, up to two decimals, to the average abnormal return
of the 225 SPI stocks stated above.
26The event-day abnormal return of -0.28% is of a similar size as the daily abnormal returns of -0.24%
to 0.7% found in Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011). The three-day CAR in our study is considerably
larger than the three-day CAR of 0.25% found in Cai and Walkling (2011).
27No direct evidence of this hypothesis is available for Switzerland, but it holds powerfully in the U.S.
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), and there is no reason to suspect this relationship to be different in Switzerland.
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results hold strongly when excluding the largest 20 firms, for example, thus restricting the
analysis to the sample of firms whose marginal investor is likely to be situated in Switzerland.
It is important to note that the reported reactions do not reflect the overall market
reaction; they represent equal-weighted abnormal returns. (Naturally, and less interestingly,
the value-weighted average is essentially zero.)
4.2. Reactions of a comparables German sample
Importantly, we compare the effect of the announcement on Swiss firms with the reaction
observed in a sample of matched firms from Germany.28 Overall, the average abnormal
returns in Switzerland are strikingly different from those of the matched German sample.
Specifically, we constructed two different portfolios of matched firms from the German CDAX
index. The first portfolio matches the firms along the correlation of their daily stock returns
during the estimation window. For each Swiss firm, we pick the German company with the
highest correlated return. For the second portfolio, we match the firms along the criteria
of industry (primary) and market value of equity (secondary). Figure 2, which plots the
development of the cumulative abnormal return around the event date, displays the difference
in reaction of the Swiss and the matched German portfolios. In Switzerland, on each of the
three relevant days (the day before the event, the event day, and the day after the event),
considerable negative abnormal returns were realized on average. In the days before and
after the event window, cumulative abnormal returns remained fairly stable. In the matched
samples of German firms, by contrast, the event had no statistically significant effect at all.
The average three-day abnormal return in Germany is -0.10% for the correlation-matched
portfolio and -0.03% for the industry-size-matched portfolio. In both cases, the event has no
statistically significant effect. Moreover, while 70% of Swiss stocks show a negative abnormal
return during the event, it is less than 50% for both matched samples of German firms.
28As the initiative covers all listed firms in Switzerland, the matched sample had to be constructed from
foreign firms.
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
4.3. Overview of the main analysis
We next turn to the main question of the paper: Do firm characteristics capturing variation in
costs (due to potential distortions in firm-specific investments) and benefits (due to improved
alignment) help explain the variation in CARs across Swiss firms? To answer this question,
we use two approaches:
(1) We compare mean CARs across portfolios formed according to these firm character-
istics. These results are presented in Table 4. This approach has the benefit that we can
make use of the maximum number of observations for each variable.
(2) We regress CARs on the firm characteristics of interest, which allows us to hold
certain important control variables constant. Baseline results for each variable of interest
are in Table 5. Table 6 contains regressions that jointly consider Hypotheses 1 and 2 and
include a larger set of control variables (which somewhat reduces the number of observations).
Fortunately, our variables of interest are not highly correlated (cf. Table 3). As such, it is
not surprising, but still reassuring, that the results we find in the portfolio analysis in Table 4
carry over to the regression results in Tables 5 and 6.
TABLES 4, 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE
Section 4.4 deals with Hypothesis 1, while Section 4.5 discusses Hypothesis 2. In Sec-
tion 4.6 we document that the various portfolios we compare – for example, those with high
and those with low expected alignment benefits – exhibit parallel trends in the time period
before the event. Finally, Section 4.7 considers the findings when testing Hypothesis 1 and
2 jointly. (Section 5.3 analyzes the potential relevance of other features of the initiative that
are unrelated to say-on-pay as well as the impact of shareholder structure.)
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4.4. Hypothesis 1 – Distortion of extra-contractual investment incentives
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Blair and Stout (1999), and Stout (2003), among
others, develop the idea that shareholders may prefer not to be too powerful because with
greater power comes a greater temptation to ex post expropriate those stakeholders that
have made firm-specific investments. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) study optimal
shareholder ownership dispersion; Blair and Stout (1999) and Stout (2003) deal with the
relationship between the board and shareholders. Although their research does not explicitly
cover the pay-setting process, their basic intuition extends to the present case.
We consider three arguments and corresponding proxies for why shareholders worry to
a different extent about their CEOs’ incentives to engage in firm-specific human capital
investments. This approach circumvents the difficulty that actually observing CEOs’ specific
investments is rarely possible. Naturally, the informativeness of the hypothesis tests depends
on the (untestable) strength of the link between the observable measures proposed and the
true variable of interest, namely, extra-contractual investments that will change once the
regulation is put in place. We aim to ameliorate this concern by studying three largely
independent arguments.
First, consider the pay structure. As explained in Section 2.2, the time-line of how execu-
tive pay will be set according to the proposed law leads to potential distortions: Compensa-
tion packages (and, in particular, potential bonus pools) are agreed upon at the beginning of
the year. If the board wishes to award extra bonuses after a year (which is especially the case
if unanticipated effort and performance by management in the elapsed year were high), a
new shareholder vote would have to be held at the next shareholder meeting. This is almost
a prototypical case of the hold-up problem: Ex post, shareholders have little incentive to
approve the awards.29 The CEO, in turn, may anticipate this problem and, therefore, not
29In particular, the shareholders’ incentives are considerably smaller than the board’s: Boards of Swiss
companies are explicitly charged to act for the benefit of the overall corporation. Also, their benefits from
expropriating management are significantly lower than those of the shareholders’.
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make the firm-specific investments that maximize firm and shareholder value. Importantly,
we expect the resulting distortions to be greatest where executives are mostly compensated
with cash bonuses. (According to the initiative, equity-plans need to be implemented in
the articles of incorporation and from then on are simply executed.) Consistent with this
prediction, Panel A.1 of Table 4 shows that the CARs were 2.5 percentage points more neg-
ative in firms that only use cash bonuses as variable compensation than in firms that use
equity-based compensation.
Second, the time horizon of the manager plays a role. Younger CEOs have a relatively
higher incentive, under binding say-on-pay rules, to invest in general rather than firm-specific
skills than older CEOs because young CEOs wish to retain their option to secure a different
position. Consistent with this argument, we find that firms with young CEOs reacted much
more negatively to the say-on-pay initiative than those with older CEOs; see Panel A.2 of
Table 4.
Relatedly, CEOs who have had a long tenure at the respective company are likely to
already have acquired substantial firm-specific knowledge. By contrast, CEOs who have
only relatively recently joined the company face the choice whether to engage in firm-specific
or general human capital investments, i.e., whether to fully contribute to their current firm’s
fortunes or whether to at least partially work on their outside options. In Panel A.3 of
Table 4 we find that shareholders of firms with CEOs in the shortest tenure quartile were
more worried about the value consequences of binding say-on-pay: in this quartile CARs
were about 1.75 percentage points lower in this quartile than in the other three quartiles,
though the difference is statistically not highly significant.
Third, where uncertainty is high, it is more difficult to contract on all possible contin-
gencies. Therefore, incompleteness of contracts becomes a major concern. The binding
say-on-pay initiative may further exacerbate the ensuing hold-up problem. In line with
this argument, Panels A.4 and A.5 of Table 4 show that stock prices of firms with higher-
than-median demand or cost uncertainty exhibited 1.7-1.8 percentage points larger abnormal
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declines than firms with lower-than-median uncertainty.
All these results are confirmed in the regression analysis, both when including the vari-
ables individually (Table 5) and when including them jointly together with other controls
(Table 6). (We comment on the analysis including alignment benefits in more detail below.)
We note that some of the findings related to our proxies for the difficulty of sustaining
firm-specific investment can also be explained by other theories. Specifically, in the model
of Cohn and Rajan (2012) reputational concerns make managers reluctant to implement
strategy changes. According to their hypothesis 1, board strength is optimally greater when
the manager is young, but is invariant to age when reputational concerns do not matter
anymore to the manager. This is consistent with the observation in Panel A.2 of Table 4.
The Cohn and Rajan (2012) model can also be interpreted to rationalize the result regarding
tenure in Panel A.3. Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2009) provide a model in which overall
firm value depends on the governance orientation of the firm (shareholder vs. stakeholder)
and the main risk a company faces (demand vs. marginal cost uncertainty). Their central
result is silent on the impact of changes in a firm’s risk on the relative attractiveness of the
two governance models. However, based on their predictions for shareholder vs. stakeholder
firms, higher demand uncertainty and higher marginal cost uncertainty imply a smaller
positive effect of a stronger shareholder value orientation in a certain parameter range. (These
calculations are available on request.) Thus, in that range, their model is consistent with
the findings in Panels A.4 and A.5 of Table 4.
Overall, it may well be that multiple forces are at work that drive the empirical facts we
observe. Nonetheless, the extra-contractual investments framework is attractive because it
provides a “brittle hypothesis:” It is a single model that makes several different predictions
that could easily be wrong. Recall also from Table 3 that the various factors for which
it correctly makes predictions are almost uncorrelated empirically (except, of course, age
and tenure, and demand and cost uncertainty, respectively). None of the three independent
predictions – regarding pay structure, time horizon of the manager, and uncertainty – is
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rejected in the data. Moreover, neither of the alternative theories discussed in the previous
paragraph predict the finding regarding the ratio of variable compensation paid in cash.
Summarizing, these considerations lead us to view the extra-contractual investments
framework as particularly useful for adding to our understanding of shareholder reactions to
enhanced shareholder power.
4.5. Hypothesis 2 – Alignment benefits
First, if management is not working in the interest of shareholders, firm-specific stock per-
formance is likely to be poor. According to the hypothesis that binding say-on-pay helps
improve alignment of managerial with shareholder interests, we should observe that firms
with poor performance in the past benefit more from say-on-pay than those with the best
performance.
In line with this prediction, the results in Panel B.1 of Table 4 display a negative rela-
tionship between the one year relative performance and the cumulative abnormal return.30
Firms that had beaten the market on average over the past year generally dropped more
than underperforming shares. As shown in Panel B.2 of Table 4, we find similar results for
the risk-adjusted performance measure (CAPM alpha). In column (6) in Table 5 and in all
regressions of Table 6, we find a strongly negative relation between past performance and
the reaction to the binding say-on-pay initiative. (The results hold for both performance
measures, but for expositional reasons are only shown for one.) These findings confirm that,
indeed, binding say-on-pay is relatively more attractive for shareholders of firms that have
30While this resembles a classical mean-reversion phenomenon, we argue that this cannot explain the
statistical significance of the cumulative abnormal return during the three day event window. First, as panel
(c) in Figure 4(c) displays, the abnormal returns for firms in both past-performance quartiles, the lowest as
well as the highest, exhibit a common trend prior to the event. Second, mean reversion is generally a gradual
process. As such, it should be reflected by the sensitivity parameter of the market model and hence not lead
to significant abnormal effects.
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performed poorly than for those that have performed well.31
Second, a central point of interest is variation in share price reactions depending on the
current pay level.32 Due to a multitude of factors determining the absolute level of com-
pensation, we focus on a standardized pay measure which is abnormal compensation. One
interpretation of this measure is that, if a company overpays or underpays its management,
it suggests poor governance.
We find that the middle 50% of firms in terms of abnormal CEO compensation on average
lost in excess of a full percentage point more than the two corner quartiles, with the corner
quartiles not showing a positive effect, see Panel B.3 in Table 4. This result, even though
economically relevant, is not statistically significant on a regular level. However, when we
control for the noise coming from firms that communicate their 2007 figures to the media
around the event (c.f. Section 5.4), the difference is statistically significant (untabulated; the
middle two quartiles drop 1.72% more than the corner quartiles, t-statistic of 1.81).
To capture the non-monotonic relationship in the regression framework, we control for
abnormal compensation with a linear and a squared term. As Tables 5 and 6 show, the point
estimates are of the expected sign, but not always significant. In untabulated regressions,
we find very similar results for abnormal board compensation.
It is interesting to note some differences to the U.S. experience. When advisory say-on-
pay became more likely to turn into law in the U.S., those firms with the highest abnormal
pay benefited substantially, while the other companies reacted relatively neutrally (Cai and
Walkling, 2011). The evidence from Switzerland instead tends to suggest that the market
perceives firms currently operating with abnormal compensation close to 0 as being poten-
tially forced to adjust to individually inefficient corporate policies under binding say-on-pay.
31This result is also consistent with an explanation based on extra-contractual investments. If performance
was high in the past, this suggests that the firm had an able CEO who made substantial firm-specific
investments. This CEO, or a successor, may be less likely to continue doing so under the new regime.
32Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu (2011) document that in the U.S. activists target firms with high CEO pay,
but voting support is high and subsequent pay changes occur only at firms with excess CEO pay.
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Third, a direct measure of alignment may also be found in the fraction of management
shareholdings. The results in Panel B.4 of Table 4 suggest that firms with very little and
very high managerial ownership fared relatively better than those with ownership that ap-
proximated the median. This (only borderline significant) result could reflect two effects:
First, firms with very low ownership benefit from better alignment, which outweighs most of
the interference costs of binding say-on-pay; second, firms with very high ownership do not
benefit much, but also have very low compliance costs because managers and shareholders
are often identical. In the regression setup, we also find some, albeit weak evidence of this
u-shaped relationship between management shareholdings and CARs.
Fourth, consider leverage. On the one hand, shareholders may benefit from having more
power in particular in firms with lower leverage because in these firms the agency costs of
free cash flow are higher. On the other hand, shareholders of companies with more leverage
may benefit more from say-on-pay because it is in these companies that shareholders have a
particular interest in participating in structuring the compensation system.33
Panel B.5 in Table 4 and column (9) in Table 5 show that CARs are more negative for
firms with low leverage. This finding suggests that the risk-taking alignment benefits are
larger than the benefits of a reduction in the agency costs of free cash flow. This effect
becomes insignificant, however, when controlling for proxies for the potential distortion of
extra-contractual investment incentives.
Overall, we conclude that shareholders perceive some alignment benefits of binding say-
on-pay.
33Specifically, in more highly levered firms, shareholders have a higher incentive to take asset risk, i.e.,
to engage in asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, it is in such companies that CEOs
may also be more reluctant to take risk because bankruptcy is very costly for a CEO in terms of reputation.
Therefore, in highly levered firms, shareholders wish to grant higher incentives to take risk (Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen, 2006). This is more easily done when shareholders have more power. From the shareholders’
point of view, the board of directors may not sufficiently take the shareholders’ preferences into account
because the board, if it is acting according to the requirements of Swiss corporate law, is acting as a steward
for the whole firm (i.e., including other stakeholders, in particular, bondholders).
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4.6. Parallel trends of CARs before the event
By considering cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns during the event window, we
have established that firms exhibited different reactions to the initiative. It is conceivable,
however, that firms already exhibited different pre-event trends. This could lead to erroneous
inferences regarding the causal effects of the event.
We examine this issue in Figure 3. We plot the daily level of cumulative abnormal
returns during a window of 20 days (four trading weeks) before and 20 days after event.
For presentational reasons, we choose two portfolio splits each for Hypothesis 1 and for
Hypothesis 2, but very similar results obtain also for the other sample splits.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
As can be seen, in all cases, cumulative abnormal returns of the two respective portfolios
(for example, the portfolio with younger CEOs and the portfolio of firms with older CEOs)
behaved very similarly before the event window. In fact, a t-test does not reject the hypothesis
that the average trends of cumulative abnormal returns in the respective two portfolios before
the event are equal.34
The similar pre-event trends are comforting and suggest that the sharp divergence of
CARs at the event window was caused by the event.
4.7. Combining Hypotheses 1 and 2: Agency versus Hold-up
Table 6 considers all variables jointly. The proxies capturing the potential distortion of extra-
contractual incentives are significant (almost) throughout. Of the variables capturing the
alignment benefits of say-on-pay, past performance and abnormal CEO compensation are the
34Very similar observations hold when expanding the pre-event window to 30 days. An additional per-
spective is offered by testing, on each individual day, for the equality of the mean of abnormal returns in one
portfolio (say, firms with younger CEOs) and the mean of abnormal returns in the other portfolio (say, firms
with older CEOs). Out of 19 tested days, at most two days show significantly different abnormal returns for
any of the considered variables. All these results are available on request.
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most reliable predictors of shareholder reactions. Interestingly, in Table 6, the explanatory
power of the regression increases substantially from left to right. In column (1), which
includes only alignment benefits and some other firm-specific controls, the R2 is 0.33; in
column (5), which also includes measures of the importance of extra-contractual investment
incentives, the R2 is 0.43.
In sum, the central result revealed in this table is a so far empirically unexplored trade-
off: The overall reaction of shareholders to enhanced power not only reflects the trade-off
between alignment benefits and compliance costs, but also a trade-off between alignment
benefits and a worsening of the hold-up problem.
5. Additional results and robustness
5.1. Firm size
The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that we generally obtain a strongly positive relationship
between firm size and CARs throughout. There are several non-exclusive factors that explain
this finding. Many of the very large Swiss firms had already introduced advisory say-on-pay in
2007, thus gaining experience with how to engage shareholders in this matter.35 Furthermore,
it seems reasonable to assume that fixed costs associated with binding say-on-pay will weigh
less for the largest firms.36 Moreover, because news coverage was more pronounced locally
than globally, we do not expect large firms to react as strongly to begin with. Limiting
the sample to only medium-sized firms, we confirm that our results continue to hold (not
tabulated). Conversely, we also confirm that the results generally are very similar in the full
35Another indicator for this increased awareness of large firms is their significantly higher percentages of
executive and board positions that have to be confirmed through individual elections.
36For example, large firms generally already have an established public relation department that is in
constant contact with shareholders. The fixed costs may also be more subtle in the form of an increased
effort by management to keep off large investors who aim at exchanging leading executive and board positions.
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225 company sample, comprising the entire SPI.37
5.2. Shareholder structure
A measure of potential interest is shareholder structure. If there is only one shareholder with
majority voting power, it is very unlikely that the new say-on-pay regulation will change
anything in the corporate governance structure of this company. Absent this majority share-
holder, uncertainty prevails due to lack of commitment ability of shareholders, leading to
higher interference costs of say-on-pay.
However, the data provide no support of this idea (Panel C.8 of Table A-1 and column
(8) in Table A-2).38 While firms where a single shareholder owns a stake of 50% or more
indeed tend to drop significantly less than firms with a more disperse shareholder base, which
is consistent with the above argument, we find an unpredicted similar effect for the most
dispersed firms.39 Moreover, the difference between the firms with a dominant shareholder
and more dispersed firms is not statistically significant, neither in the non-parametric tests
nor in the regression analysis. This suggests that the shareholder structure of a company
was perceived as not being related to the initiative’s demands.
37The very smallest firms experienced less negative abnormal returns than the median-sized firms, in line
with the idea that the very smallest companies are unlikely to be vulnerable to excessive shareholder-activism
as the major shareholders are usually tightly involved in the firm’s business.
38Only data of large shareholdings, above 5%, are comprehensively available in the year of the analysis.
Since the activist shareholders that are known to wield significant power in Switzerland, for example, Ethos
Fund, rarely hold more than 5% of a company, we cannot conduct tests, in the spirit of those of Cohn,
Gillan, and Hartzell (2011), regarding whether reactions of firms with activist shareholders are more positive.
In untabulated results, we find that firms’ reactions did not vary significantly with the concentration of
shareholdings among the group of large shareholders.
39This suggests that firms with a dispersed shareholder structure may benefit from the enhanced oppor-
tunities for shareholders to express their collective opinion on management pay.
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5.3. Other elements of the initiative
The initiative contains a number of other provisions in addition to binding say-on-pay. While
the public and policy discussion was almost exclusively about the say-on-pay component of
the initiative, it is still possible that shareholders also reacted to some extent to these other
proposals. To investigate this possibility, we compare market reactions in firms that currently
use a provision that would be forbidden (or limited) under the initiative with the reactions
in firms that do not use such a provision. The direction of any reaction would depend on
the perception of shareholders regarding the value relevance of the provision. For example,
if the market reaction in firms with a given provision is more positive than in other firms,
this would be evidence that indeed shareholders perceived the issue as value-relevant and as
connected with alignment benefits for them. If, by contrast, there is no significant effect,
this can mean that–relative to the say-on-pay provisions–the market neglected the relevance
of the initiative in this respect or that investors did not regard the issue as value-relevant.
We find that none of the non-say-on-pay provisions of the initiative is significantly as-
sociated with CARs. Specifically, proceeding in the order of the initiative’s demands (see
Supplementary Appendix A), we obtain the following results, which are summarized in Ta-
bles A-1 and A-2 of the Supplementary Appendix:40
(1) Requirement of annual, individual elections of board members. Reactions of share-
holders were not different depending on whether a company currently already has individual
elections in place and whether it has a staggered board (Panels C.1 and C.2 in Table A-1
and columns (1) and (2) in Table A-2). (2) Possibility of electronic and distance voting as
well as a requirement that pension funds vote in the interest of the insured. It is difficult
40Some of the provisions will most likely not influence firms in measurable ways, and so we do not analyze
them separately here; for example, very few board members have a consulting relationship with their own
companies. Data for a few other items are not available. We do not have comprehensive data on other board
seats of board members. Moreover, firms are not required to disclose (and do not in general disclose) whether
they have in place a policy for sign-on payments for future executive hirings or for bonuses for management
for certain transactions. Since market participants also do not observe such policies, their existence is very
unlikely to explain the stock market reaction.
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to find an appropriate proxy for this demand. A possibility is outlined in Section 5.2. If
this provision was perceived as creating value for shareholders, we should see a relatively
more positive reaction for smaller firms who should gain through an increased participation
of their shareholders. On the other hand, firms with a majority shareholder are projected to
show no reaction as any value creating provision would have already been implemented. The
findings in Panel C.8 of Table A-1 and column (8) in Table A-2 clearly reject this hypothesis.
(3) A ban of severance agreements and change-of-control clauses. This provision could be
damaging for firms with young CEOs because these care most about their future career and
for firms in an uncertain environment, so this provision of the initiative could partly explain
some of the cross-sectional results we have documented. However, we see in Panels C.3 and
C.4 of Table A-1 and columns (3) and (4) in Table A-2 that firms with severance agreements
did not react differently than those without. A similar result applies for change-of-control
agreements. Thus, the effect of CEO age on CARs we observed earlier is more likely to
be driven by the hold-up channel of Hypothesis 1. (4) Restrictions on credit, loans and
retirement plans for management. If investors worry about these restrictions, firms currently
employing these instruments should react more negatively than others. We do not find any
evidence in support of this idea (Panels C.6 and C.7 of Table A-1 and columns (5) and (6)
in Table A-2). (5) Restrictions on notice periods. Firms where CEOs have employment
contracts with notice periods of more than 12 months did not react more positively (which
would support an alignment benefits argument) or more negatively (which would support
an interference costs argument); instead, this feature of the initiative appears to have been
irrelevant to shareholders (Panel C.5 of Table A-1 and column (7) in Table A-2).
(6) Requirements regarding equity participation plans. The initiative would require equity
participation plans to be set in the articles of incorporation of the firm. If this provision had
been behind the market reaction we would have observed more negative reactions in those
firms that currently use such plans. By stark contrast, recall from the main analysis that we
find that CARs were most negative in firms that did not use equity participation plans.
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In sum, these results strongly suggest that the market reacted specifically to the proposed
say-on-pay rules and did not interpret the initiative as a more generic push toward more
regulation or other features that would affect corporate governance.
5.4. Robustness
First, we assessed the robustness of our results in the light of three events, two in the event
window, and the third in the estimation window.
On February 27, a day after our event, UBS was able to raise USD 11bn of fresh capital
in a special shareholder meeting. On the day before, then Swiss President Pascal Couchepin
expressed his opinion that UBS would not need a government bailout. Even if this outcome
of the shareholder meeting (which was hardly surprising as 599mn votes were in favor of
and only 87mn votes against the capital injection) had moved the stock of UBS and perhaps
the Swiss stock market as a whole, the cross-sectional results we obtain are unlikely to be
explained by this event. Moreover, our analysis holds when restricting the event window to
the day of the event itself. Furthermore, when we use the Dow Jones Global Total Stock
Market Index (in which UBS has a small weight), we obtain the same results.
On Sunday February 24, 2008, the Swiss electorate accepted, in a referendum, a corporate
tax reform (the“Unternehmenssteuerreform II ”). The major points of the reform were aimed
at supporting partnerships and small family businesses. A few elements were relevant for
holding companies or owners with large stakes in individual firms, but have very limited
impact on the regular firm listed on the SPI. (Financials did not react differently to the
initiative than other firms.) Finally, the tax reform would allow companies to repay invested
capital (including agios) tax-free, essentially allowing them to pay a special kind of dividend
free of tax for the recipient. This rule change did not at all feature in the public discussion
leading up to the vote, and few market participants seem to have understood the potential
benefits of this new regulation. To the extent that the benefits were priced in, we would be
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underestimating the negative overall effect of the say-on-pay initiative.
As for the possible confounding event in the estimation window, on February 10, 2008, a
single newspaper released a short article claiming a successful end to the initiative’s signatures
collection. However, this claim was not officially confirmed, but rather discarded by an
interview with the initiative’s manager on the topic in the very same paper and day. Indeed,
we found no abnormal reaction of the SPI stocks around this date. Shortening the estimation
window so that it ends on February 7, 2008, also does not change the results.
Second, some firms announced their earnings around the event window, potentially af-
fecting our results. The directional effect on the cumulative abnormal return is not clear,
but test statistics including these firms are likely to be underestimated as announcements
increase the sample’s standard deviation. To investigate this effect, we defined a binary
indicator variable showing whether a firm announced its 2007 results within five days of the
event window. (Announcement effects usually fade quickly, making our choice of a five-day
window a rather prudent one.) As seen in Tables 5 and 6, firms that announced their results
in this window generally had more positive abnormal returns.41
Our regressions also show that CARs tended to be particularly negative where there
was an abnormally large volume of trading, arguably driven by information processing by
shareholders regarding the say-on-pay initiative’s progress. We interpret this finding as
reassuring evidence for the event’s significance.
Third, we winsorized the event window CARs at the 5%-level to check for robustness
against outliers. We find that our results stay unchanged.
41Omitting the firms with earnings announcements did not materially affect the results. Indeed, by ex-
cluding these firms, we reduce noise and hence improve the precision of our estimates. As mentioned above,
for abnormal CEO compensation we now also find a statistically significant difference between the middle
and the corner portfolios in the regressions equivalent to those in Table 5.
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6. Conclusion
The present analysis uses an arguably clean event to investigate how shareholder power im-
pacts shareholder value. Specifically, we first document that the unexpected announcement
of a step toward a binding say-on-pay law in Switzerland led to significant stock price re-
actions. 70% of firms reacted abnormally negatively; the equal-weighted average abnormal
return of Swiss firms was negative and statistically significant, while the average abnormal
return of a matched sample of German firms was indistinguishable from zero. At first sight,
the fact that shareholders reacted on average negatively to an enhancement of their power
could be taken as evidence of Carl Fu¨rstenberg’s famous conjecture of “shareholder stupid-
ity.”42 Careful analysis of the cross-sectional variation in reactions shows, by contrast, that
the evidence is instead consistent with the view that shareholders rationally anticipate that
say-on-pay has benefits and costs for them, and that they react most negatively where the
costs are likely to outweigh the benefits.
These findings have important implications for the current policy discussion on how to
design shareholder rights laws. Greater power provides shareholders with an enhanced ability
to ensure alignment of managerial interests with shareholder value. However, in the natural
experiment examined here, shareholders would obtain power in such a fashion (through the
ability to vote on managerial compensation ex post) that this is likely to ex-ante distort
extra-contractual managerial investments that are specific to the firm. By highlighting the
resulting trade-off, we believe that this is one of the first papers to empirically support the
argument, so far mostly presented in theoretical discussions, that it may be in the best
interests of shareholders not to maximize their power. Policymakers should recognize that
shareholders may do well to cede some control to directors (as they do under advisory say-
on-pay, compared to binding say-on-pay).
42The German banker Carl Fu¨rstenberg quipped: “Shareholders are stupid and impertinent. Stupid because
they give their money to somebody else without effective control over what that person is doing with it and
impertinent because they ask for a dividend as a reward for their stupidity.”
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Our study focuses on the impact of say-on-pay for shareholders. Some recent reforms in
the executive compensation area also aim to benefit other stakeholders and society at large.
The analysis here is silent on these broader implications, and future research is needed to
address them.
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Figure 1. Individual cumulative abnormal returns around the event day
This graph shows the individual, non-winsorized cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the largest 100 firms in the Swiss
Performance Index (SPI) in the event window. Abnormal returns are calculated with the market model and are sorted by size
of the cumulative abnormal returns along the horizontal axis. The event-window covers the time span between a day prior and
a day after February 26, 2008. On this day, it was publicly announced that the critical threshold of 100’000 signatures in favor
of an initiative demanding binding say-on-pay in Switzerland had been collected. This requires the government to eventually
hold a national ballot on whether the initiative should become constitutional law.
Figure 2. Average cumulative abnormal returns around the event day
This graph shows the equal-weighted average of cumulative abnormal returns for the largest 100 firms in the Swiss Performance
Index (SPI, solid line) over time. The same analysis was done for a matched sample of German firms from the CDAX index.
The portfolio of German firms was matched based on equity return correlation (dotted) or an industry-size match (dashed).
Cumulation of the abnormal returns starts at t=-6. The vertical axis represents the average level of the cumulative abnormal
return while the horizontal axis is measured in days relative to the event (t=0). The event window is marked by square
brackets on the horizontal axis. Abnormal returns are calculated with the market model. The event window, [-1,+1], shows
a cumulative abnormal return of -1.49% for the SPI firms and 0.42% for the CDAX firms. This cumulative abnormal return
is the sum of the daily abnormal returns for SPI firms on day t=-1 (-0.61%), t=0 (-0.28%) and t=1 (-0.60%). For the equity
correlation (industry-size) matched sample of CDAX firms, the abnormal returns are for -0.32% (-0.12%), 0.74% (0.51%) and
-0.63% (-0.56%) for days t=-1, t=0 and t=1, respectively.
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Figure 3. Trends of cumulative abnormal returns of subsamples around the event
Panels (a) to (d) show the daily level of cumulative abnormal returns for selected sample splits of the largest 100 stocks in the
Swiss Performance Index during the 40 day window [-20,+20] around the event. Cumulation of the abnormal returns starts at
t=-20. The vertical axis represents the daily level of the cumulative abnormal return while the horizontal axis is measured in
days relative to the event (t=0). The event window is marked by square brackets on the horizontal axis. Abnormal returns are
calculated with the market model. Panel (a) splits the sample according to the CEO’s age in below median (solid) and above
median (dotted) age. Panel (b) splits the sample according to the CEO’s bonus structure into cash-only incentive (solid) and
mixed incentive payments (dotted). Panel (c) shows the fourth (solid) and first (dotted) quartile of the sample in terms of the
performance of a stock relative to the relevant size index. Panel (d) depicts the middle (solid) and corner (dotted) quartiles of
the sample split according to abnormal CEO compensation.
(a) CEO Age (b) Cash Incentive Share
(c) Relative Performance (d) Abnormal CEO Compensation
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Table 1. Timeline of say-on-pay legislative efforts in Switzerland
Date Legislative events Possible confounding events
July 31 - August 6,
2006
A “Sonntags-Zeitung” article
(08/06/2006) mentions that
Trybol owner Thomas Minder
has submitted the wording of the
text of his “Fat-Cat-Initiative”
that week.
a) On 08/03/2006 the European Central Bank
(ECB) raised its interest rate by a quarter point
to 3% as anticipated by analysts. Bank of Eng-
land (BoE) surprisingly raising its interest rate
by the same margin to 4.75%. b) The oil price
was under turmoil that week because of war in
Lebanon and uncertainty of the severeness of the
Caribbean hurricane “Chris.” c) Announcement
of a below expectations net increase in employ-
ment in the US leading to believe that The Fed-
eral Reserve will not change interest rates after
17 increases in a row.
October 17, 2006 The Federal Chancellery verifies
the initiative complies with legal
requirements.
On 10/18/2006 the Federal Council of Switzer-
land had announced it entrusted five known ex-
perts the task to establish a federal audit super-
visory authority.
October 31, 2006 Thomas Minder begins collecting
signatures for a federal initiative.
Economic Committee of the National Assembly
agrees to establish a Swiss Financial Market Su-
pervisory Authority (FINMA) with 14 to 4 votes.
February 26, 2008
= Event
Initiative committee sub-
mits the required 100’000
signatures.
On 02/24/2008, a corporate tax reform lowering
taxation of certain special types of dividend pay-
ments is accepted by the Swiss electorate.
April 2, 2008 The Federal Chancellery verifies
the initiative as valid.
On 04/02/2008 the Swiss Market Index (SMI)
gains 1.4% due to the extraordinary increases of
the shares of the two major banks and in Tokyo
the Nikkei reports a plus of 4.2%.
December 5, 2008 The Federal Council of Switzer-
land advises to reject the initia-
tive and makes a so-called indi-
rect counterproposal with an ad-
dition to the ongoing revision of
the Swiss Code of Obligations.
On 12/05/2008 the Swiss Market Index (SMI)
loses partially more than 3% and closes minus
2.09%. The German Stock Index (DAX) even
loses 4%.
May 12, 2009 Judiciary committee of the
Council of States tightens the
indirect counterproposal and
accommodates to the demands
of the initiative committee.
No relevant confounding event found.
June 11, 2009 Council of States finishes debate
over details of the counterpro-
posal which is now less tight than
the proposed form of the judi-
ciary committee. The issue now
returns to the national council.
The Associated Press reports that the US budget
deficit has ascended to a new high in May and is
expected to peak at the record high of 1.84 trillion
dollar at the end of the fiscal year.
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the main sample
This table displays summary statistics for the largest 100 firms in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI). Market Capitalization
measures the market value of the free float on event day closing. Event Window Stock Return is the overall stock return during
the three day event window. Relative Performance measures the gap between the observed stock return and the return of
the size-appropriate index over a one year period prior to the event. CAPM Alpha measures the gap between the observed
stock return and an estimated stock return based on CAPM for the year prior to the event. Sales Volatility is a firm’s ratio of
the standard deviation of sales to the average sales over the last five years. COGS Volatility is a firm’s ratio of the standard
deviation of cost of goods sold (COGS) to the average sales over the last five years. Leverage is measured as total debt to total
capital. Company Event is a binary indicator equal to one if the firm communicated past year’s accounting figures during a
10 day window around the event window. Abnormal Trading Volume is the difference between trading volume in the event
window and the median trading volume of the respective firm in the previous year, taken as a percentage of the median trading
volume of the respective firm in the previous year. Total CEO/Board Compensation is the sum of base and variable pay for the
year 2007. CEO Cash Incentive Share is the share of a CEO’s variable remuneration in 2007 that is paid in cash. Abnormal
CEO/Board Compensation is measured as the difference between paid compensation and estimated normal compensation in
terms of firm size and performance. All statistics for the board are reported including its Chairman. CEO Tenure is the number
of years a CEO has been with the current company. CEO Severance Agreement is a dummy equal to one in case the CEO has
a severance agreement. CEO Change-of-Control Clause is a dummy equal to one in case the firm grants the CEO severance
payments specifically linked to a change of control in the firm. CEO Long Notice Period is a dummy equal to one in case the
CEO’s notice period is longer than 12 months. CEO Loans Outstanding is a dummy equal to one in case the firm is granting
loans to the CEO. CEO Other Payments Share measures the ratio of salary payments other than fixed and variable relative to
total compensation received by the CEO. The most prominent contribution to this share are payments towards pension plans.
Largest Shareholder is the share the largest single shareholder holds in the firm. Management Shareholdings is the percentage
of equity held by the management and board. Dual is a control for CEO-Chairs. Staggered Board is a binary indicator equal to
one if the board is staggered. Single Election is a binary indicator equal to one if board members have to be elected one-by-one.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Firm Characteristics
Market Capitalization (in Mio. CHF) 9’876.37 29’097.26 113.00 196’044.91 100
Event Window Stock Return (%) 1.71 4.33 -15.28 11.29 100
Relative Performance (in annual %) 11.32 69.48 -62.27 622.53 99
CAPM Alpha (in annual %) -21.92 26.21 -72.03 99.55 91
Sales Volatility (%) 27.50 28.06 2.37 150.50 100
COGS Volatility (%) 23.19 53.03 0.66 388.41 76
Leverage (debt to total capital in %) 32.41 25.05 0 95.34 99
Company Event (binary indicator) 0.20 0.40 0 1 100
Abnormal Trading Volume (in %) 59.11 157.10 -65.39 967.40 100
Compensation
CEO Total (in Mio. CHF) 4.25 4.49 0.48 22.28 91
CEO Variable (in Mio. CHF) 2.75 3.82 0 20.05 88
CEO Cash Incentive Share (in %) 57.47 34.50 0 100.00 97
CEO Abnormal (in Mio. CHF) 0.71 2.68 -2.67 11.61 85
Board Total (in Mio. CHF) 2.99 3.90 0.19 25.41 88
Board Abnormal (in Mio. CHF) 0.59 1.89 -1.10 11.29 88
CEO Attributes
CEO Age (years) 53.51 7.69 37.00 82.00 97
CEO Tenure (years) 9.64 8.02 0.49 39.58 95
CEO Severance Agreement (binary indicator) 0.12 0.32 0 1 94
CEO Change-of-Control Clause (binary indicator) 0.23 0.43 0 1 94
CEO Loans Outstanding (binary indicator) 0.14 0.35 0 1 90
CEO Other Payments Share (in %) 0.09 0.09 0 0.47 90
CEO Long Notice Period (binary indicator) 0.06 0.24 0 1 100
Governance
Largest Shareholder (in %) 27.40 23.14 0 99.40 100
Management Shareholdings (in %) 13.10 20.62 0 70.30 99
Dual (binary indicator) 0.15 0.36 0 1 88
Staggered Board (binary indicator) 0.59 0.50 0 1 92
Single Election (binary indicator) 0.56 0.50 0 1 91
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Table 6. Market reaction to binding say-on-pay, regression analysis II
Regressions in this table are based on the largest 100 firms in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI). The dependent variable is the
cumulative abnormal return during the three day event window. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. Variables
appended by quartile specifications are indicator variables with the indicator equal to one for the quartile stated. For example,
Young CEO (Q1&Q2) is a binary indicator equal to one if the CEO is of below median age. t-values are calculated based on
robust standard errors and reported in brackets, with significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash-only Incentive (Q4) -0.017* -0.019**
(-1.94) (-2.21)
Young CEO (Q1&Q2) -0.013* -0.012
(-1.68) (-1.64)
Sales Volatility (Q2&Q3) -0.023*** -0.024***
(-2.76) (-2.99)
Relative Performance -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.019***
(-6.13) (-6.63) (-5.76) (-5.75) (-5.74)
Abnormal CEO Compensation -0.004 -0.005* -0.005 -0.004 -0.005*
(-1.46) (-1.68) (-1.65) (-1.39) (-1.81)
(Abnormal CEO Compensation)2 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.001**
(1.42) (1.59) (1.82) (1.48) (2.01)
Management Shareholdings -0.032 -0.030 -0.020 -0.004 0.009
(-0.48) (-0.47) (-0.30) (-0.07) (0.16)
(Management Shareholdings)2 0.130 0.135 0.101 0.108 0.087
(1.27) (1.32) (1.00) (1.17) (1.01)
Leverage 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.010 0.012
(0.63) (0.75) (0.64) (0.52) (0.68)
ln(Market Capitalization) 0.005** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.001
(2.35) (1.94) (1.81) (1.97) (0.60)
Company Event 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.020* 0.018*
(1.62) (1.50) (1.60) (1.95) (1.88)
Abnormal Trading Volume -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(-1.02) (-1.19) (-1.13) (-1.06) (-1.36)
Constant -0.064** -0.050** -0.047* -0.045** -0.014
(-2.52) (-2.31) (-1.95) (-2.04) (-0.65)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84
Adjusted R-squared 0.327 0.349 0.340 0.386 0.429
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Evidence of Excess Comovement in US Mergers∗
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Abstract
This paper considers changes in market comovement of merging US firms. Comparing
the expected to the actual post merger comovement, we find that the post merger
beta exhibits excess comovement with the acquiring firm. This suggests that the firm’s
comovement is at least partly determined by its investors. We find that excess co-
movement is significantly greater in cash transactions, when target shareholders tender
their entire stake, than in pure stock transactions. Additionally, we document that the
excess comovement is greater when the target is included in the S&P 500 as a result
of the merger.
∗Financial support from the National Centre of Competence in Research ”Financial Valuation and Risk
Management” (NCCR FINRISK) is gratefully acknowledged. Insightful comments and suggestions were
received from Kjell Nyborg and Per Stro¨mberg.
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per.oestberg@bf.uzh.ch.
‡Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, Email: christoph.wenk@bf.uzh.ch.
1. Introduction
Classical asset pricing theory predicts that in a frictionless market the return required by
investors depends on the comovement of the firm’s assets with the market. In an international
context, there is evidence that the comovement changes significantly when the location of
listing changes (Froot and Dabora, 1999, and Chan, Hameed and Lau, 2003) and when a
company is acquired by a foreign firm (Brealey, Cooper and Kaplanis, 2010). These results
suggest that stock comovement with the market is at least partly determined by the firm’s
investors and that international markets are segmented.
In the average merger, the majority of the target shareholders’ stake is acquired and
therefore the post merger shareholder base is predominantly comprised of the acquiring firm’s
shareholders. Given this, and if the market comovement is affected by the firm’s investors,
we expect the post merger market comovement to be shifted towards the acquiring firm. This
paper examines US mergers and provides evidence that investors partially determine stock
comovement by showing a significant shift in market comovement towards the acquiring firm.
We estimate the pre merger comovement of the target and the acquirer and use these
estimates to calculate an expected post merger comovement. The expected post merger
comovement is then compared to the actual post merger comovement. When the acquirer
exhibits larger comovement with the market than the target (the prediction is asymmetric
depending on the relative riskiness of the target and the acquirer), we find that the expected
post merger comovement is 1.09 while the actual post merger comovement with the market
is 1.18. This represents an excess comovement with the acquiring firm of 8.26 percent.
Additionally, the implied effect on the target’s market comovement is an increase in beta of
0.27 or 34 percent relative to the pre merger beta.
Given that investors affect market comovement, the degree of excess comovement should
be increasing in the fraction of equity tendered by target shareholders. Therefore, cash
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mergers (which imply that target shareholders do not retain any stake in the merged firm)
should be associated with significantly greater excess comovement. For cash mergers, the
difference between the actual and expected post merger beta is 0.20 (compared to 0.09 for the
overall sample). In cash transactions, target comovement increases by 0.32 or 46.1 percent
relative to the pre merger beta. In contrast, for 100 percent stock deals (when there is less
exit), the excess comovement is statistically and economically insignificant.
Building on work by Vijh (1994), Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) argue that there
is a ”habitat” of investors that invest in S&P 500 stocks. This implies that the firm’s share-
holders change as a result of inclusion into the S&P 500 and therefore the comovement with
the S&P 500 increases. Given that there is a S&P 500 habitat, we expect the excess comove-
ment towards a S&P 500 acquirer to be larger when a target firm is included into the index
as a result of the merger. Our results support this conjecture and additionally we verify that
our results are not driven by an index inclusion effect.
It is well documented that investors have a preference for particular firm characteristics
like industry and geographic location.1 Therefore, target shareholders that have a preference
for a particular industry are more likely to sell their shares as a result of a cross industry
merger than an intra industry merger. We find some support for this, in inter industry merg-
ers (when the acquirer has a larger beta than the target) the excess comovement towards the
acquirer’s comovement is 11.71 percent while for intra industry mergers it is 3.77 percent and
statistically insignificant. Similarly, there is no excess comovement in within state mergers
while in intra state mergers the excess comovement is 9.03 percent.
The findings of this paper suggest that there is not only cross-border segmentation,
but also segmentation along other dimensions such as index membership and geography.
However, there are a number of possible alternative explanations for our results that we
1Empirically it has been documented that investors prefer stocks in their geographic vicinity (Coval
and Moskowitz, 1999 and Huberman, 2001). Additionally, it has been shown that shareholders exhibit a
preference for stocks from industries that they have experience from (Do¨skeland and Hvide, 2010).
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have to consider. First, on average mergers are associated with increases in leverage and this
could potentially explain the excess comovement.2 However, for leverage changes to explain
our results, it must be the case that leverage increases when the beta of acquirer is greater
than the beta of the target and that leverage decreases when the beta of the acquirer is
smaller than the target’s beta, since in the first case we have a higher than expected post
merger beta and in the latter a lower than expected post merger beta. In fact, for transactions
in which the beta of the acquirer is lower than the target’s, we find that leverage increases
modestly. Additionally, we conduct multivariate sorts that illustrate that excess comovement
is independent of the change in leverage. Finally, in our regression analysis, we find that the
change in leverage is insignificantly related to the excess comovement and does not affect
our results qualitatively.
Second, some mergers result in synergies which might transform the assets and therefore
also the comovement of these assets with the market. However, for synergies to explain our
results it must be the case that the synergy asset has a riskiness that is above that of the
expected post merger beta when the acquirer has a higher beta than the target and vice
versa when the beta of the target is greater than that of the acquirer. Further, it must be
that the transformation of these is rather rapid since we measure the post merger beta over
100 weeks after completion. Finally, in regression analysis we verify that synergies are not
driving our results.
Third, following completion it is possible that the riskiness of the assets of the target
is transformed to become similar to the riskiness of the assets of the acquirer. However,
this risk transformation needs to be rapid (see above). Additionally, it has to be greater in
transactions that are associated with greater shareholder exit (e.g., cash deals). Furthermore,
we consider the progression of the firm’s post merger comovement and do not find evidence
of a gradual transformation of the riskiness of the firm’s assets.
2Ghosh and Jain (2000) study leverage increases in mergers. They find that leverage increases by a
modest 6.3% on average. We find similar leverage increases in our sample (see Figure 2).
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Prior work has provided evidence of segmentation by examining both returns and mar-
ket comovements.3 Concerning comovement, Chan, Hameed and Lau (2003) document a
decrease in comovement with the Hong Kong and an increase in the comovement with the
Singapore Stock Exchange following a change in listing from Hong Kong to Singapore. Most
closely related to us, Brealey, Cooper and Kaplanis (2010) document cross-border segmen-
tation by providing evidence of excess comovement in cross-border mergers. They find that
following a merger, the comovement with the exchange where the acquiring firm is traded
increases while the comovement with the exchange of the target company decreases. We
build on their results by providing evidence of segmentation by considering mergers of US
firms. Another paper that illustrates within-border excess comovement is Pirinsky and Wang
(2006). They show that when firms change headquarters location they start comoving more
with an index of firms in the geographic vicinity of their new headquarters.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data
sources, sample selection criteria and methodology. We start Section 3 by considering sorts
illustrating the relation between the pre merger and post merger betas. We then verify these
results using regression analysis. In Section 4 we show that our results are not driven by
asset transformation and Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
Our sample of mergers and acquisitions comes from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
We only include transactions between firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. More-
3In terms of return segmentation, early work showed how investment barriers imply return premiums. The
barrier to investment can be investment restrictions (Black (1974) and Stulz (1981)) or lack of information
(Merton (1987)). In terms of empirical evidence, Hong and Kacperzyk (2009) show that ”sin” stocks exhibit
abnormal performance that cannot be attributed to traditional factors. Additionally, Sloan and Lehavy
(2008) and Bodnaruk and O¨stberg (2009) show that firms with less recogntion (segmented firms in terms of
investor awareness) have higher returns.
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over, our sample covers the period from 1980 to 2008.4 We only consider completed transac-
tions where the target and acquiring company are publicly traded. Additionally, we require
the target and acquirer to be different firms (i.e., we exclude all repurchases). This gives
us a total of 8, 411 mergers. We obtain stock return data from the CRSP daily files (this
reduces our sample to 6, 160).
In estimating comovement (see next section), we follow Brealey et al. (2010) and require
100 weeks of return data for the target and the acquirer prior to the run-up period and for
the merged company after completion. This leaves us with 3, 510 deals.
Further, we only consider deals where 100 percent of the target company is owned by
the acquirer after the merger. We only include targets which have a market capitalization
above 50 million (Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008). In order to evaluate if the post merger
comovement is biased towards the acquirer, we require that the targets assets to represent
a non-insignificant proportion of total assets of the merged company.5 Therefore, we only
consider mergers in which the target company has a market capitalization that is at least 25
percent of the acquirer. Finally, we exclude deals which involve at least one financial firm
(SIC code 6000 to 6999). This leaves us with a total of 712 deals.
To control for the change in leverage due to the merger we calculate the leverage change
as defined by Ghosh and Jain (2000). Leverage is the fiscal year-end ratio of debt to total
firm value. We measure debt as the book value of long-term debt (Compustat Item dltt)
added to the debt in current liabilities (Compustat item dlc). Total firm value is the book
value of debt added to the market value of equity. The change in leverage is defined as the
difference in leverage between the fiscal year end before the announcement of the merger and
the fiscal year end after the completion of the merger.
4SDC includes transactions from before 1980 and after 2008, but these transactions are excluded due to
other restrictions.
5Brealey et al. (2010) do not have to implement such a restriction since they examine comovement with
respect to different markets whereas we consider one market, but examine whether the acquirer determines
a disproportionate share of the comovement.
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We draw on Brealey et al. (2010) in calculating the synergies of the merger. Synergies
are the market adjusted increase in market capitalization of the acquirer and target in the
six weeks surrounding the announcement (three before and three after) as a percentage of
the pooled firm.
Figure 1 describes the time line of our research design.
Insert Figure 1 here
We estimate the individual comovement of the acquirer, target and merged firm with
the market (the value-weighted CRSP index) over the 100 week pre run-up period (acquirer
and target) and over 100 weeks post completion (merged firm). To avoid confounding effects
of news announcements and rumors, we exclude eight weeks prior (run-up) to the merger
announcement (Schwert, 1996). This involves running the following weekly regression for
the acquirer, target and merged company:
Rj,t = αj + βjRm,t + εj,t
where j is a firm index, Rj.t is the return on the firm and Rm,t is the return on the CRSP
value weighted index. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize our betas at the one and
99 percent level.
We calculate the expected merged beta as:
E(β) =
MVA
MVA + (1− λ)MVT βA +
(1− λ)MVT
MVA + (1− λ)MVT βT (1)
where βA and βT are the pre merger comovements of the acquirer and target, respectively
and MV refers to the market value of equity. If the acquiring firm has a significant toehold,
the comovement of the target is already partly reflected in the comovement of the acquirer
(Brealey et al., 2010). Put differently, if only a small stake is acquired in the target due to
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the toehold then the comovement of the acquirer is not expected to change significantly. To
control for this, equation (1) adjusts for the fraction of the target held by the acquirer at
announcement (λ).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our key variables.
Insert Table 1 here
On average, target companies are roughly half the size of acquiring companies. Target
companies represent roughly 35 percent of total pre merger market capitalization. We can
see that on average leverage increases from 23.91 percent pre merger to 31.74 percent post
merger. Our descriptive statistics indicate that total synergies only represent a small fraction
of the pre merger firm. Additionally, in most deals the acquirer does not have a toehold.
The pre merger betas of the target and acquirer are similar and close to one. Turning to the
expected beta (E(β)), as predicted, it is between the target and acquirer beta. Finally, the
post merger beta (βM) is greater than the expected beta which is consistent with a leverage
increase.
We use SDC to classify the following methods of payment: cash, stock, mixed and other.
Dummy variables Cash, Stock, Mixed and Other take the value 1 if the deal is only financed
with cash, only with stock, a mix of both and if other methods of payment are used.
3. Empirical Findings
3.1. Univariate Analysis
This paper tests whether the investors contribute to the comovement of the firm with the
market. To do so we examine mergers and acquisitions. Given that target investors exit
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following the merger, the post merger comovement of the firm should be closer to the co-
movement of the acquirer than expected. Additionally, the greater the fraction of target
shareholders that leave as a result of the merger, the closer the post merger comovement
should be to the comovement of the acquirer.
In this section we provide univariate analysis of the relation between the expected and
the actual merged beta. Our central hypothesis is that the comovement of the merged firm
is closer to the comovement of the acquirer than expected. When the comovement of the
acquirer with the market is greater than comovement of the target with the market (βA > βT ),
we expect the actual merged beta to be greater than the expected beta (βM > E(β)).
Hence, implying that the acquiring firm exhibits undue influence (relative to its market
capitalization) on the comovement of the merged firm. Likewise, we expect the actual merged
beta to be lower than the expected beta (E(β) > βM) when the beta of the target is greater
than the beta of the acquirer.
Figure 2 presents our pre merger betas (acquirer and target) and our post merger expected
and observed beta. Panel A considers deals for which βA > βT while Panel B considers deals
for which βT > βA.
Insert Figure 2 here
Examining Panel A, it is evident that the actual merged beta is greater than the expected
beta indicating excess comovement with the acquirer. Turning to Panel B, we see that the
actual merged beta is slightly below the expected beta.
Table 2 compares the actual to the expected betas in our overall sample, split according
to whether βA is higher or lower than βT , and tests whether the excess comovement is
significant.
Insert Table 2 here
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When βA > βT , the expected beta is 1.09 compared to the actual merged beta of 1.18. The
difference between the actual and expected merged beta (βM −E(β), excess comovement) is
statistically significant at the one percent level and represents a shift towards the acquirer’s
beta of 8.26 percent relative to the mean expected beta. This understates the effect on target
betas since targets represent on average less than half of the merged firm.
To evaluate the economic impact on target betas, we calculate an implied target beta
based on our estimates. We replace for E(β) in βM = E(β) by using equation (1) and
rearrange to obtain an expression for the implied target beta,
βImpT =
MVA + (1− λ)MVT
(1− λ)MVT β̂M −
MVA
(1− λ)MVT β̂A (2)
Using our estimates β̂A, β̂M we calculate an implied target beta for each transaction. The
implied target beta (βImpT = 1.05) is on average 34.2 percent larger than the pre merger
estimated target beta (βT = 0.78) when βA > βT .
Turning to the deals in which βT > βA, we see that the excess comovement is negative
(−0.01) which is in line with our prediction. However, the difference is not economically or
statistically significant. One potential explanation for this finding is that in order to observe
excess comovement we require that target investors sell their shares. Therefore, splitting our
results according to method of payment (see next section) provides for a more powerful test.
3.1.1 Method of Payment
If equity comovement is determined by the firm’s investors, then the greater the fraction
of target shareholders that exit following the merger, the greater the excess comovement
(Brealey et al.) with the acquirer. In mergers that are paid only with cash, all target share-
holders exit whereas in stock-for-stock mergers no target shareholder has to exit. Therefore,
we expect the excess comovement with the acquirer to be significantly larger in cash mergers
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than in stock mergers. Figure 3 presents pre merger and post merger betas of our cash deals
according to whether βA > βT (Panel A) or βT > βA (Panel B).
Insert Figure 3 here
Both panels of Figure 3 are indicative of the post merger comovement having shifted
significantly towards the comovement of the acquirer.
Panel A of Table 3 presents univariate analysis of pre and post merger betas of cash
deals.
Insert Table 3 here
When the comovement of the acquirer is greater than the comovement of the target,
the expected beta is 0.97 while the actual beta is 1.18 implying that the tilt towards the
acquiring firm is 21.65 percent relative to the expected beta. Additionally, this difference is
statistically significant at the one percent level. Further, the implied target beta calculated
using equation (2) is 46.1 percent larger than the pre merger estimated target beta. Turning
to the deals where βT > βA, we find an expected beta of 0.93 whereas the actual post merger
beta is 0.84, the difference of −0.09 represents a −9.68 percent deviation from the expected
merged beta. The implied target beta is now 27.5 percent lower than the pre merger beta.
This difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Panel B of Table 3 presents our results for pure stock transactions. It is striking that
irrespective of whether the target beta is higher or lower than the acquirer beta, the difference
between the actual and expected post merger beta is never statistically nor economically
significant.
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3.1.2 Index Inclusion
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) document that the comovement with the S&P 500
increases after the inclusion into the S&P 500 and Vijh (1994) documents an increase in
comovement with the CRSP value-weighted index following inclusion to the S&P 500. Given
that investors have preferences and mandates to invest in particular stocks, some investors
will be forced to liquidate their holdings of a company once it is included into the S&P 500
(e.g., small cap funds). This implies a greater degree of exit following inclusion and therefore
we would predict greater excess comovement with the acquirer for those targets that are
acquired by a S&P 500 firm. In this section, we examine the excess comovement of S&P
500 included targets and verify that our previous results are not driven by index inclusion.
Index composition data is obtained from COMPUSTAT. In our sample we have 61 targets
that are included into the index as a result of the merger.
Insert Table 4
In Panel A of Table 4 we consider those deals in which the target is included into the S&P
500.6 Considering those deals for which βA > βT we find a large shift towards the comovement
of the acquirer. When considering implied target betas, the mean (median) firm experiences
an increase in beta of 23.8 (38.8) percent. Unfortunately, the difference is not statistically
significant, perhaps due to the low sample size. For the deals in which βA < βT , the
shift towards the acquirer’s comovement is larger. The mean (median) excess comovement
(βM−E(β)) is −0.15 (−0.13) which equals a deviation of 14.56 (12.04) percent. The effect in
terms of implied target betas is larger, the mean (median) target firm experiences an decrease
6There are very few deals in which the acquirer is included into the S&P 500 as a result of the merger
(33). However, for these deals we would expect excess comovement to be smaller since there will be forced
exit on the side of the acquirer.
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in beta of 46.6 (40.1) percent. These differences are statistically significant at the one percent
level. Overall, the results of this panel are consistent with the findings of Barberis et al. that
document a S&P 500 ”habitat.” Put differently, the excess comovement seems to be larger
when the target is included in the index as a result of the merger.
To illustrate that our results are not driven by index inclusion, in Table 4 Panel B we
consider those cash deals (where we predict and document the strongest effect) in which
neither the acquirer nor the target experience a change in inclusion status from the start of
the pre to the end of the post merger estimation windows. In the βA > βT case, we find
a large positive and statistically significant excess comovement while when βT > βA, it is
negative and statistically significant. Hence, our results are qualitatively unchanged after
removing index inclusions.
In summary, Table 4 documents that we observe an index inclusion effect consistent with
previous work, but that this effect cannot explain our findings.
3.1.3 Industry
Investors often have a preference over what industry they invest in (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer,
2003). This implies that we expect to have a greater fraction of target shareholders exiting
when mergers are across industries (e.g., industry specific mutual funds) rather than within
industry. Hence, we predict the excess comovement towards the acquirer to be greater in
across industry mergers than in intra industry mergers.
Table 5 splits mergers into those in which the acquirer and target have the same SIC
code and those in which the SIC code of the target and the acquirer differs.7
Insert Table 5 here
7We have also used the S&P sector classification as our industry measure. The results are qualitatively
unaltered, but with a significantly smaller sample of across industry mergers.
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Panel A of Table 5 considers across industry mergers. When βA > βT the excess comove-
ment with the acquirer beta is 11.71 percent relative to the expected beta. Similarly, the
economic effect in terms of implied betas is large and statistically significant at the one per-
cent level. The excess comovement is negative when we consider βT > βA, but economically
and statistically insignificant.
In PanelB, we do not find any evidence of excess comovement for within industry mergers,
which is consistent our prediction.
3.1.4 Geography
There is a significant amount of evidence documenting that investors have a strong preference
for local stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, and Huberman, 2001). In terms of geography
and comovement, Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document that comovement with local stocks
alters following changes in the location of firm headquarters.
Given the strong preference for local stocks, we expect greater target shareholder exit
in across state mergers and therefore greater excess comovement with the acquirer. To test
this, we classify mergers according to whether the headquarters (SDC) of the two merging
firms are located in the same state.
Insert Table 6 here
Panel A of Table 6 considers mergers across state borders. For mergers in which βA > βT ,
we find that the tilt towards the acquirer beta is statistically significant at the one percent
level. We consider same state mergers in Panel B and find no significant tilt towards the
acquirer. Although our geography results are weaker than our results on industry and method
of payment, they are indicative of excess comovement being greater for across state mergers.
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3.1.5 Leverage
We follow Ghosh and Jain (2000) in computing the change in leverage due to the merger.
The leverage ratio is the fiscal year-end ratio of debt to total firm value. We measure debt
as the book value of long-term debt added to the debt in current liabilities as reported by
Compustat. Total firm value is the book value of debt added to the market value of equity.
To facilitate comparison of pre and post merger leverage we construct a hypothetical merged
firm prior to announcement by pooling the balance sheet of the target and acquirer.
Figure 4 describes the leverage level from three years before the announcement to three
years after the completion to cover the beta estimation windows.
Insert Figure 4 here
Panel A considers the leverage of our entire sample while Panel B considers only cash
deals. The results parallel those of Ghosh and Jain, we find that leverage increases as a
result of the merger. In Panel A the leverage increases by roughly seven percentage points
from three years before the announcement to three years after completion. If we consider the
time period from one year prior to the announcement to one year after completion, similar
to Ghosh and Jain, we find that leverage increases by seven percent.
In both Panels, A and B, we have split our sample according to whether the beta of the
target is higher or lower than the beta of the acquirer. The leverage pattern is strikingly
similar irrespective of the relative riskiness of the acquirer and the target. In both cases
the leverage increases due to the merger. Since Figure 4 documents that when the beta of
the acquirer is smaller than the beta of the target, this leverage increase predicts a higher
than expected post merger beta. However, in this case, Table 3 Panel A documents that the
post merger beta is in fact lower than expected, indicating that leverage cannot explain our
results.
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Further, to make sure that leverage is not driving our results, in Table 7 we have split
our cash deals (where we predict and document the strongest effect) according to whether
they have above (Panel A) or below (Panel B) median change in leverage.
Insert Table 7 here
Table 7 provides different pieces of evidence to suggest that the excess comovement is
not due to leverage. Firstly, our transactions in Panel A experience an insignificant average
(median) increase in leverage of 2.23 (2.34) percent. Nonetheless, the post merger beta is
higher than expected when the beta of the acquirer is larger than the beta of the target
(βA > βT ). Hence we document the effect in the absence of a leverage increase. The
difference between the actual and the expected post merger beta is economically significant,
however the reduction in power implies that we cannot reject the null. Secondly, in Panel B
our transactions experience an average (median) increase in leverage of 34.30 (31.76) percent.
For deals in which the beta of the target is larger than the beta of the acquirer (i.e., those deals
where leverage increases are predicted to reduce excess comovement with the acquirer) we
find a difference between the post merger beta and the expected beta of −0.09. This implies
that the excess comovement is still economically significant even though leverage increases
substantially. Even though the above two findings suggest that leverage does not explain
our excess comovement, it is clear from Table 7 that leverage does influence estimated betas.
Consider when the beta of the acquirer is larger than the beta of the target, going from Panel
A to Panel B implies an increase in the point estimate of the excess comovement (βM−E(β))
from 0.12 to 0.25. On the other hand, when the beta of the acquirer is lower than the beta
of the target, going from Panel A to Panel B decreases the median excess comovement from
−0.11 to −0.05 indicating that leverage increases are associated with increases in beta. In
general, our results are weaker when the beta of the target is greater than the beta of the
acquirer which can be justified by the observed leverage increase.
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The results of this section are indicative of excess comovement being independent of
leverage, which our regression analysis below provides further evidence of.
3.2. Regression Analysis
3.2.1 Deal Characteristics and Excess Comovement
In this section, we pool all transactions and use regression analysis to document the existence
of excess comovement while controlling for deal specific factors. To examine whether the
post merger beta is closer to the acquirer, we use as dependent variable excess comovement
(βM − E(β), equation (1)). To capture the asymmetric prediction of the tilt being positive
when βA > βT (see Figure 3, Panel A) and negative when βT > βA (see Figure 3, Panel B)
we consider as explanatory variable the conditional beta dummy (βA|βT ) which takes the
value of 1(−1) if the beta of the acquirer is larger (smaller) than the beta of the target. This
implies that we always expect a positive relation between βA|βT and our dependent variable
(βM − E(β)). We estimate the following regression:
βM − E(β) = α + b1(βA|βT ) + Γ′W + ε (3)
where W is vector of control variables, Γ is a vector of coefficients and ε is an error term.
Insert Table 8 here
Table 8 contains the results from our regression analysis. In the first specification, we
estimate equation (3) without control variables. Our main variable of interest, βA|βT , is
positively and significantly related to excess comovement.
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Specification (2) introduces our control variables. To make sure our results are not driven
by leverage we introduce as a control variable the absolute change in leverage (defined in
section A.5 of the Empirical Findings). It is comforting that the coefficient on leverage is
positive and significant, indicating that post merger betas are increased as a result of the
leverage added in the merger. Additionally, we control for the synergies associated with the
merger and the relative market capitalization of the target. Finally, we control for changes
in comovement due to index inclusions with our dummy variable Index Inclusion.8
The effect of the conditional beta dummy (βA|βT ) is economically significant, going from
deals where βA < βT (βA|βT takes the value −1) to deals where βA > βT results in an
increase in excess comovement of 0.09 (specification (2)). This represents a 225 percent
change compared to the average excess comovement of the full sample (0.04). Put in terms
of betas, our results imply that the post merger beta of the firm increases by 0.09 when
βA|βT goes from −1 to 1. This represents a 8.75 percent change compared to the average
target beta in our sample.9
For those deals in which we expect particularly large excess comovement, cash (specifi-
cation (3)), target index inclusion (specification (5)), across industry mergers (specification
(6)) and across state mergers (specification (8)), the conditional beta dummy is at least
statistically significant at the five percent level. However, we find no evidence of excess
comovement in stock deals (specification (4)), same industry (specification (7)) and same
state transactions (specification (9)). As expected, there is substantial variation in economic
impact across deal characteristics. For example, the economic impact of cash transactions
and deals in which the target is included in the S&P 500 is three times the economic impact
8In our sample we have 66 targets and 37 aquirers that change their S&P 500 status (inclusions and
deletions) from the start of the pre merger to end of the post merger estimation period. Since our goal here
is to make sure that our regression results are not driven by changes in S&P 500 status, we control for any
change in status for either acquirers or targets.
9In this regression, the estimated economic impact probably understates the true impact on target betas
since targets, on average, represent 35 percent of the market capitalization of the merged firm.
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of the full sample. Overall, the results of Table 8 demonstrate the existence of excess co-
movement while controlling for leverage and transaction synergies. The next section formally
tests whether there are differences in excess comovement across deal characteristics.
3.2.2 Shareholder Exit and Excess Comovement
In this section, we verify that deals that should be associated with greater shareholder exit
also experience greater excess comovement. To capture that, we expect the tilt towards the
acquirer’s beta to be larger in cash transactions (due to the complete exit of target sharehold-
ers), we interact our dummy variable Cash with the conditional beta dummy (βA|βT ). Our
prediction is that Cash transactions are associated with a greater excess comovement than
Stock deals. To test this, we keep deals financed with 100 percent stock as our base category
and introduce interacted (with βA|βT ) dummy variables for all other categories (Cash, Mixed
and Other). Thus, specification (3) in Table 9 estimates the following regression,
βM − E(β) = α + b2(βA|βT × Cash) + b3(βA|βT ×Mixed) + b4(βA|βT ×Other) + Γ′W + ε
As expected, we find that the excess comovement with the acquirer is statistically sig-
nificantly greater for cash transactions than for stock transactions. In terms of economic
magnitude, cash transactions are associated with a 450 percent greater excess comovement
than stock transactions.
Insert Table 9
In specification (4), we consider whether the excess comovement with the acquirer is
larger in cases where the target is included in the S&P 500 as a result of the merger.
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To do so, we create the dummy variable, Target Inclusion. Specifically, this dummy
variable takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is included in the S&P 500 prior to the an-
nouncement whereas the target is not and the merged firm is not excluded from the S&P
500 during our post estimation window. In the regression, we interact the dummy variable
with the conditional beta dummy (βA|βT ). The point estimate of the coefficient is positive
and economically as well as statistically (one sided test at the ten percent level) significant.
Thus, suggesting that index inclusion is associated with significant investor exit which results
in a larger tilt towards the comovement of the acquirer. The economic magnitude is large
and comparable to that of cash deals.
Similarly, we also consider whether the degree of excess comovement varies with other
factors such as geography and industry that investors have a clear preference for. To do so,
we create two dummy variables, Different SIC and Different State, that take the value 1 if
target and acquirer have different SIC codes and are headquartered in different states respec-
tively and 0 otherwise. Like before, we interact the dummy variables with the conditional
beta dummy (βA|βT ). In specification (5), we examine whether mergers across industries
are associated with a tilt towards the acquirer. The coefficient on our interaction variable
βA|βT×Different SIC is positive and significant in both economic and statistical terms. Fi-
nally, in specification (6), we consider whether deals in which the target and acquirer are
located in different states are associated with larger post merger beta differentials. The
coefficient on our interaction variable is positive and statistically significant at the ten per-
cent level. The results of Table 9 suggest that shareholder exit significantly impacts excess
comovement.
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4. Robustness
One concern raised by Brealey et al. (2010) is that the merger transforms the targets assets
to become more like the assets of the acquirer. However, for this transformation to explain
our findings it must be that the transformation is more rapid for cash transactions and deals
in which the target is included in the S&P 500 index. Furthermore, this transformation has to
be rather rapid since we estimate our post merger beta over 100 weeks following completion.
Additionally, we follow Brealey et al. and document the progression of comovement post
completion. If asset transformation is driving our results we would expect that the unobserver
target beta tends towards the acquirer beta over time. This has several implications. First,
the beta of the merged firm should be changing as the assets are being transformed. Second,
when the beta of the acquirer is greater than the beta of the target (βA > βT ), as the beta
of the target converges to that of the acquirer the beta of the merged firm should increase.
Third, when βT > βA the beta of the merged firm should decrease as the transformation
progresses. To test these predictions we have estimated the post merger beta over 100 weeks
starting in eight consecutive quarters following completion.
Insert Figure 5 here
Panel A of Figure 5 considers the progression of the post merger beta for cash deals in
which βA > βT . Contrary to the asset transformation hypothesis we do not find an increase
in the post merger beta over time. The beta at completion is 1.17 and the last estimated
beta is 1.08.10 The difference between the two is not statistically significant. In Panel B of
Figure 5 we consider cash deals for which βT > βA. There is no discernible trend in beta
10The corresponding post merger beta estimated in Table 3 is 1.18 (compared to 1.17 in this section). To
consider the progression in comovement we require the firm to be present in CRSP four years following the
completion and this results in a loss of three observations compared to Table 3.
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over time, the beta at completion is 0.82 and the last estimated beta is 0.85. The difference
is neither statistically nor economically significant.11
5. Conclusion
Previous studies (Chan, et al., 2003, and Brealey et al., 2010) document excess comovement
in international equity markets. These papers study events in which the shareholder base of
the firm is expected to change (listings and cross-border mergers) and relate this to changes
in comovement. Thereby providing evidence of international segmentation and suggesting
that stocks are priced on country level rather than internationally (see Karolyi and Stulz,
2003 for a review of the literature).
This paper provides evidence of excess comovement in US mergers and thereby of seg-
mentation on a national level. We do this by comparing a post merger beta to an expected
post merger beta based on the pre merger comovement of the target and the acquirer. We
find that the post merger comovement is shifted towards the comovement of the acquirer.
In a similar vein, Barberis et al. (2005) document segmentation on a national level by
showing that stocks that are included into the S&P 500 experience an increase in comovement
with the S&P 500. They argue that there are investor habitats and therefore index inclusion
is associated with investor entry and exit. When we consider those target firms that are
included into the S&P 500, we find evidence suggesting that the shift towards the acquirer
is larger corroborating the existence of a S&P 500 habitat. Additionally, we verify that our
results remain qualitatively unchanged even in the absence of index inclusion. Relying on
mergers for identification rather than index inclusion has the advantage that we can consider
segmentation along other dimensions over which investors may show a preference for, such
as industry, geographic location (e.g., Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) and index membership.
11Using the overall sample we have confirmed that asset transformation is not driving our results.
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Identifying excess comovement relies on two assumptions; first that there is entry or exit
of investors associated with the event and second that nothing else is altered as a result of the
event. Arguably, firms may undergo significant changes as a result of a merger (e.g., leverage
may increase) and therefore, it is important that we are careful in considering alternative
stories. However, for any alternative story to explain our results it must be the case that
the explanation generates asymmetric predictions with respect to the relative riskiness of the
acquirer and the target. That is, the story has to jointly explain why the post merger beta
is greater than expected when the comovement with the market of the acquirer is greater
than that of the target and why the post merger beta is smaller than expected when the
target is riskier than the acquirer. For example in terms of leverage, it must increase in one
set of transactions and decrease for the complement. In particular, we control for changes
in leverage and synergies in our analysis.
Given the mounting evidence that markets are segmented (both internationally and na-
tionally), this suggests that care should be taken when estimating betas in situations in
which a significant proportion of the investor base has been altered.
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Figure 1
Timeline
This figure depicts the timeline of our research design. During the pre run-up period, which lasts for 100 weeks
and ends eight weeks prior to the merger announcement, we estimate the betas for the acquiror (βA) and the target
(βT ). E(β) is the market value weighted average of these betas, adjusted for a possible toehold. The run-up period,
covering the eight weeks prior to announcement, is excluded from the estimation period due to the possibility of
informed trading. The post merger period lasts for 100 weeks after completion. In this period we estimate the beta
of the merged firm, βM .
93
Figure 2
Comovement changes in mergers
These figures illustrate changes in comovement as a result of the merger. Panel A illustrates the deals for which
βA > βT and Panel B the deals for which βA < βT . The horizontal axis represents the timing of the merger: (-1) is
the pre and (1) the post merger period. βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and target respectively.
E(β) is the expected beta of the merged firm, calculated as the market value weighted average of βA and βT , adjusted
for a possible toehold. Finally, βM is the beta of the merged firm after completion.
(a) Panel A: βA > βT (b) Panel B: βT > βA
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Figure 3
Comovement changes in cash mergers
These figures illustrate changes in comovement as a result of the merger for cash deals only. Panel A illustrates
the deals for which βA > βT and Panel B the deals for which βA < βT . The horizontal axis represents the timing of
the merger: (-1) is the pre and (1) the post merger period. βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and
target respectively. E(β) is the expected beta of the merged firm, calculated as the market value weighted average
of βA and βT , adjusted for a possible toehold. Finally, βM is the beta of the merged firm after completion.
(a) Panel A: βA > βT (b) Panel B: βT > βA
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Figure 4
Average change in leverage around mergers
This figure illustrates the average change in leverage around mergers. Panel A contains the data of the full sample
while Panel B contains cash deals only. Furthermore, the data is split according to whether βA > βT or βA < βT .
Leverage is defined as the end-of-year ratio of the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s book value of debt to the sum of
the acquirer’s and target’s total market value. Total market value is defined as book value of debt plus the market
value of equity. Book value of debt is defined as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat-Item dltt) plus debt in current
liabilities (Compustat-Item dlc). The leverage levels are shown for the three years prior to announcement and the
three years after completion.
(a) Panel A: Full Sample (b) Panel B: Cash Transactions
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Figure 5
Progression of the merged firm’s beta
This figure depicts the progression of the merged firm’s beta over time. Panel A illustrates the deals for which
βA > βT and Panel B the deals for which βA < βT . The horizontal axis represents the timing of the merger: (-1) is
the pre merger period, (0) the completion period and positive numbers are quarters after completion (one to eight).
During the pre run-up period, which lasts for 100 weeks and ends eight weeks prior to the merger announcement, we
estimate the betas for the acquirer (βA) and the target (βT ). The beta of the merged firm, βM , is estimated for the
first time at completion using 100 weeks of data. In each of the consecutive eight quarters, the beta of the merged
firm is estimated anew using 100 weeks of data.
(a) Panel A: βA > βT (b) Panel B: βT > βA
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Table 1
Summary statistics of our main variables
We present descriptive statistics for our main variables. MV Target and MV Acquirer is the market value
in Mio. USD of the target and the acquirer firm eight weeks prior to deal announcement. Target Weight is
the ratio of MV Target to the combined market value, MV Target plus MV Acquirer, adjusted for a possible
toehold. Leverage ex-ante is the end-of-year ratio of the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s book value of debt
to the combined total market value for the year prior to announcement. Total market value is defined as
book value of debt plus market value of equity. Book value of debt is calculated as the sum of long-term debt
(Compustat-Item dltt) plus debt in current liabilities (Compustat-Item dlc). Leverage ex-post is calculated
analogously for the year after deal completion. Synergies is the ratio of the combined, market adjusted
abnormal value (target and acquirer) created over a six week window around the merger announcement
(three weeks before and three weeks after) relative to the combined market value of the target and acquirer
eight weeks prior to the merger announcement. Synergies are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. λ is
the toehold the acquirer owns at deal announcement. β’s are estimated using weekly data over a 100 weeks
estimation period. βA is the acquirer’s and βT the target’s beta based on an estimation window ending eight
weeks prior to deal announcement. E(β) is the expected beta of the merged firm, calculated as market value
(MV Target and MV Acquirer) weighted average of βA and βT , adjusted for possible toeholds. βM is the
beta of the merged firm calculated after deal completion. All β’s are winsorized at the one and 99 percent
level.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
MV Target (Mio.) 2’360 7’117 461 28 81’900 712
MV Acquirer (Mio.) 4’928 17’000 987 22 230’000 712
Target Weight 34.47% 15.74% 32.49% 2.74% 79.77% 712
Leverage ex-ante 23.91% 18.02% 21.05% 0.00% 83.66% 693
Leverage ex-post 31.74% 23.38% 28.27% 0.00% 94.99% 703
Synergies 6.23% 16.76% 5.08% -38.59% 68.71% 712
λ 2.95% 12.87% 0.00% 0.00% 95.35% 712
βA 1.05 0.60 0.98 -0.27 3.01 712
βT 1.03 0.64 0.98 -0.59 3.16 712
E(β) 1.05 0.54 1.00 -0.31 2.90 712
βM 1.09 0.57 1.03 -0.44 2.78 712
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Table 2
Univariate Results for the full sample
We present univariate results for the full sample according to whether βA > βT (columns 2 and 3) or
βA < βT (columns 4 and 5). βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is
the expected merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the acquirer
beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β) is Excess
Comovement. We report mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive
(βM − E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative (βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value
of the target beta which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T − βT is the difference between
the implicit and the observed target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the
difference between βImpT and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test
statistics are reported for one sided tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and
one percent(***).
Overall Sample
βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.24 1.19 0.85 0.80
βT 0.78 0.75 1.30 1.18
E(β) 1.09 1.04 1.00 0.96
βM 1.18 1.11 0.99 0.94
βM − E(β) 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.05
(3.08) (2.47) (-0.45) (-0.71)
βImpT 1.05 0.93 1.26 1.10
βImpT − βT 0.27** 0.18** -0.04 -0.08
(2.32) (1.95) (-0.43) (-0.66)
Change 34.2% 23.4% -3.2% -7.2%
N 372 372 340 340
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Table 3
Univariate results according to method of payment
We present univariate results for different methods of payment. Panel A restricts the full sample to cash
deals only while Panel B considers pure stock deals. We measure Excess Comovement according to whether
βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre merger betas
of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted
average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual
merged beta and βM−E(β) is Excess Comovement. We report mean and median test statistics (in brackets)
for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative (βM −E(β) < 0) when
βA < βT . β
Imp
T is the implicit value of the target beta which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold.
βImpT − βT is the difference between the implicit and the observed target beta. Testing procedure and
statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized
at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for one sided tests with the significance levels
of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: Cash Deals Panel B: Stock Deals
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.14 1.14 0.76 0.73 1.36 1.26 0.96 0.89
βT 0.70 0.69 1.21 1.10 0.86 0.83 1.43 1.22
E(β) 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.87 1.20 1.12 1.11 1.02
βM 1.18 1.12 0.84 0.83 1.23 1.18 1.11 1.03
βM − E(β) 0.20*** 0.14*** -0.09** -0.11** 0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.04
(2.97) (2.42) (-1.70) (-1.77) (0.70) (0.24) (-0.06) (-0.18)
βImpT 1.03 1.07 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.66 1.39 1.29
βImpT − βT 0.32* 0.38** -0.33** -0.17** 0.11 -0.17 -0.04 0.07
(1.41) (1.88) (-1.94) (-1.75) (0.56) (-0.05) (-0.20) (0.12)
Change 46.1% 54.5% -27.5% -15.2% 12.7% -20.2% -2.5% 5.8%
N 66 66 58 58 148 148 115 115
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Table 4
Univariate results according to index inclusion
We present univariate results for index inclusion. Panel A restricts the full sample to deals where the
target has become part of the S&P 500 Index as a result of the transaction. Panel B restricts the full
sample to only cash deals that are not affected by any change in S&P 500 listing status. We measure Excess
Comovement according to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9).
βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected merged beta,
calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted
for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β) is Excess Comovement. We report
mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0) when
βA > βT and negative (βM −E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value of the target beta which
would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T −βT is the difference between the implicit and the observed
target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT and βT in
percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for one sided
tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: Target Index Incl. Panel B: Cash Deals w/o Index Incl.
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 0.98 0.87 0.92 0.92 1.14 1.16 0.75 0.73
βT 0.68 0.60 1.32 1.32 0.68 0.65 1.21 1.08
E(β) 0.89 0.80 1.03 1.08 0.96 1.01 0.93 0.87
βM 1.00 0.86 0.87 0.93 1.17 1.13 0.83 0.82
βM − E(β) 0.11 0.13 -0.15*** -0.13*** 0.21*** 0.16*** -0.09** -0.11**
(1.15) (1.09) (-2.54) (-2.54) (2.89) (2.31) (-1.69) (-1.75)
βImpT 0.84 0.84 0.71 0.79 1.09 1.02 0.89 0.98
βImpT − βT 0.16 0.23 -0.62** -0.53*** 0.41** 0.37** -0.32** -0.11*
(0.41) (0.58) (-2.37) (-2.56) (1.71) (1.83) (-1.84) (-1.65)
Change 23.8% 38.8% -46.6% -40.1% 59.7% 56.8% -26.4% -9.7%
N 32 32 29 29 57 57 52 52
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Table 5
Univariate results according to industry
We present univariate results for intra versus inter industry mergers. Panel A restricts the full sample
to across industry deals (different SIC) only while Panel B considers within industry deals (same SIC)
exclusively. We measure Excess Comovement according to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or
βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target.
E(β) is the expected merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the
acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β)
is Excess Comovement. We report mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement
being positive (βM − E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative (βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the
implicit value of the target beta which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T −βT is the difference
between the implicit and the observed target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change
is the difference between βImpT and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level.
Test statistics are reported for one sided tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**)
and one percent(***).
Panel A: Different SIC Panel B: Same SIC
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.27 1.23 0.83 0.77 1.19 1.11 0.88 0.85
βT 0.77 0.74 1.28 1.18 0.80 0.76 1.32 1.18
E(β) 1.11 1.07 0.98 0.90 1.06 1.00 1.03 1.02
βM 1.23 1.15 0.97 0.93 1.09 1.06 1.02 0.95
βM − E(β) 0.13*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.08
(3.15) (2.78) (-0.51) (-0.45) (0.87) (0.33) (-0.11) (-0.54)
βImpT 1.17 0.97 1.22 1.15 0.87 0.84 1.30 1.09
βImpT − βT 0.40*** 0.23** -0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.09
(2.49) (2.26) (-0.46) (-0.32) (0.43) (0.19) (-0.12) (-0.65)
Change 51.9% 31.2% -4.6% -2.8% 8.5% 9.9% -1.4% -7.5%
N 224 224 197 197 148 148 143 143
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Table 6
Univariate results according to geography
We present univariate results for within and across State mergers. Panel A restricts the full sample to
across State deals (different State) only while Panel B considers within State deals (same State) exclusively.
We measure Excess Comovement according to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns
4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected
merged beta, calculated as the market value weighted average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights
are adjusted for a possible toehold. βM is the actual merged beta and βM−E(β) is Excess Comovement. We
report mean and median test statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0)
when βA > βT and negative (βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value of the target beta
which would be required for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T − βT is the difference between the implicit and the
observed target beta. Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT
and βT in percent. All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for
one sided tests with the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: Different State Panel B: Same State
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.23 1.17 0.86 0.83 1.26 1.22 0.84 0.73
βT 0.77 0.72 1.32 1.18 0.81 0.81 1.23 1.19
E(β) 1.08 1.01 1.01 0.96 1.10 1.09 0.99 0.87
βM 1.18 1.12 0.99 0.95 1.17 1.09 1.00 0.93
βM − E(β) 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.04
(2.90) (2.47) (-0.76) (-1.01) (1.09) (0.51) (0.31) (0.30)
βImpT 1.09 0.92 1.25 1.08 0.93 1.03 1.26 1.26
βImpT − βT 0.31*** 0.20** -0.07 -0.10 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.06
(2.35) (1.94) (-0.55) (-0.98) (0.52) (0.53) (0.15) (0.41)
Change 40.6% 27.9% -5.0% -8.1% 14.4% 27.0% 1.9% 5.1%
N 285 285 249 249 87 87 91 91
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Table 7
Univariate results for changes in leverage
We present univariate results for different level of changes in leverage. We restrict the sample to cash
deals only. Panel A contains all deals where the change in leverage is below the median (Q1) change. Panel
B includes all deals where the change in leverage is above the median (Q2) change. The mean (median)
change in leverage is reported in the second row of each panel. We measure Excess Comovement according
to whether βA > βT (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7) or βA < βT (columns 4, 5, 8 and 9). βA and βT are the pre
merger betas of the acquirer and the target. E(β) is the expected merged beta, calculated as the market
value weighted average of the target and the acquirer beta. Weights are adjusted for a possible toehold.
βM is the actual merged beta and βM − E(β) is Excess Comovement. We report mean and median test
statistics (in brackets) for Excess Comovement being positive (βM −E(β) > 0) when βA > βT and negative
(βM − E(β) < 0) when βA < βT . βImpT is the implicit value of the target beta which would be required
for βM = E(β) to hold. β
Imp
T − βT is the difference between the implicit and the observed target beta.
Testing procedure and statistics are as above. Change is the difference between βImpT and βT in percent.
All betas are winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Test statistics are reported for one sided tests with
the significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Panel A: ∆ Leverage Q1 Panel B: ∆ Leverage Q2
2.23% (2.34%) 34.70% (32.04%)
βA > βT βT > βA βA > βT βT > βA
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
βA 1.24 1.14 0.77 0.72 1.10 1.16 0.70 0.70
βT 0.76 0.72 1.26 1.10 0.72 0.76 1.13 1.02
E(β) 1.10 1.01 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.83
βM 1.22 1.17 0.84 0.84 1.17 1.11 0.80 0.80
βM − E(β) 0.12 0.06 -0.09* -0.11* 0.25*** 0.16** -0.09 -0.05
(1.20) (0.80) (-1.33) (-1.38) (2.47) (2.06) (-1.06) (-1.02)
βImpT 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.81 1.06 1.26 0.98 0.98
βImpT − βT 0.10 0.39 -0.51** -0.28** 0.34 0.49** -0.15 -0.04
(0.27) (0.00) (-1.99) (-1.76) (1.21) (2.00) (-0.94) (-0.76)
Change 13.5% 19.0% -40.3% -25.7% 47.9% 64.5% -13.3% -4.1%
N 26 26 32 32 35 35 22 22
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Table 9
Regression results for the full sample
We present the regression results with Excess Comovement (βM −E(β)) as our dependent variable. βA|βT measures relative
riskiness and is equal to (−1) for βA < βT and 1 for βA > βT . βA|βT × Cash, βA|βT ×Mixed and βA|βT × Other are
interaction variables of the dummy variables of cash, mixed and other deals with βA|βT . The base category in Regression
(3) is pure stock deals. βA|βT × Target Inclusion is an interaction variable of Target Inclusion, a dummy equal to one
in case the Target is included in the S&P500 Index as a result of the merger, with βA|βT . βA|βT × Different SIC is an
interaction variable of Different SIC, a dummy equal to one in case the SIC of the acquirer and the target are different, with
βA|βT . βA|βT ×DifferentState is an interaction variable of Different State, a dummy equal to one in case the State of the
acquirer and the the target are different, with βA|βT . Target Weight is the market capitalization of the the target company,
adjusted for toeholds, relative to the combined market capitalization of the target and the acquirer firm eight weeks prior to
the merger announcement. Change in Leverage is the difference in end-of-year leverage of the combined balance sheet (target
and acquirer) one year prior to the merger announcement to the merged firm end-of-year leverage one year after the completion
of the deal. Leverage is measured as book value of debt to total market value which is defined as book value of debt plus
market value of equity. Change in Leverage is winsorized at the one and 99 percent level. Synergies is the ratio of the target’s
and acquirer’s combined market adjusted abnormal value created over a six week window around the merger announcement
(three weeks before to three weeks after) relative to the combined market value eight weeks prior to the merger announcement.
Index Inclusion is a control variable equal to one if either the acquirer or the target changed their S&P 500 listing status from
the beginning of the pre to the end of the post merger estimation window. All regressions control for a deal announcement
year fixed-effect. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are calculated for a one sided test (βM −E(β) > 0) and reported
in brackets with significance levels of ten percent(*), five percent(**) and one percent(***).
Dependent Variable: βM − E(β)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βA|βT 0.052*** 0.045**
(2.56) (2.18)
βA|βT x Cash 0.135***
(2.97)
βA|βT x Other 0.055*
(1.43)
βA|βT x Mixed -0.002
(-0.04)
βA|βT x Target Inclusion 0.132***
(2.38)
βA|βT x Different SIC 0.066***
(2.41)
βA|βT x Different State 0.057***
(2.45)
Target Share -0.064 -0.080 -0.079 -0.057 -0.072
(-0.44) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.39) (-0.49)
Change in Leverage 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 0.002 0.002*
(1.29) (1.17) (1.38) (1.28) (1.33)
Synergies Share 0.224* 0.212* 0.232** 0.229** 0.231**
(1.61) (1.51) (1.66) (1.65) (1.66)
Index Inclusion -0.033 -0.039 -0.040 -0.030 -0.032
(-0.66) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.61) (-0.63)
Constant 0.04** 0.040 0.050 0.046* 0.037 0.040
(1.95) (0.77) (0.96) (0.87) (0.71) (0.78)
N 712 685 685 685 685 685
R-squared 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.014 0.017 0.017
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Abstract
This paper provides a joint analysis of the effect of mergers on default risk and
bondholder value. I find that mergers significantly increase acquirers default risk,
measured by abnormal changes in CDS spreads. This change can be explained best by
the deal structure, while target characteristics contribute only little. The impact of the
merger on default risk is not only transitory, but shown to be persistent over time. It
leads to a gain for CDS investors of USD 656m, while bondholders of acquiring firms
lose USD 17.3m. This skewed distribution of gains and losses, as well as the positive
relation between CDS notional outstanding and changes in default risk, provides an
indication that empty creditors matter in terms of mergers.
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1 Introduction
Literature has comprehensively documented the value generation anddestruction ofmerg-
ers and acquisitions form the point of view of a firm’s shareholders. The related work on
how bondholders are impacted by mergers and acquisitions is much less developed and
so far offers mostly ambiguous results, arguably because the trading data for bonds is not
as complete as for equity and, moreover, because bonds are not as standardized an instru-
ment as stocks. In this paper, I will take the analysis a step further by using a measure,
namely credit default swap spreads, that is on the one hand independent of individual
bond features and, on the other hand, has a high enough trading frequency to estimate
the impact of the merger with a higher precision. Specifically, I intend to answer the ques-
tions of whether mergers are changing the default risk of corporate debt, how this poten-
tial change can be explained and how it effects bondholder value. Furthermore, this paper
broadly adds to the growing literature on empty creditors by providing evidence on the
relation between overinsurance and the change of bond default risk.
In the wake of a slowly recovering merger market, with many firms holding plenty of
excess cash in their balance sheets, it is as important as ever to understand how mergers
impact bondholders. Moreover, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Market
Association (SIFMA), the volume of outstanding corporate debt in the US has been grow-
ing gradually and reached a volume of USD 8.47 trillion as of the second quarter 2012.1
This compares to amarket capitalization of all equities listed on the NYSE of USD 13.3 tril-
lion as reported by the World Federation of Exchanges. A recent Bloomberg article notes
that "forty-two percent of investment-grade companies that sold new issues in U.S. dollars
last quarter cited mergers and acquisitions as a use of proceeds". The question of whether
mergers change the risk of outstanding debt and hence lead to wealth-transfers between
1This is an increase by 5 percent compared to the second quarter of 2011 and by 40 percent compared to
pre-crises level of 2007.
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different stakeholders within a firm is therefore an important issue in the professional as
well as the academic world. While the agency problem of debt (Jensen and Meckling,
1976), i.e. the cost of monitoring the compliance of the management’s investment deci-
sions with the ex-ante contracted strategy, is widely recognized, it is much less obvious
why wealth transfers between share and debtholders actually happen. Are bondholders
too lenient, maybe due to an overinsurance of their investment (empty creditors), in mon-
itoring and restricting a firm’s management from using mergers to redistribute wealth
from bondholders to shareholders? Or will a merger lead to a safer entity by bringing
together firms with less than perfectly correlated cash flows and thus shift wealth from
shareholders to bondholders?
The contribution to the existing literature on bondholder wealth is threefold. First,
by using a more liquid and more standardized measure, I extend past research in this
field with an arguably more precise and powerful econometric analysis. Second, the close
relation between CDS spreads and bond values allows to implicitly link changes in credit
default swap spreads to changes in risk adjusted wealth of bondholders. This makes it
possible to effectively put a price-tag on the impact of each merger transaction. Third,
I provide preliminary evidence on how overinsured bondholders, i.e. empty creditors,
impact M&A deals.
Combining the idea of the classical credit risk model by Merton (1974) with the no-
arbitrage pricing framework for credit default swaps (see for, example, Duffie and Single-
ton (1999) or Hull and White (2000)), I propose several testable hypotheses on the impact
of mergers on the default risk of bonds and hence bondholder value. The general pre-
diction of this framework states that the change in default risk should be non-positive,
depending on the correlation of the twomerging firm’s asset volatility. This is in line with
the coinsurance or debt capacity hypothesis proposed by Lewellen (1971) andHiggins and
Schall (1975). Indeed, I do find evidence in the data that firms merging across industry,
where the correlation is arguably smaller, increase default risk significantly less than firms
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merging within their industry.
Based on the analysis of 184merger transactionswithUS acquirers, I find evidence that
mergers increase CDS spreads on average. During a three daywindow around themerger
announcement, the observed abnormal change inCDS spreads is on average +4.95 percent.
This finding is statistically significant.
The overall increase in bondholder risk suggests a negative impact of M&A transac-
tions on the acquiring firm’s bondholder value. While the direction of the impact is con-
sistent with Billett, King, and Mauer (2004), who found an abnormal drop in bond prices
of -0.09 percent for investment grade bonds, and earlier work of Dennis and McConnell
(1986), the magnitude observed in CDS spreads is substantially larger. In terms of wealth,
this equals an average loss of approximately USD 17.3m for the acquiring firm’s debthold-
ers and a gain of USD 656m for investors holding CDS contracts. The bondholder value
effect happens, because investors holding bonds in a firm that announces a merger will on
average have to carrymore risk on their investment going forward. Because this additional
risk is not compensated by the market, they will effectively lose money.
To explain the significant average increase in default risk following amerger announce-
ment, it must be the case that other important parameters change systematically. In my
analysis, I differentiate between changes as a result of the deal structure, for example fi-
nancing and consideration offered in the deal, and impacts that are due to acquired risk
and benefit, as for example the leverage ratio or asset volatility of the target relative to the
acquirer.
Overall, my findings suggest that mergers, on average, entail a considerable degree of
wealth transfer between CDS investors and acquiring firm bondholders. Limited evidence
also hints towards a wealth transfer from the acquiring firm’s to the target firm’s bond-
holders. I show that certain characteristics of the deal and the involved firms can be used
to identify the transaction as desirable or harmful to existing debtholders of the acquiring
firm. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. I describe the related literature
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in Section 2. In Section 3, I develop the predictions concerning the effect of mergers on
default risk and hence CDS prices. Section 4outlines the employed methodology and Sec-
tion 5 describes the data used in the analysis. In Section I present the empirical results
and Section concludes.
2 Literature
The literature has developed different reasons, from a shareholder point of view, for why
mergers happen and what the predicted reaction of share prices following the transaction
announcement is. The literature taking the bondholder’s point of view, on the the other
hand, has only received limited attention in answering the question of how mergers ac-
tually impact the value of the debt. The most prominent value proposition of mergers
concerning debt has first been raised in the context of conglomerate mergers. The idea
of coinsurance, the diversification of a firm’s cash flow and hence the reduction of de-
fault risk, was introduced by theoretical work of Lewellen (1971) and Higgins and Schall
(1975). They predict that coinsurance reduces risk, measured as cash flow volatility, in the
merged entity and hence benefits existing bondholders. Early empirical literature on this
topic goes back to Kim and McConnell (1977) who found a negative yet not significant
abnormal bond return to merger announcements. While Eger (1983) found positive and
significant abnormal returns, Dennis andMcConnell (1986) found negative and significant
changes. Positive and significant returns were again found byMaquieira, Megginson, and
Nail (1998) while the most comprehensive analysis along in this strand of literature so far,
by Billett, King, and Mauer (2004), only finds a significant positive abnormal bond return
for target firms (suggesting a drop in risk as a result of themerger). For acquirers, they find
a slightly negative price impact which would imply an increase in risk. An agreement of
how bondholder wealth is impacted, however, has not been reached as the different find-
ings were too diverse.
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A major issue of all these studies is the sparse data on bond trades. The low trading
frequency and limited sample size compromises statistical testswhichwere created for liq-
uid stocks (c.f. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009)). Moreover, unlike stocks,
bonds cannot be treated as a homogenous instrument due to their many design features
and different maturities. As such, the reactions to merger announcements vary consider-
ably between issues and hence make conclusions on a general level dependent on strong
assumptions.
Furfine and Rosen (2011) explore the question of howM&As effect bondholders not on
the basis of bond prices, but from the point of view of a firm’s probability of default. The
latter is measured as a firm’s expected default frequency, as calculated by KMV. They find
that the acquirer’s probability of default, on average, increases by 93.6 percent around a
merger. This significant increase is assigned to a large extent to managerial actions and
poor past firm performance. Because of the model-based default prediction, which relays
on daily stock prices and quarterly leverage levels, the heterogeneity of bonds as well as
the low bond trading frequency is not an issue in their analysis. While the research ques-
tion and their general approach is similar to what is presented in this paper, I belief that
the central element of both studies, the measure of default risk, differs considerably. The
expected default score of Furfine and Rosen is based on a widely known model and pre-
dicts default within the next year. A CDS, on the other hand, is a market based measure
of risk that is derived from actual transactions.2 Moreover, the default horizon considered
in my case is five years forward. Another notable difference between these studies is the
ability to comment on bondholder value. The expected default score of Furfine and Rosen
does not allow to effectively measure the price impact of a merger. CDS spreads, alterna-
tively, permit to put a price tag on the merger impact and hence allow a classification of
2As such, CDS spreads should incorporatemost of the current and forward looking information available
for a firm and the entire market. This is a particularly important issue for large events with a big impact on
a single firm, such as a merger announcement.
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the effect’s real magnitude. Additionally, expected default scores have the drawback that
one cannot disentangle idiosyncratic changes in default risk from market-wide changes,
an important property when determining the true impact of an event.
A comprehensive overview on credit default swaps is provided by Jarrow (2010). The
existing empirical literature using CDS data as a main source of information is compa-
rably sparse. Much of the early work using CDS data focussed on the limited-arbitrage
between bond and CDS prices. Hull, Predescu, andWhite (2004), for example, look at the
reactions of these two instruments to credit rating changes. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis
(2005) conclude in their research that default risk is the major component of a corporate
yield spread and as such important for driving price movements. Blanco, Brennan, and
Marsh (2005) as well as Feldhütter and Lando (2008) show that the no-arbitrage parity
relation between credit spreads and CDS hold on average, with deviations occurring in
short time windows. During these deviations, CDS prices lead bond spreads (Zhu, 2006).
Empirical work with a more corporate oriented focus has emerged with a broader CDS
coverage of firms. Acharya and Johnson (2007), for example, used CDS to analyze insider
trading while Jorion and Zhang (2007, 2009) use CDS to measure credit contagion, i.e. the
clustering of default of related firms. Stulz (2010) considers the role of CDS in the recent
credit crises and concludes that the CDS market is not responsible for the extraordinary
events which defined the crisis, but, especially in the beginning of the crises, seemed to
have worked rather well. Another important strand of literature using CDS is on empty
creditors, i.e. bondholders that have bought full insurance against default. Bolton and
Oehmke (2011) provide a theoretical model of how CDS may influence the behavior of
bondholders and Danis (2012) provides first empirical evidence on how empty creditors
matter in case a firm goes into default.
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3 Hypotheses
The hypotheses in this study are centered around changes in credit default swap spreads
and hence it is important to understand the basic nature of this instrument first. In the
classical view, a CDS protects its buyer against the loss of funds invested in a specific
reference entity. In case of a credit event of the reference entity, for example amissed coupon
payment or a straight out bankruptcy, a CDS is triggered and the protection buyer receives
the difference of par minus recovery, multiplied by the insured notional amount.3 For this
protection, the buyer has to pay an annual fee, measured in basis points of the insured
nominal, to the seller.4 The minimum nominal value that protection can be bought for
is USD 10 million. While many of the largest firms worldwide use CDS to manage their
risk, the protection seller side is dominated by large, global financial institutions that are,
according to the Bank for International Settlements, liable for more almost 75 percent of
the outstanding net notional as of June 2012.
The CDS market has experienced an impressive growth in the last decade. According
to Markit, the gross notional amount outstanding has been growing from USD 919 billion
in 2001 to USD 25.9 trillion in 2011. After a netting of counterparty contracts, the outstand-
ing amount as of 2011 was still USD 2.7 trillion. The large size and increasing complexity
of this market had led participants to agree on a general institutional framework, which
has become known as the Big Bang Protocol (ISDA, 2009).5 It largely standardizes the way
CDS contracts are structured and provides settlement guidance in case of default.
3There exist four different standards on what characterizes a credit event (old restructuring, modified
restructuring, modified-modified restructuring, and no restructuring). The difference between the first three
definitions mainly concentrates on the classification of the debt that is deliverable upon a credit event. The
fourth, no restructuring, excludes a restructuring of debt, as for example a Chapter 11 filing would be, from
the credit event definition. In the US, no restructuring has become the most widely used standard.
4For US entities, the introduction of the Big Bang Protocol (2009) has led to the general agreement to split
the spread into a fixed coupon payment of 100bps (investment grade) and 500bps (high yield) and pay the
remaining spread as an upfront payment to the seller.
5For a a detailed summary of the main content of this protocol, see Price and Casey (2009).
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Credit default swaps have also been trading in indices since 2001. The two most liquid
families of indeces are the CDX for North America and the iTraxx for Europe and Asia.
In case of an index, the notional is split evenly across the constituents. In case a reference
entity of an index with n constituents defaults, the protection buyer will receive 1
n
th of the
nominal invested, less any recovery proceedings.
The spreads quoted in the single name CDS market are the costs incurred to protect
all debt issued at the level of a reference entity (and not for a specific bond issue only).
For larger entities, the protection is sometimes split into a senior and a subordinated debt
CDS. This aggregation at the level of a firm’s debt class is crucial for my analysis, as it
allows the assessment of the overall change in default risk of a firm.
To validate that credit default swap spreads are indeed an appropriate way to think
about changes in debt default risk and value, it is illustrative to consider the asset-swap
CDS pricingmodel. Figure 1 highlights the basic transactions involved in this no-arbitrage
pricing framework. Initially, the investor seeking default protection takes up a loan at
Libor (rl) and uses the proceeds to buy a risky τ -year corporate bond Bi at par, with a
nominal ofNi and a coupon of ri. To hedge against interest rate changes, the buyer engages
in a fixed-for-float interest rate swap at cost cSWAP , paying ri and receiving rfloat.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The difference in coupon payments between what the investor receives from the risky
bond after hedging for interest rate changes and what he has to pay for the risk-free loan,
rfloat − rl, will then equal the price to protect Bi against default (rcds). The asset swap
model, therefore, requires that the following no-arbitrage condition holds:
rfloat − rl = rcds (1)
Assuming the cost for the interest rate swap, cSWAP = ri − rfloat, and the Libor are deter-
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mined exogenously to the firm and remain stable over the short time horizon, the price
for an individual firm’s credit default swap is, as seen in equation 1, essentially driven by
idiosyncratic changes in risk, reflected in ri:6
ri − cSWAP − rl = rcds (2)
To develop predictions on the impact of mergers on bondholder wealth, I combine the
before mentioned replication argument with the basic idea of there credit risk model by
Merton (1974). At this point, it is important to notice that the goal of this exercise is not to
find anomalies in CDS pricing or even propose a new pricingmodel, but rather to provide
a foundation to think in a structured way about the different channels through which a
mergermay impact CDS prices; the structuralmodel offers just that, a simple, yet powerful
tool for comparative statics. I start with the notion that, based on their payout profiles, a
risky bond of firm i can be replicated by buying a risk-free bond and selling a put-option
on firm i’s assets:
Payoff Risky Debt ≡ Payoff Riskfree Debt− Payoff Put Option
With the risk-free interest rate being determined exogenously and assumed constant
over short periods of time, the firm specific component of the bond value is determined
by the value of the put option alone and hence can be priced according to the formula of
6Changes in risk should therefore also be directly observable in bond prices. However, the low trading
intensity in most of the bond market suggests that these changes in risk are generally only reflected grad-
ually in bond prices (Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009)). Observing the more actively traded
derivatives market should therefore be preferred if the market reaction to a specific event is considered.
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Black and Scholes (1973):
Bi = Ai ·N(−d1) +Ki · e−rf (τ) ·N(d2),
with
d1 =
log( Vi
Ki
) + rf (τ) +
1
2
σ2A(τ)
σ
√
τ
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
τ .
where Ai are a firm’s total assets, σA the firm’s asset volatility, K the nominal value of a
firm’s total debt, τ the time to maturity and rf a risk-free interest rate. N(·) is the cumula-
tive standard normal distribution function.
As the market value of the risky corporate bond (Bi), determined by the put option
value, is closely connected to the coupon payment (ri), relevant in the asset swap model,
the two arguments can be linked.7 This allows a comparative static argument along the
following lines: as the value of the long put-option increases, themarket value of the bond,
Bi, decreases or, put differently, the coupon of this bond would have to adjust upwards
for the market value to stay equal8. A higher coupon on the corporate bond will increase
the CDS spread ceteris paribus.
My hypotheses can hence be arranged along the input parameters of the Black Scholes
option pricing model. In the context of M&A, the transaction between acquirer (a) and
target (t) can be interpreted, under the assumption that both firms assets follow the same
brownian motion, as a combination of two put options. To single out the effect of the
merger, the parameter comparison should be done between the ex-ante proforma combi-
7Because the Merton model assumes a zero-coupon discount bond, the implicit coupon return can be
derived from the difference between the nominal value K and the market value of the bond B. In other
words, the larger the difference between B andK, the higher the implicit coupon ri.
8Another way to think about it is by assuming that a firm issues a bond with exactly the same duration
and notional everyday anew. If the default risk of the firm increases, the firm would have to issue the next
bond with a higher interest rate for a bond issued at par.
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nation P prem and the ex-post merged firm P postm :
P prem (Aa + At, Ka +Kt, rf , (w
2
aσ
2
A,a + w
2
tσ
2
A,t + 2wawtρa,tσA,aσA,t)
1
2 , τ)
⇔ (3)
P postm (Am, Km, rf , σA,m, τ),
where ρa,tmeasures the correlation between the changes in assets of the two firms. The
relation in equation 3 thus provides a basic framework for predictions on merger related
impacts on CDS spreads. While it is not immediately clear why a merger should lead to
a change in the default probability of a firm, equation 3 provides some guidance on what
channels are important to consider in this setting.
The notion of co-insurance, a cashflowdiversification benefit obtained through amerger,
also holds for the CDS framework. It predicts that the merger of two weakly correlated
firms reduces the default risk of the new entity. A low ρa,t reduces the value of the put
and increases the value of the bond or, alternatively, lowers the coupon. A lower ri reduces
the spread of the CDS and hence the default risk as perceived by the market. Hence, even
if the merger creates no synergies and does not change the level of total debt, a change
in default risk is possible. This leads to the before mentioned general prediction that the
effect of mergers on default risk should a priori be non-positive.
A reason for shareholders to engage in a merger transaction are expected synergies.
These newly created assets belong to the residual claimants of the firm and hence not only
increase the value for shareholders, but at the same time also benefit bondholders. In the
analyzed framework, positive merger related synergies (Asyn) imply that the asset base of
the merged firm is larger than the ex-ante proforma combination of acquirer and target,
i.e. Aa +At +Asyn = Am > Aa +At, and hence decreasing the price of the put option. The
resulting increase in the value of the bond reduces the required coupon payments and
hence lowers the CDS spread.
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Ghosh and Jain (2000) conclude in their analysis that mergers on average increase the
leverage of the merged firm relative to the ex-ante proforma combination of the two enti-
ties involved in the transaction. An increase in leverage as part of the merger is commonly
perceived as an increase in the firm’s default risk. This is also reflected in equation 3,
in terms of book-leverage. If the acquirer raises additional debt to finance a transaction
(Knew), the merged firm ends up with Ka + Kt + Knew = Km > Ka + Kt and hence an
increase in the price of the put option. This leads to a lower bond value and thus a higher
CDS spread.
Another hypothesis concerns the consideration offered in the transaction. Pure cash
mergers, i.e. mergers are paidwith a 100 percent cash consideration, will lead to a drain in
the acquirer’s cash holdings and hence a reduction in its assets,Aa+At > Am. Lower assets
will increase the price of the put option and reduce the value of the bond. As a result, I
should observe an increase in CDS spreads for cash mergers.9 In contrast, mergers that
only offer stock consideration should leave total assets unchanged. Pure stock mergers
should therefore not lead so significant changes in a firm’s default risk.
An important issue in the literature on bonds are covenants (see, for example, Dichev
and Skinner (2002) orChava, Kumar, andWarga (2010)). Covenants are generally amended
to protect the owner of bonds from excessive risk taking by shareholders/management
and thus reduce agency conflicts. As covenants exist in many different forms and require-
ments, I focus my analysis on some of the most influential ones in relation to a merger.
For the acquiring firm, I consider the put covenant which allows current debt investors to
call their bonds at par-value if they perceive that the firm’s behavior is not consistent with
the ex-ante agreement. For the target firm, the covenant I consider is change-in-control.
This covenant allows, in a similar fashion, to call the bond at par value in case the firm’s
9A second order effect, reinforcing the impact of the reduced assets, comes from the asset volatility. Cash
positions contribute a very small amount to asset volatility and a reduction of this position should hence
lead to a higher asset volatility of the firm.
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ownership changes.
Both covenants reduce the risk carried by bondholders as they protect them from a
transfer of wealth away from them by factors other than the regular business risk. From an
incentive point of view, the interests of acquiring and target firm bondholders associated
with these covenants are aligned in the sense that neither of them favors a deal that impairs
the bondholders of the merged firm. As these covenants provide a very broad protection,
the impact cannot be attributed to a single parameter in equation 3 alone. Therefore, I pre-
dict that firms with a higher share of their bonds covered by such a covenant, on average,
experience a lower impairment of their wealth from merger transactions than firms with
no coverage and should therefore exhibit a non-positive effect on their CDS spreads.
4 Methodology
Hypotheses are tested using an event-study methodology setting as applied commonly
with stock return data. Compared to the monthly data used in most of the previous lit-
erature on bondholder wealth, the daily spreads of CDS allow for a much more precise
measurement of the market reaction. According to the analysis by Bessembinder, Kahle,
Maxwell, and Xu (2009), the market model approach is able to provide higher powered
tests as for example the market adjusted method used in Jorion and Zhang (2009). The
drawback, however, is that the market model requires a much more complete time series
of data for calibration. I believe that the market model is the more appropriate one for the
events I consider here, as it allows to control for the firm-specific volatility in CDS spreads
and thus does not overweight firms with an a priori higher spread volatility. I calculate
the abnormal change of a firm’s CDS spread around a merger announcement (Abnormal
Spread Change (ASC) or Cumulative Abnormal Spread Change (CASC) for a multi-day
window) using the market model. The abnormal change of firm i’s CDS spread is hence
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the residual of the following regression:
∆ri,t = αi + βi(∆rm,t) + i, (4)
where ∆ri,t is the relative change in the CDS spread of firm i and ∆rm,t is the relative
change in the spread of the CDS market index (CDX North America IG). I define the es-
timation window for the sensitivity parameter βi to be 100 days, ending at the merger
run-up window 20 days before the announcement [-120,-20]. The length of the event win-
dow, the period where the market is expected to reassess the risk of the reference entity,
is chosen to be from the day prior to the day after the announcement [-1,+1]. I take the
logarithm of the CASC’s because a closer inspection of the data revealed that log CASC’s
follow more closely a normal distribution and as such are more desirable for statistical
testing.
The hypotheses stated in Section 3 are tested in two ways; univariate, by comparing
sample splits along different variables of interest and multivariate, by regressing the vari-
ables of interest on CASCs. In the former case, it is especially important to consider the
derivation of an appropriate standard deviation to test for significance. Bernard (1987)
raised the issue that firms within the same portfolio split may breach the independence
assumption of ASC’s between firms and thus bias the standard deviation downwards.
This could be the case even if the firms in the portfolio do not share the same actual event
day. One way to adjust for this issue is, according to Bernard and Kothari and Warner
(2007), to equal weight the firms within their portfolio and hence provide a structure that
explicitly allows for the dependence between the firm’s ASC’s. For testing purposes, one
should then use the standard deviation of the portfolio.
Due to limited availability of CDS data for target firms (cf. Section 5), themain analysis
is based on CDS data from acquiring firms only. It is therefore important, especially for
the multivariate analysis, to not only control for deal implied ex-ante to ex-post changes,
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but also consider the ex-ante differences between acquirer and target firms.
While it is important to determine the magnitude and statistical significance of the
merger impact in the first place, it is of equal substance to put a price tag on the effect
and relate the statistical finding to real values. Changes measured in USD are important
as they allow a common denominator for direct (CDS holders) and indirect (bondhold-
ers) impacts and hence a figure that sums up the total change in value implied by the
merger. Changing CDS spreads directly impact the wealth of investors already holding
CDS; these investors will either pay too much, if default risk decreases, or too little, if de-
fault risk increases, going forward. The same argument holds for the indirect impact on
bondholders. If default risk increases, current bondholders will receive too low an interest
rate for the risk they are taking going forward, while a decrease in default risk will lead to
a relative gain.10 A possible conflict of interest that can evolve from these payoff-profiles
are discussed in Section 6.9 An approximation of the hypothetical change in bondholder
wealth11 can be derived by taking the difference of CDS spreads before (pre) and after
(post) the transaction:
rCDSpre = r
i
pre − cSWAPpre − rlpre
rCDSpost = r
i
post − cSWAPpost − rlpost
⇔
rCDSpost − rCDSpre = (ripost − ripre)− (cSWAPpost + rlpost − cSWAPpre − rlpre) (5)
Provided the assumption of a constant risk-free rate and a constant cost for swap’s holds
10For this line of argument to hold, I have to assume that bonds are priced correctly prior to the merger,
with unexpected changes in risk as large as the ones implied by a merger not priced in. For cases where the
CASC is significant, it seems unlikely that such a change in risk has already been priced in at issuance.
11Provided this jump in default risk is persistent (c.f. Section 6.8), the gain/loss calculation for a current
debt investor holding the asset until maturity would have to reflect this impact over the remaining debt
maturity, as future coupon payments of current issues will not be adequate for the asset’s default risk.
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over the short three day window, the change in CDS spreads is approximately comparable
to the changes that should be reflected in debt of the same maturity.12 Because equation 5
only holds for absolute changes in CDS spreads, CASC’s have to be transferred back into
basis points throughmultiplication with the CDS spread level prior to the announcement.
Additionally, if the change in default risk can be shown to be persistent (c.f. Section 6.8),
a calculation of the total change in value has to reflect the duration of the debt currently
in the portfolio. Put differently, the bondholder will not only receive too low a coupon for
the default risk taken in the current year, but for all future years invested until repayment.
5 Data
Data on Credit Default Swap spreads is obtained from Bloomberg. I use the end-of-day
New York spread data which is available for more than 800 US firms. As CDS are only
traded over-the-counter, prices are not as readily available as for stocks. Similar to other
data providers, such as Markit or CMA, Bloomberg collects daily tradable CDS spread
quotes during a window of 24 hours from the most active CDS contributors, removes the
highest and lowest if at least five quoteswere contributed and reports the arithmeticmean.
In case no provider offers a tradable quote, no price is reported for that day. Bloomberg
provides data on CDS starting 2004, with a growing universe of entities being covered in
more recent times.
Because CDS coverage predominantly centers around the largest firms in the S&P 500,
the availability of target firm CDS is considerably limited (25 firms only). The main analy-
sis is therefore conducted with acquiring firm’s CDS only and limited to the more widely
available senior tranche. CDS can be bought for a variety of durations, from a singlemonth
to many years. While the recent trend has been towards shorter maturities, the most ac-
12Debt is rarely of a maturity that is exactly five years. For debt with a maturity longer than five years, the
change in CDS spreads is likely to be a lower bound while for debt with a shorter than five year maturity,
CDS spread changes offer an upper bound.
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tively traded tranche is still the five year duration which I use in my analysis.
My data from Bloomberg lists 929 firmswith a CDS spread. After reducing the sample
by CDS on the subordinated bond class and keeping only CDS with the no restructuring
credit event definition, my data covers 830 entities.
The index relevant for this study is the CDX North America Investment Grade. The
index is composed of the 125 most liquid single name CDS and rolled every six month
according to the most liquid CDS titles in the market. While old index compositions keep
being traded, the liquidity is concentrated in the most current composition. As with the
single name CDS data, I also obtain quotes of the index from Bloomberg. For the main
analysis, I rely on the most current and hence most liquid index composition.
The price data from Bloomberg is extended by volume and number of transactions
data obtained from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). This data is
provided on a weekly basis, starting in November 2008. DTCC only reports levels of num-
ber of contracts and nominal value outstanding (and not the effectively observed changes
in contracts or nominal value). Therefore, these numbers need to be interpreted as a lower
limit of total transactions as they represent only the residuals after netting out total market
activity.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 provides an overview of the trading activity and changes in nominal volume
outstanding of CDS used in this analysis. The average number of trades conducted in
the week of the event is 37.8813, around 8 trades a day, with an average weekly change
in gross volume outstanding of USD 38.8m. The outstanding gross notional amount of
credit default swaps for acquiring firms one week prior to announcement is USD 13.3bn.
13The change in number of trades is a lower bound for the deals closed and hence the minimum value of
0 in the statistic should not be taken as a sign that no deal has taken place.
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5.1 Further Data
Data ondeal characteristics ofmergers and acquisitions are from the SDCPlatinumdatabase.
I restrict deals to public acquirers that are located within the US and are announced in the
period of 2004 to 2011.
Across Industry transactions are classified as deals in which the acquirer and the target
company operate in different industries. Classification of industry affiliation is according
to SIC with data provided by Compustat.
Synergies are defined similar to Brealey, Cooper, and Kaplanis (2010), as the cumu-
lated abnormal stock return in the eleven day event window [-5,+5] around the merger
announcement, multiplied with the market value six days prior to the merger announce-
ment. Abnormal stock returns are calculated using the market model based on the value-
weighted CRSP index. Stock market returns and equity values used in this calculation are
obtained from CRSP.
Compustat also provides data on debt outstanding to calculate Leverage. Following
Ghosh and Jain (2000), debt is defined as the book value of long-term debt (Compustat
item ‘dltt’) anddebt included in current liabilities (Compustat item ‘dlc’) and set in relation
to total firm assets, calculated as book value of debt plus market value of equity.14 For
target firms outside the US that or not reported in Compustat Global, data on debt and
cash is from Reuters Datastream.
I further use Bloomberg to obtain data on each firm’s debt Covenants as well as the Time
to Maturity of a firm’s outstanding debt. For covenants, I form the ratio of the amount of
debt capital protected to total debt capital outstanding for each firm while for time to
maturity, I calculate a value-weighted average over all bonds of a firm.
Data on Asset Volatility are derived by own calculations. I apply the iterative approach
14A second measure of leverage, as suggested amongst others by Welch (2011), is calculated using net
debt, i.e. book debt adjusted by cash holdings (Compustat item ‘ch’). The results are similar, both in terms
of magnitude as well as statistical significance and hence I refrain from reporting them separately.
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used inVassalou andXing (2004) to calculate a firm’s daily asset value over time andderive
its asset volatility. The approach is outlined in more detail in Appendix A.
To derive an estimate of the firm’s Asset Beta, I value weight the equity beta, calculated
over 250 trading days ending 20 days prior to announcement, and the debt beta, which I
assume to be 0.4 following Kaplan and Stein (1990), by the end-of-year leverage level prior
to the announcement year.
Data on Consideration is obtained from SDC using the items ‘percent of cash’ and ‘per-
cent of stock’. Also from SDC is the variable Share Acquired, which is derived from the item
‘percent sought’.
Deal Ratio is calculated as deal value reported by the SDC item ‘value of transaction’
(paid consideration plus debt outstanding of target firm) divided by the acquiring firm’s
market value of equity 20 days prior to the announcement. For 33 deals that did not report
a deal value, I proxy value of transaction bymultiplying the variable ‘ShareAcquired’with
the market value of the target at the day of announcement and added net debt.15
The initial sample from SDC, in line with the before mentioned restrictions, covers
8’878 deals. I require that at least one of the involved firms, acquirer or target, has CDS
price data available around the merger announcement. Specifically, I drop all transactions
that have less than 60 CDS spread observations in the 100 day pre-runup window [-120,-
20] and less than two observations during the three-day announcement window [-1,1].
This leaves 449 deals. To be recognized as an important enough transaction by investors, I
limit the variable ‘Deal Ratio’ to be at least 1 percent and require that ‘Share Acquired’ is
least 30 percent. This reduces the sample to 184 transactions, 25 of which have CDS spread
data for target firms. The sample reduces further due to data limitations in parts of the
analysis. For the analysis of CDS investor value, the sample reduces to 59 observations
15An alternative measure for deal ratio would be to consider only the equity value purchased in the trans-
action ( ‘Share Acquired’ multipliedwith themarket value of the target at the day of announcement) relative
to the acquiring firm’smarket value of equity. The results are similar in terms of magnitude and significance
and can be provided upon request.
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due to limitations in the DTCC coverage.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables can be found in Table 2. Several statistics
are worth noting. The average level of CDS spreads in the week prior to the deal an-
nouncement is considerably lower for acquirers (113.28 bps) than for targets (163.34 bps).
However, due to the before mentioned constraint of CDS data availability, the number of
observations for the latter group is rather low. Consistent with the relative size of the CDS
spreads, the asset volatility of the acquirer, 16.35 percent, is notably lower than that of the
target with 21.85 percent. On average, the acquired firm is 27.07 percent of the acquir-
ing firm’s value of equity. Because the ratio is calculated based on the target’s enterprise
value, it can be quite large. The average stake that the acquirer purchases in the target firm
is 96.63 percent.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Pairwise correlations of the main variables of interest are provided in Table 3. While
most explanatory variables seem to be only weakly correlated, there are some notable
exceptions that need to be consideredwith care. It seems, for example, that acquirers with
a relatively higher ex-ante leverage ratio in general pick targets with comparably higher
leverage ratios too (correlation of 0.514). An similar observation ismade for asset volatility,
where the correlation between acquirer and target is 0.498. Because neither of the two
pairs of correlated variables are used together in the same regression, the concerns are
only minor. However, the rather strong negative correlation of -0.547 observed between
consideration offered and deal ratio is used explicitly in some of the regressions. While
this correlation is a common observation in practice, as larger deals generally are financed
with a bigger share of stock, the size of it has to be kept in mind when considering the
regression
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6 Empirical Results
6.1 Announcement Reaction
I start by documenting the overall reaction of CDS spreads to merger announcements.
Figure 2 shows the development of the acquirer and target firm’s average CASC around
the deal announcement. Both participants in the transaction show a distinctive reaction
to the event.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The CASC of an equal-weighted portfolio of acquiring firms in the three day win-
dow bracketing the deal’s announcement is +4.95 percent and statistically significant. For
the target portfolio, the reaction is much more pronounced, with a significant CASC of
-19.31 percent. The average, unadjusted CDS spread raises by 9.57 basis points (+9.2 per-
cent) in case of the acquirers and drops by 19.76 basis points (-11.62 percent) in case of
the targets. In terms of value, the increase in default risk impairs existing bondholders of
the acquiring company, on average, by USD 17.3m, while the drop in default risk benefits
target bondholders, on average, by 86.3m.
I next explore the hypotheses of Section 3 in twoways: first, by comparing sample splits
along a variable of interest (c.f. Table 4) and second, by using a multivariate regression
framework (c.f. Tables 5 and 6).
Before considering the hypotheses, a general remark should be made on the control
variables. The relative size of the deal is an important determinant of the effect. As shown
in panel A.1 of Table 4, deals with an abovemedianDeal Ratio have a CASC of 8.32 percent
while small deals only have a CASC of 0.69 percent. This effect is confirmed in the basic
regression framework of Table 5 where an increase in the Deal Ratio by one percentage
point increases CASC by 4.4 basis points. To control for the notion that more risky firms
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may initiate more risky deals, I include a variable measuring acquirer asset volatility. The
coefficient shows up positively in the regression, yet has no significant effect onCASC. The
control for the big bang agreement was because it was hard to grasp how the institutional
changes in the market effect the trading and pricing behavior. The agreement had no
significant impact on CASCs and hence no additional measures need to be taken.
6.2 Coinsurance
So far, the empirical research has found it difficult to provide significant evidence in sup-
port of the coinsurance theory related to bond returns. Even though Billett, King, and
Mauer (2004) found an effect that points in the right direction, i.e. a larger increase in
abnormal bond returns for within-industry mergers, they were not able to show that this
coefficient is statistically different from zero. Furfine and Rosen (2011), on the other hand,
find an increase in expected default risk for firms merging across industries, a result that
is pivotal to the general expectation. Splitting the sample along the four-digit SIC code, I
find that mergers within the same industry increase risk significantly, CASC of 8.91 per-
cent, whereas across industrymergers react considerably less, with a CASC of 3.49 percent
(c.f. panel A.2 in Table 4). The difference is significant at the one percent level and a first
indication for the coinsurance effect. That there is a difference in reaction to the merger
announcement can also be shown graphically. In panel (a) of Figure 3, the difference in
announcement reaction of within and across industry deals shows up markedly. The re-
gression confirms this finding in column 1 of Table 5 and shows it to be robust against the
inclusion of the most important controls (c.f. Table 6). Deals that are done across indus-
tries will on average increase CDS spreads by 4.2 percentage points less than deals that
are done within the same industry. In terms of value, debt investors of firm’s that merge
within the same industry, on average, face costs of USD 41.9m. This is a 4.5 fold higher cost
than what bondholders of firms which merge across industries have to bear (USD 9.4m).
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Table 4 ABOUT HERE
6.3 Synergies
To conformwith the hypothesis on synergies of Section 3, I focus on the sum of target and
acquirer synergies (total synergies), measured in USD. While target synergies are a direct
measure of the expectations of the acquiring firm’smanagement16, acquirer synergies gen-
erally reflect the market’s evaluation of how large the synergy asset will be eventually.17
For the univariate analysis, I split the sample into transactions with positive and nega-
tive synergies. Contrary to my predictions, positive synergies lead to a significant abnor-
mal increase in CDS spreads by 6.29 percent while negative synergies have a much lower
reaction of 3.14 percent only (c.f. panel A.3 in Table 4). The regression results, where I
control for the total amount of synergies created, statistically confirm the univariate find-
ings. However, in economic terms, the effect is almost negligible; for every billion of USD
in synergies created, CASC increases by 0.8 percentage points (c.f. column 3 of Table 5).
Nonetheless, the fact that the finding is not in line with the prediction requires an expla-
nation.
Provided that the proxy for synergies I use is adequate, I believe that a possible answer
to this result can be found in the investor’s perception on synergies’ riskiness. If they
believe that management’s assessment of synergies will not materialize, the money spent
on synergies, i.e. the premium paid to target shareholders, will not increase total assets
of the firm in the long run, but rather reduce them and hence increase default risk. A
16The size of the premium the acquiring firm’s management is willing to pay for the acquisition can be
interpreted as the lower bound of what they expect to gain from the merger.
17Other argumentation may be in favor of considering the acquiring firm’s synergies only as those are the
ones which will stay within the merged firm. Target synergies are, for a large part, due to premiums paid to
target shareholders and will thus only show up partially in the merged firm’s assets. However, I believe that
after controlling for consideration offered, total synergies are a better measure as they combine the informed
guess of management with a critical market assessment. Consideration is important, because it is only in
all-cash mergers that synergies vanish completely and only in all-stock mergers that they are retained fully
within the merged firm.
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possibility to test this is to split total synergies into target and acquirer synergies, as it is
predominantly the former that is perceived to be more risky (in the sense that I argued
above). In untabulated regressions, I find confirming evidence to this hypothesis, as only
target synergies have a statistically significant and positive impact on CASCs. Moreover,
controlling for consideration offered (cash-only vs. stock-only) and using a cross-term of
consideration and synergies, I find that the increase in CASCs is largely driven by target
synergies in deals that are paid for in cash only. In other words, those deals in which the
paid synergies will not increase the assets of the merged firm.
Figure 3 ABOUT HERE
6.4 Leverage
The data confirms the hypotheses that deals which increase the leverage of the acquirer
also lead to positive CASCs. A first indication thereof can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 3.
The increase in CASC is considerably steeper for acquirers that are subject to an increase
in leverage than for those which see a decreasing leverage level. An increase in leverage,
on average, results in a CASC of 6.14 percent. This is significantly different from the lever-
age decreasing deals which have no significant impact on default risk (c.f. panel A.4. in
Table 4). Not surprisingly, this result is confirmed in panel A.5. of Table 4 where the sam-
ple is split along changes in book debt (increase/decrease). This finding also holds after
controlling for other deal specifications. As shown in column 2 of Table 6 an increase in
leverage by one percentage point significantly increases CASC by 0.3 percentage points.18
Thus, on average, leverage would have to increase by 16.3 percentage points to compen-
sate, ceteris paribus, for the reduction in default risk through coinsurance. In terms of
value, acquiring firms that increase their leverage by one percentage point, on average,
reduce their bondholder wealth by USD 0.7m.
18Similar results in terms of magnitude and significance are obtained if leverage is considered net of a
firm’s cash holdings.
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Figure 5 ABOUT HERE
6.5 Consideration
Consistent with the prediction, I find thatmergers paidwith 100 percent cash significantly
increase default risk relative to mergers paid with stock-only. CASC for all-cash deals is
3.93 percent and significant, while deals that are paid with stock-only reduce default risk
by 2.24 percent, yet are not statistically significant (c.f. panel A.6 in Table 4). However,
due to data availability, this result is subject to a limited sample size and hence implica-
tions thereof have to be considered with care. Even though this result is confirmed in the
regression analysis in column 5 of Table 5, with cash deals increasing CASC on average
by 9.6 percentage points more than stock deals, the total impact of consideration offered
diminishes and turn insignificant after the main variables of interest are controlled for
(column 3 in Table 6) .
Figure 6 ABOUT HERE
6.6 Covenants
Both covenants that are considered in this analysis are fairly expensive for firms if they are
triggered and thus in general undesirable to breach. Consistent with the prediction of Sec-
tion 3, I find that firms with more than half of their notional value protected by covenants
increase CASC significantly less than firms with a low protection level. However, the two
covenants differ in how they effect the firm’s risk as can be seen in the sample splits of
Table 4. While firms with a high put coverage ratio seems to decrease their default risk,
even though not significantly, the firms with low ratio have a highly significant CASC of
6.22 percent. Similarly, the higher availability of CIC covenants in target firms result in a
lower CASC for the acquiring firms, however the difference to the firms with a low cover-
age is, even though statistically significant, economically considerably lower than in their
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put covenant counterpart. The difference of impact between the two covenants becomes
more obvious in the regression analysis. Acquiring firm put covenants are decreasing
CASC significantly by 4.2 percent and are robust to the inclusion of the most important
control variables column 7 in Table 5 and column 5 in Table 6, while the impact of CIC
covenants is not significant in either regression setting (c.f. column 6 in Table 5 and col-
umn 4 in Table 6).
6.7 Ex-ante differences
An acquirer’s default risk may not only change as a result of the structure of the deal, but
also adjust to the risk purchased in the transaction. In this case, the target has a higher
default probability than the acquirer prior to the deal. Because CDS spreads for target
firms are only available for a very limited sample, I use four proxies to test this channel of
risk transfer.
Table 7 ABOUT HERE
The univariate results, collected in panels B.1 to B.4 of Table 4, positively support the
notion of acquired risk in three out of the four cases. For deals in which targets have a
higher asset volatility, a higher leverage or a lower bond duration19 relative to the acquirer,
the CASC is significantly higher. The graphical analysis of panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4
underlines this finding. In both cases, CASCs increased considerably more if the target
firm was perceived more risky than the acquirer. The direction of impact of these results
carries over to the regression analysis in columns 1 to 4 in Table 7. However, after control-
ling for even the very basic deal characteristics, none of these proxies is able to explain a
significant share of the total change in CASC. The results in columns 5 to 8 in Table 7 put
19Target bonds with a lower duration can be thought of as gaining in seniority relative to existing acquirer
bonds in the sense of a repayment priority given the acquirer’s asset base.
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the two explanatory approaches of deal structure and bough-in risk in relation. The for-
mer variables are clearly of higher explanatory power and keep, for most of the analysis,
their significance while the latter remain insignificant. Hence, changes in acquiring firm’s
CDS spreads are better explained by deal characteristics than by relative differences.
Figure 4 ABOUT HERE
6.8 Longterm Effects
A concern of the previous analysis may be that the reaction in CDS spreads observed
around mergers is only a short-lived deviation from the true prices and hence the relative
low trading volume in bonds. If this were the case, calculations on wealth changes and
shifts would be temporary only and disappear as quickly as they have shown up. A first
indication that speaks against the effect being temporary only is the graphical represen-
tation of CASCs around the event. Even though limited in the number of days it covers,
Figure 2 displays a fairly steady development of CASC before and, more importantly, af-
ter the announcement. To address this issue more rigorously, I follow previous literature
on long-term return analysis such as Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). These
authors strongly advocate the use of calendar-time portfolios to analyze performance in
the long-run. Specifically, they show that calendar-time portfolios are more powerful to
detect truly significant abnormal returns over longer event-windows than the more tra-
ditional buy-and-hold approach.20 For each day within the window of interest (2004 -
2011), I construct portfolios by equal weighting the firms that are within the event win-
dow that I define to last from three days prior to themerger announcement to 40 days after
merger completion. The changes in portfolio CDS spreads (∆rm,t) are then regressed on
20The buy-and-hold approach does generally not allow to control for the cross-sectional dependence of
the firms involved in the event of interest. As a result, the covariance structure is biased downwards and
statistical significance therefore reported too high. The calendar time approach, on the other hand, reflects
the cross-sectional correlations of individual firms in the portfolio variance and hence provides superior
statistical properties.
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the changes in the CDS market index (∆rm,t), similar to the regression design described
in equation 4:
∆rp,t = αp + βi(∆rm,t) + i. (6)
The regression intercept, αp, can therefore be interpreted as the average daily abnormal
spread change of the portfolio consisting of event firms only. Provided the market model
is specified well, αp is equal to zero under the null hypothesis. For my full sample of event
firms, I find that αp is significantly different from zero at the one percent level, with a daily
average abnormal spread change of 0.23 percent. This finding provides evidence in favor
of a persistent impact of a merger transaction on a firm’s default risk. I therefore reject the
concern that the observed abnormal change in CDS spreads is only a short term deviation.
6.9 Empty Creditors
The more widely spread use of credit default swaps has raised the issue of “empty cred-
itors”. Empty creditors are, according to Bolton and Oehmke (2011), debtholders that
have obtained insurance against default, but otherwise retain control rights in and outside
bankruptcy. As a result thereof, the incentives of debtholders to keep the risk of a firm at
an essentially equal level may shift and lead to inefficiently high numbers of bankruptcies.
The distribution of changes in wealth as discussed at the outset could certainly prove
to be attractive enough for creditors to buy insurance and profit in case a firm’s default
risk increases. Based on the gross nominal amount of CDS outstanding one week prior
to the deal announcement, on average USD 13.3bn, the event led to an average increase
in the value of CDS outstanding of USD 656m. That is, investors holding CDS contracts
prior to the announcement will pay too little for the risk theywill carry going forward and
hence gain considerably from themerger announcements. Even after netting counterparty
transactions, themonetary impact of the change in risk is still a gain ofUSD65.1mand thus
a manyfold of the average negative effect of USD 17.3m for acquiring firms’ bondholders.
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In terms of mergers, empty creditors may matter in how a deal is structured. That is,
acquiring firmswith an overinsured bond portfolio have the incentives of bond and share-
holders aligned and hence should be financing deals predominantly with additional debt.
As a result, these firms are predicted to increase the default risk significantly. Because
there is no data linking an investor’s holding of bonds and CDS in the same company, the
level of an investor’s protection against default risk can only be measured on an aggregate
market level. I proxy overinsurance in twoways; first, by considering the total net notional
amount of CDS outstanding one week prior to announcement and second, by forming an
insurance ratio, calculated as the outstanding net notional amount of CDS for the acquirer
one week prior to announcement relative to the most recent annual number of total debt.
For both measures, higher values increase the likelihood of overinsurance and hence the
prospect of a CDS spread increase as a result of the merger transaction.
Figure 5 ABOUT HERE
I find two pieces of evidence that speak in favor of the overinsurance hypothesis. First,
panels (a) and (b) in Figure 5 display the reaction of the abnormal spread change around
the date of announcement. While all acquirers show a very close comovement prior and
after the event window, firms that have an above median level of net notional CDS out-
standing or that protected an abovemedian percentage of their debt, exhibit a substantially
larger increase in their abnormal CDS spreads.
Second, comparing the CASC statistically across median splits, I find that firms with
abovemedian net notional CDSoutstanding, on average, have statistically significantCASCs
of 7.06 percent which is more than five-fold of the increase in below median firms (c.f.
panel C.1 in Table 4). Similarly, firms with above median protection ratios have CASCs of
5.41 percent, more than double of what is observed for belowmedian firms (c.f. panel C.2
in Table 4).
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Even though these two pieces of evidence seem promising, the small size of the sample
only allows a limited degree of generalization of this finding. Further prove should be
provided in a multivariate framework. To do so, however, it is important to solve the
endogeneity problemwhich arises between the level of insurance chosen and many of the
explanatory variables used to describe a merger deal. This goes beyond the scope of this
project and will be considered in a follow-up paper.
7 Conclusion
Mergers have been under scrutiny by researchers for a long time. While most research
has focused on shareholder value and agency problems related to this question, little has
been done to analyze the situation of debt holders during a merger transaction. This pa-
per is targeted to diminish this gap and bring the literature on bondholder value a step
ahead. It does so by providing an analysis on the following three questions. First, does a
merger transaction impact the default risk of current bondholders? Second, what are the
value implications of mergers on bondholders? Third, can the value of nominal CDS out-
standing lead to a distortion of bondholder incentives comparable to what the literature
on empty creditors suggest?
By measuring abnormal changes in credit default swap spreads around merger an-
nouncements, I am able to circumvent the biggest challenges of the previous literature
and provide insights not only on the overall impact on default risk, but also on the USD
value that has been created or destroyed as a result of the merger.
Merger transactions lead to an increase in the acquirer’s debt default risk in two thirds
of the deals. The average cumulated abnormal spread change in the three day window
around the announcement is 4.95 percent. Based on a basic asset pricing framework, dif-
ferent explanations for why default risk increases are derived. For example, the abnormal
increase in CDS spreads is particularly large for mergers that are done within the same
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industry, where cash flow diversification possibilities are small. Relative to transactions
across industries, which can profit from this co-insurance effect, these deals increase ab-
normal CDS spreads by a three-fold.
Moreover, the risk does not seem to be driven by the characteristics a target contributes
to the merged company, but rather by how a deal is structured. For example, it is not
the fact that the target carries a higher leverage ratio than the acquirer that drives the
increase in CDS spreads, but rather the circumstance that the deal leads to an increase in
the acquirer’s level of leverage.
The close relation of CDS spreads and bond prices offers the possibility to not only
consider changes in default risk, but also to put a price tag on it. Interestingly, the im-
pact of mergers on bondholder wealth is rather moderate, with an average loss of USD
17.3m. What is striking, however, is the comparable change in wealth of current CDS in-
vestors. On average, outstanding CDS contracts gain USD 656m in value as a result of
the merger announcement. The considerable difference between the profits for holders
of CDS contracts and the losses for bondholders points towards a potentially substantial
agency conflict arising in the structuring of the deal.
This paper links the default risk of bonds to changes in their value and provides a
first assessment on how mergers effect these channels. Further work needs to be done,
especially on the last issue of agency conflicts in deal structuring. With the number of deals
in the sample increasing constantly, future research will be able to answer this question in
more detail and scope.
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A Asset volatility calculation
I follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) in calculating the asset volatility of the firms involved in
mergers considered. Based on the model of Merton (1974), a firm’s equity can be thought
of as a call option on the firm’s total assets, with a strike price equal to the book value of
total debt outstanding. The option has a positive value to shareholders in case total assets
are larger than total debt and none otherwise. Using the framework of Black and Scholes
(1973), the call option can be priced similar to the put option in equation 3, by using the
following formula:
VE = VAN(d1)−Xe−rtN(d2) (7)
with
d1 =
ln(VA
X
) + (r + 1
2
σ2A)τ
σA
√
τ
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
τ
Asset volatility (σA) is calculated implicitly, using equation 7 in an iterative process. In
the first step, I use daily market values of a firm’s equity over the past 100 days to estimate
σE . Using this estimate as a first proxy for σA, I calculate the implicit daily market value
of assets by solving equation 7 for VA. In the second step, I use the previous estimates of
VA for the past 100 trading days to update my estimate of σA, i.e. I replace the initial value
for σA (which was σE). The updated asset volatility will then be used again in equation 7
for a next round, to solve and update the values of VA, and so forth. Iterations are done
until the difference between two consecutive estimates of σA is sufficiently small.
The model is specified as follows. X is the most recent available estimate of book debt
as it is defined in Section 5.1. VE is calculated, with data from CRSP, as shares outstanding
multiplied by the daily share price. To have consistency in the length of the contract to the
one from CDS spreads, τ is set equal to five years. Finally, r is the treasury rate of a five
year constant maturity bill.
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Figure 1. Asset Swap Mechanism
This figure presents the mechanism behind the asset swap CDS pricing model. It requires three steps: First, the protection buyer takes
up a risk-free bank loan with nominal Ni at Libor rl. Second, the nominal of the loan is invested in a risky bond with a fixed coupon
ri that is bought at par. The third step involves a hedge against changes in the interest rate level. The protection buyer hence engages
in a swap, paying ri and receiving rfloat. Finally, the price paid for insurance against default, the CDS price, is the difference between
rfloat and rl.
Figure 2. Average abnormal CDS spread change around deal announcements
This figure shows the daily level of cumulative abnormal spreads for the portfolio of acquirers (solid) and targets (dotted) during the
20 day window [-10,+10] around the event. Cumulation of the abnormal spreads starts at t=-10. The portfolios are equal-weighted.
The vertical axis represents the daily level of the cumulative abnormal spread while the horizontal axis is measured in days relative
to the event (t=0). Abnormal spread changes are calculated with the market model. For acquirers, the daily abnormal spread changes
in the event window are +0.41% (t=-1), +2.42% (t=0) and +2.12% (t=1). For targets, the effects were +0.15% (t=-1), -10.10% (t=0) and
-9.36% (t=1).
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Figure 3. Trends in CASCs of subsamples on deal characteristics
Panels (a) and (b) show the daily level of the cumulative abnormal spread for selected sample splits of acquiring firms during the 20
day window [-10,+10] around the event. Cumulation of the abnormal returns starts at t=-10. The vertical axis represents the daily
level of the cumulative abnormal spread while the horizontal axis is measured in days relative to the event (t=0). Abnormal spread
changes are calculated with the market model. Panel (a) shows mergers within (solid) and across industries (dotted). Panel (b) splits
along transactions that increase (solid) or decrease (dotted) the acquirer’s leverage.
(a) Coinsurance (b) ∆Leverage
Figure 4. Trends in CASCs of subsamples on relative ex-ante firm characteristics
Panels (a) and (b) show the daily level of the cumulative abnormal spread for selected sample splits of acquiring firms during the 20
day window [-10,+10] around the event (t=0). Cumulation of the abnormal returns starts at t=-10. The vertical axis represents the daily
level of the cumulative abnormal spread while the horizontal axis is measured in days relative to the event (t=0). Abnormal spread
changes are calculated with the market model. Panel (a) splits the sample in transactions in which the target has a higher asset volatility
than the acquirer ex ante (solid) and vice-versa (dotted). Panel (b) splits the sample in transactions in which the target has a higher
leverage than the acquirer ex ante (solid) and vice-versa (dotted).
(a) Relative Asset Volatility (b) Relative Leverage
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Figure 5. Trends in CASCs of subsamples on levels of CDS protection
Panels (a) and (b) show the daily level of the cumulative abnormal spread for selected sample splits of acquiring firms during the 20
day window [-10,+10] around the event. Cumulation of the abnormal returns starts at t=-10. The vertical axis represents the daily
level of the cumulative abnormal spread while the horizontal axis is measured in days relative to the event (t=0). Abnormal spread
changes are calculated with the market model. Panel (a) splits the sample in deals where the acquirer has an amount of notional CDS
outstanding that is above (solid) or below (dotted) the median. Panel (b) splits the sample in deals where the acquirer has a share of
debt protected by CDS that is above (solid) or below (dotted) the median.
(a) CDS Net Notional (b) CDS Protection Ratio
Table 1. Summary statistics on credit default swaps for the main sample
This table displays summary statistics on the CDS data obtained from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. CDS Net National
is the notional amount of CDS outstanding, netted for counterparty contracts. CDS Net National change is the change in net notional
amount of CDS outstanding in the week of the transaction. CDS Gross National is the notional amount of CDS outstanding. CDS Gross
National change is the change in gross notional amount of CDS outstanding in the week of the transaction. CDSNet Protection Level is the
ratio of CDS Net Notional relative to a firm’s total debt prior to the deal announcement. CDS Gross Protection Level is the ratio of CDS
Gross Notional relative to a firm’s total debt prior to the deal announcement. CDSContracts outstanding is the number of CDS contracts
outstanding for a particular firm. CDS Contract change is the change in CDS contracts outstanding in the week of the transaction. All
change variables have to be interpreted as a lower bound as DTCC only reports levels, but not observed changes. The changes reported
here are therefore the residuals left after netting out total market activity.
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
CDS Net Notional (bn) 1.19 0.95 0.32 5.95 59
CDS Net Notional change 24.20 38.80 0.01 280 59
CDS Gross Notional (bn) 13.30 8.38 2.52 35.30 59
CDS Gross Notional change 17.90 41.70 0.52 235.00 55
CDS Net Protection Level (%) 18.09 21.60 2.30 108.78 59
CDS Gross Protection Level (%) 231.15 325.98 25.34 1’715.28 59
CDS Contracts outstanding 2’114 1’206 326 5’480 59
CDS Contracts changes 37.88 75.57 0 388 59
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the main sample
This table displays summary statistics for acquirer, target and deal specific characteristics. CASC is the cumulative abnormal spread
change of the credit default swap in the three day window [-1,+1] around the announcement (t=0). CASC is derived with the market
model based on the CDX North America IG index. CDS Spread is the average observed CDS spread in the market during the three day
event window. Leverage is defined as the book value of debt relative to total assets (the sum of debt and market value of equity). It is
calculated as of end-of-year for the year prior (pre) and the year of the announcement (post). Put Covenant Ratio is the share of total
debt that is covered by a put covenant. Debt Time to Maturity is the average time to maturity of the value-weighted debt portfolio of
the firm. Asset Volatility is obtained through own calculations. Asset Beta is a value-weighted average of the calculated equity beta for
the period prior to the announcement [-120,-20] and the assumed debt beta of 0.4. CDS Net National is the notional amount of CDS
outstanding, netted for counterparty contracts. CDS Gross National is the notional amount of CDS outstanding. Protection Level is the
ratio of CDS Net Notional relative to a firm’s total debt prior to the deal announcement. CDS Contracts outstanding is the number
of CDS contracts outstanding for a particular firm. CDS Contract changes is the absolute change, and as such a lower bound, of CDS
contracts in the week prior to the announcement. CIC Covenant Ratio is the share of total debt that is covered by a change-in-control
covenant. Total Synergies are defined as the sum of the acquirer and target synergies, valued in millions of USD. They are calculated by
multiplying the cumulative abnormal stock return for an eleven day window [-5,+5] around the announcement with the market value
of equity six days prior to announcement. Cash Deal is a dummy variable equal to one in case the deal is financed with cash only. Stock
Deal is a dummy variable equal to one in case the deal is financed with stock only. Cross-Industry is an indicator variable that compares
the four-digit industry SIC code of the target and the acquirer. It is equal to one in case the codes for the target and the acquirer are
different. Deal Ratio is calculated as the transaction value of the deal (based on the target’s enterprise value) relative to the acquirer’s
pre-runup equity value four weeks prior to the announcement. Share Acquired is defined as the share of total target equity acquired in
the transaction.
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Acquiror
CASC (%) 4.15 13.49 -18.55 79.40 184
CDS Spread (t=0) 113.28 162.71 7.23 1394.72 184
Market Value (m) 53’700 58’300 140 341’000 184
Leverage pre (%) 26.11 20.42 2.20 91.42 184
Leverage post (%) 27.42 21.29 1.82 92.37 155
Put Covenant Ratio (%) 12.41 20.00 0.00 100.00 171
Debt Time to Maturity (y) 8.90 5.30 0.16 40.63 171
Asset Volatility (%) 16.35 9.57 4.72 71.83 153
Asset Beta 0.81 0.24 0.33 1.99 184
Target
CASC (%) -18.51 25.21 -91.47 17.85 25
CDS Spread (t=0) 163.34 183.53 22.92 760.37 25
Market Value (m) 5’635 9’397 2.00 59’400 183
Leverage pre (%) 23.17 25.34 0.00 99.69 174
CIC Covenant Ratio (%) 53.86 45.76 0.00 100.00 83
Debt Time to Maturity (y) 9.75 6.76 0.20 33.00 83
Asset Volatility (%) 21.85 14.61 3.41 63.69 53
Asset Beta 0.99 0.44 0.33 2.20 153
Deal
Total Synergies (m) 383 6’375 -25’200 62’900 154
Cash Deal (%) 41.30 49.37 0.00 100.00 184
Stock Deal (%) 14.81 35.69 0.00 100.00 108
Cross-Industry (%) 75.00 43.42 0.00 100.00 184
Deal Ratio (%) 27.07 43.54 1.03 291.53 184
Share Acquired (%) 96.63 12.25 36.30 100.00 184
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Table 4. Explaining abnormal CDS spread changes: univariate splits
This table displays cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASC) during the three day event window [-1,1] in selected sample splits
according to variables of interest described in Table 2. If not indicated differently, the variables are based on the acquiring firms only.
Panel A centers around differences in deal characteristics, Panel B looks at relative differences between acquirers and targets prior to
the deal and Panel C presents sample splits along proxy variables for empty creditors. Panel A.7 is based on data from targets only.
The t-statistics are calculated by forming equal weighted portfolios according the specified sample splits. Based on the portfolio’s daily
abnormal spread change, standard deviations are calculated over a 100 day window prior to the run-up period [-120,20].
Panel A.1: Deal Ratio Panel A.2: Cross-Industry
CASC (%) t-value n CASC (%) t-value n
Below Median 0.69 1.18 92 Same SIC 8.91 5.88 46
Above Median 8.32 8.83 92 Different SIC 3.49 6.51 138
Difference -7.63 -9.98 Difference 5.42 6.94
Panel A.3: Total Synergies Panel A.4: ∆Leverage
CASC (%) t-value n CASC (%) t-value n
Negative 3.14 4.79 78 Increase 6.14 8.73 74
Positive 6.29 7.25 76 Decrease 1.08 1.29 39
Difference 3.15 4.15 Difference -5.07 -6.78
Panel A.5: Book Debt Panel A.6: Consideration
CASC (%) t-value n CASC t-value n
Increase 5.53 10.96 79 Cash Deals 3.93 5.53 76
Decrease 2.25 0.95 33 Stock Deals -2.24 -0.51 16
Difference -3.28 -3.10 Difference 6.17 4.59
Panel A.7: CIC Covenant Ratio Panel A.8: Put Covenant Ratio
CASC (%) t-value n CASC (%) t-value n
Below 50% 8.34 4.61 41 Below 50% 6.22 10.07 158
Above 50% 5.69 6.05 42 Above 50% -1.12 -0.64 13
Difference -2.65 -1.94 Difference -7.33 -10.43
Panel B.1: Asset Beta Panel B.2: Asset Volatility
CASC (%) t-value n CASC (%) t-value n
Acquirer > Target 8.61 9.46 59 Acquirer > Target 1.29 0.76 14
Acquirer < Target 3.19 3.58 94 Acquirer < Target 6.07 7.15 39
Difference -5.41 -6.02 Difference 4.78 4.46
Panel B.3: Relative Leverage Panel B.4: Time to Maturity
CASC (%) t-value n CASC (%) t-value n
Acquirer > Target 3.98 6.01 98 Acquirer > Target 6.63 4.05 50
Acquirer < Target 6.84 5.89 76 Acquirer < Target 7.97 6.77 32
Difference -2.86 -3.26 Difference -1.34 -0.92
Panel C.1: CDS Net Notional Panel C.2: CDS Protection Level
CASC (%) t-value n CASC (%) t-value n
Below Median 1.36 2.04 30 Below Median 2.56 3.24 30
Above Median 7.06 8.28 29 Above Median 5.41 8.00 29
-5.70 -7.51 -2.85 -3.87
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Table 5. Explaining abnormal CDS spread changes: deal characteristics I
Regressions in this table are based on the full sample. The limited availability of some data may lead to a reduction in sample size in
some settings. The dependent variable in these regressions is the log of the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASC)
over the three day window around the merger announcement [-1,1]. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. ∆Leverage is the
change in percentage points of the acquirer’s leverage during the year of the announcement. Consideration is a dummy variable equal
to one if the consideration offered is cash-only and zero in case consideration is stock-only. After Big Bang is a dummy variable equal
to one for deals that were announced after the introduction of the Big Bang agreement on April 8th 2009. t-values are calculated based
on robust standard errors and reported in brackets, with significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cross-Industry -0.042*
(-1.76)
Total Synergies 0.008**
(2.28)
∆Leverage 0.003*
(1.76)
Consideration 0.096**
(2.23)
CIC Covenant -0.016
(-0.50)
Put Covenant -0.042*
(-1.70)
Deal Ratio 0.044* 0.035* 0.046* 0.046* 0.180* 0.032 0.047*
(1.90) (1.70) (1.75) (1.71) (1.84) (1.26) (1.90)
Acquirer Asset Volatility 0.081 0.068 0.079 0.079 0.033 0.095 0.105
(0.83) (0.72) (0.66) (0.85) (0.36) (0.75) (0.96)
After Big Bang -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 0.015 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.13) (0.91) (-0.14) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 0.008 0.045* 0.010 -0.005 -0.093* 0.028 0.009
(0.39) (1.66) (0.49) (-0.27) (-1.91) (0.80) (0.46)
Observations 153 153 127 148 75 72 143
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.051 0.085 0.074 0.141 -0.028 0.038
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Table 6. Explaining abnormal CDS spread changes: deal characteristics II
Regressions in this table are based on the full sample. The limited availability of some data may lead to a reduction in sample size in
some settings. The dependent variable in these regressions is the log of the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASC)
over the three day window around the merger announcement [-1,1]. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. ∆Leverage is the
change in percentage points of the acquirer’s leverage during the year of the announcement. Consideration is a dummy variable equal
to one if the consideration offered is cash-only and zero in case consideration is stock-only. After Big Bang is a dummy variable equal
to one for deals that were announced after the introduction of the Big Bang agreement on April 8th 2009. t-values are calculated based
on robust standard errors and reported in brackets, with significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cross-Industry -0.056** -0.049* -0.046 -0.086* -0.058**
(-2.02) (-1.84) (-1.36) (-1.80) (-2.10)
Total Synergies 0.008** 0.007** 0.001 0.011** 0.008**
(2.25) (2.25) (0.45) (2.07) (2.41)
∆Leverage 0.003* 0.004** 0.003 0.002
(1.73) (2.07) (1.39) (1.53)
Consideration 0.048
(1.45)
CIC Covenant 0.042
(1.12)
Put Covenant -0.053*
(-1.92)
Deal Ratio 0.038* 0.038 0.078 0.043 0.046
(1.68) (1.54) (0.84) (1.47) (1.65)
Acquirer Asset Volatility 0.040 0.039 -0.130 0.026 0.050
(0.34) (0.34) (-1.07) (0.14) (0.37)
After Big Bang -0.005 0.012 0.016 0.025 0.013
(-0.27) (0.58) (1.34) (0.60) (0.65)
Constant 0.062* 0.044 0.002 0.050 0.057*
(1.94) (1.46) (0.03) (1.18) (1.71)
Observations 127 126 66 64 117
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.163 0.321 0.171 0.201
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Table 7. Explaining abnormal CDS spread changes: relative characteristics
Regressions in this table are based on the full sample. The limited availability of some data may lead to a reduction in sample size in
some settings. The dependent variable in these regressions is the log of the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal spread changes (CASC)
over the three day window around the merger announcement [-1,1]. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. Higher Target
Leverage is a dummy variable equal to one if the target’s leverage level prior to the deal announcement is higher than the acquirer’s and 0
otherwise. Longer Target Maturity is a dummy variable equal to one if the target’s debt time to maturity is longer than the acquirer’s and
0 otherwise. Higher Target Asset Volatility is a dummy variable equal to one if the target’s asset volatility prior to the deal announcement
is higher than the acquirer’s and 0 otherwise. Higher Target Asset Beta is a dummy variable equal to one if the target’s asset beta prior
to the deal announcement is higher than the acquirer’s and 0 otherwise. ∆Leverage is the change in percentage points of the acquirer’s
leverage during the year of the announcement. After Big Bang is a dummy variable equal to one for deals that were announced after
the introduction of the Big Bang agreement on April 8th 2009. t-values are calculated based on robust standard errors and reported in
brackets, with significance levels: * 0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Higher Target Leverage 0.016 0.007
(0.87) (0.33)
Longer Target Duration 0.013 -0.002
(0.39) (-0.05)
Higher Target Asset Beta -0.024 -0.029
(-1.17) (-1.50)
Higher Target Asset Volatility 0.038 0.035
(1.48) (1.20)
Cross-Industry -0.047* -0.063 -0.046* -0.033
(-1.66) (-1.37) (-1.76) (-1.00)
Total Synergies 0.008** 0.011** 0.008** 0.005
(2.28) (2.21) (2.36) (1.21)
∆Leverage 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.000
(1.76) (0.61) (1.82) (0.15)
Deal Ratio 0.046* 0.037 0.045* 0.016 0.036 0.040 0.033 0.019
(1.70) (1.38) (1.67) (0.77) (1.44) (1.39) (1.45) (0.85)
Acquirer Asset Volatility 0.052 0.111 0.087 -0.048 0.022 0.009 0.013 -0.009
(0.55) (0.85) (0.70) (-0.36) (0.18) (0.05) (0.12) (-0.06)
After Big Bang -0.002 0.011 -0.005 0.006 0.014 0.025 0.016 0.004
(-0.10) (0.36) (-0.25) (0.22) (0.65) (0.60) (0.78) (0.12)
Constant 0.006 0.001 0.026 0.002 0.042 0.059 0.064* 0.026
(0.28) (0.02) (1.07) (0.07) (1.32) (0.94) (1.80) (0.75)
Observations 145 70 126 53 125 62 125 50
Adjusted R-squared 0.028 -0.019 0.030 -0.034 0.158 0.126 0.174 -0.034
154
Part III: Curriculum Vitae
Christoph Thomas Wenk Bernasconi April 2013
Date of Birth 5th October 1981
Citizenship Swiss
Research Corporate Governance, Mergers & Acquisitions, Two-sided markets, Peer-to-peer lending
Teaching Corporate Finance, Valuation, Mergers & Acquisitions, Empirical Corporate Finance
Education University of Zurich, Switzerland
PhD Program in Finance January 2009 – April 2013
• Advisors: Professor Dr. Alexander F. Wagner, Professor Dr. Kjell G. Nyborg
• Title: Essays in Empirical Corporate Finance
• Grade: Summa Cum Laude
• Advanced Coursework:
The Econometrics of Auctions, Prof. Robert Porter, 2010
Empirical Strategies, Prof. Joshua Angrist, 2009
Empirical Corporate Finance, Prof. Professor Alexander Ljungqvist, 2009
Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland
Swiss Program for Beginning Doctoral Students January 2008 – February 2009
• Econometrics
Proff. Bo Honore´ and Mark Watson
• Microeconomics
Proff. M. Dewatripont, J. Moore, J-C. Rochet, K. Schmidt
• Macroeconomics
Proff. J. Gal´ı, R. King, S. Rebelo
University of Zurich, Switzerland
Master of Arts in Business Administration August 2005 – October 2007
• Major: Financial Economics
• Master Thesis: The determinants of lending - Empirical Evidence from Prosper.com
Supervisors: Prof. E. Fehr and Dr. C. Zehnder
• Grade: Magna Cum Laude
Bachelor of Arts in Banking and Finance October 2003 – July 2005
• Bachelor Thesis: An efficient investment portfolio for the Swiss electricity supply sector
Supervisor: Prof. T. Hens, Dr. R. Madlener
159
